The Beliefs of Lancaster County Ministers:

A Report on PROJECT RELIC

By John Tannehill
Department of Political Science
Millersville State College

Train up a child in the way he should go:
and when he is old, he will not depart from it.
Proverbs 22:6

The Lancaster City-County Human Relations Commission

900 East King St.
Lancaster, Pa 17602

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INTRODUCTION

In the winter of 1977 the Lancaster City-County Human Relations Commission (then Committee) voted to apply to the Comprehensive Education Training Act (CETA) program for a grant to study the attitudes of Lancaster County ministers towards Blacks, Hispanics and Jews. The Commission believed that along with teachers and parents, ministers are among the prime influences in the shaping of attitudes and beliefs of both children and the community. Inasmuch as countering prejudice is among the multi-charges of the Commission, it was felt that this type of information would be a valuable tool in mobilizing the Lancaster clergy in support of human relations efforts.

The grant was approved by CETA in the Spring of 1977. Dr. Jack Fischel, Professor of History at Millersville State College and a member of the Human Relations Commission board, along with Patrick Kenney, Jr., Executive Director of the Human Relations Commission, were appointed by the Human Relations Commission to oversee the project. Dr. Fischel proceeded to employ a project director and eight interviewers. The Project Director was given full authority to devise a plan to implement the study and to report on its progress at the monthly board meetings of the Human Relations Commission.

Under the guidance of its director, Howard Kenig, Project Relic ("Religion in Lancaster" as the project was called) modelled many of its procedures after the seminal classic by Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (Harper and Row, N.Y., 1966).

The sample in Project Relic included 149 ministers. The questionnaire was created by Howard Kenig and Jack Fischel. The interviews and collation of data was coordinated by Howard Kenig who spent more than a year and a half testing and measuring the conclusions drawn from the data. Everyone concerned with the project appreciated the sensitivity and possible controversial nature of the study and much is owed to Kenig for his time and patience in seeing to it that hasty conclusions were not drawn from the accumulated information.

In March of 1980, Professor Jack R. Fischel and Professor John Tannehill of the Millersville State College Political Science Department completed the writing entitled, "Report on Religion in Lancaster County," the Human Relations Commission board approved the report, and it was released to the public. At the time of its release, Professor Tannehill indicated to the Human Relations Commission board that additional information could still be gleaned from the data. Professor Tannehill convinced the board that with added time a more refined document--less susceptible to error and criticism, and richer in detail--would be forthcoming.

The Human Relations Commission board approved the request and what follows is the product of that additional labor. However, because of its detail and use of technical language, the reader is urged to begin the reading of the report by starting with the author's summary at the end of Chapter II and the conclusions at the ends of Chapters IV - VI.

Project Relic owes a great deal to those who nurtured it from its beginning in 1977 to its conclusion in the form of this final report. Special thanks are due to the County Commissioners,

Patrick Kenney, the Human Relation Commission board for their patience and support, and to Howard Kenig and the interviewers, Susan L. Doyle, Paul S. Hilton, Tanya S. Horn, Thomas E. Laine, Cynthia F. Lewis, Leona Wagner, Barbara Weidinger, Patricia Hood and Brenda Redrow, for their dedication and commitment to the project.

Jack R. Fischel
April 5, 1982

I. THE SETTING, THE SAMPLE, AND THE PROBLEM

The Setting. *This report is based on a sample of church ministers from Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, for Project Relic (Religion in Lancaster County). Lancaster offers a useful, although perhaps unusual, setting for a study of this type. Christianity has been strong since the first settlements in the early 18th century and it still is. The County has many strongly supported churches, which are important centers for people in the different communities and rural areas. Different denominations and independent churches exist in profusion, many of them more religiously conservative than is true at the national level.*

Part of the reason for this is that Lancaster is an old area and tradition has a greater impact than in most parts of the country. Every wave of immigrants to America has left its mark on the County, although perhaps with diminishing effects as Lancaster moved from a major center for early trade and manufacturing and an important stopping point in the migration westward to a more retiring role in national and Pennsylvanian affairs. These immigrants, from the early German-Swiss Mennonites and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians on down, brought with them their religious beliefs and many have remained strong in faith since their coming. The Amish, sacrificing present day comforts and maintaining a separation from modern society, personify this most forcefully, but it seems typical of other Christian groups in the County as well. The results are an area characterized by great religious pluralism, affected by the "melting pot" influences of 19th century revivalism and 20th century ecumenicalism, but with many preserving loyalties to separate religious traditions. While there has been great heterogeneity within Protestant Christianity, neither the Catholic nor Jewish faiths constitute as large a proportion of Lancaster's population as they do elsewhere.

Racially, on the other hand, Lancaster County has tended to be homogeneous. While Blacks have lived in the County since the first part of the 18th century and some areas have Black communities with deep historical roots, their numbers in the general population have been small. Preliminary figures from the 1980 Census report there are 6,972 Blacks in the County -- 1.9% of the population.[1] *They are a more visible and important group in Lancaster where they make up 9.2% in a population of 54,725.*

Hispanics, largely from Puerto Rico, but also from various Latin American countries, have recently become the largest minority group in Lancaster. According to the 1980 figures, there are now 9,104 in the County, 2.5% of the population. They are also concentrated in the City, where they make up 12.0%. Their numbers have increased rapidly since 1970, by 63% in the County and by 161% in the City. The respective growth rates for Blacks have been more modest -- 17% and 18%. Other minority groups are 2.2% of the County population, making the total proportion of minorities 6.6%. This is less than national averages; so the Lancaster area is more White than most.

The Sample. *This study is based on interviews with 149 clergymen conducted in late 1977 and early 1978. A census of churches in Lancaster County was made and a subset of these was selected randomly. About 20% of the total churches are represented in the final data. At each church, one*

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1 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Advance Reports, 1980 Census of Population and Housing, PHC80-V-40, p. 21. The Lancaster County population figure is 362,346.

minister was interviewed. This sampling procedure means generalizations from the findings of this report must technically be made to churches, not to the total population of ministers or to church members in the County. Larger churches, with several ministers on the staff, will be underrepresented in proportion to total ministers. These churches are more likely to belong to mainline denominations and to be located in the City. On the other hand smaller churches which have several, part-time pastors, as many Mennonite churches do, will also be underrepresented, compared to the total number of Lancaster ministers. These reservations are probably not serious; consequently, this report will normally refer to a "sample of ministers", although in fact it is a sample of churches.

However, it is clear that the sample cannot be taken as representative of church members or the total population of Lancaster County. One minister may be on the staff of a church with thousands of members and another have a chapel with less than a hundred members, yet each is weighted as equal in the sample. The procedure, in this light, skews the sample toward smaller churches, compared to the population of church members. Generally, this is likely to make the sample more conservative religiously than the County is as a whole. This is probably an advantage for this particular study, but it means generalizing from the distributions given in this report to Lancaster generally is very doubtful. This is also not a serious defect, if the above cautions are kept in mind. Previous studies in different fields indicate that taking the views of professionals or highly involved people as representative of the common members of groups is frequently inaccurate. The respondents are ministers and the way they responded to questions may not be typical of their parishoners, if for no other reason than the ministers have specialized training.

Of course, treating the sample as representative of Christians nationally is not possible. In a national sample taken in 1976, Roman Catholic were 28%;[2] *in the Relic data, they are 5%. Baptists were 21% and in Relic, 8%. Methodists were 11% nationally and 15% in this survey. Some groups, like the Mennonites, constitute a much larger portion in Relic --11% versus perhaps a few in a national sample. (See Appendix B for a complete listing of the denominations in the sample.) While it would clearly be foolish to take the distributions of religious beliefs and social attitudes reported here as typical of Christians generally, it is likely that relations found in the data will be more representative, at least of ministers in other areas similar to Lancaster County.*

In any case, the data in Relic is of interest intrinsically, reflecting a variety of responses to questions about ministers' Christian beliefs and about their attitudes toward Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews.[3]

The Social Impact of Religion. *Religion is a pervasive factor in social life. Even modern nations with official policies of atheism -- the Communist countries -- have found it impossible to stamp out religion. Such a persistent aspect of societies seems likely to have an impact on other areas of social life.*

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2 Gallup Opinion Index, Report 145.

3 The questionnaire for Relic was prepared by the project director, Howard Kenig. I was not involved in the project at that time, so this investigation was somewhat like secondary analysis, trying to use the questions to measure things I felt were most important, but without the ability to control what was asked. The results show that many interesting aspects of the ministers' beliefs were covered in the questionnaire.

A central concern of this study is the impact of religion on ethnic relations. This concern is an empirical one -- what is the actual effect of religion on attitudes toward ethnic groups --, but lurking behind it is a normative question -- is this effect beneficial, does it lead to improved ethnic relations? Readers of this report will, of course, form their own judgements on this question.

It is certainly easy to cite the idea of "the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God" and to expect that those Christians who are most religious should be less prejudiced toward those different from themselves: after all, "by their fruits ye shall know them." [4] *These feelings seem particularly strong concerning ministers in the United States. Both the Calvinist and pietist strains in American Christianity set high expectations for ministers as moral leaders who should be examples for the laity, who should transcend what might be accepted as normal human reactions in others.*

However, a broader view makes it clear that these expectations may not be born out in fact. Religious communalism has been an important source of ethnic conflict. Many lives have been lost in clashes between Moslems and Hindus on the Indian subcontinent, both before and since the partition of that area. The Arab-Israeli struggle has a basis in religion, as well as in language and culture. Civil war between Christians and Moslems has torn Lebanon apart. In Europe, religious wars reached their peak after the Reformation, but Northern Ireland shows that sectarian hatred can still claim many lives and render an area almost ungovernable. In early American history, religious persecution seemed a more common impulse than tolerance. Christianity was used to justify slavery and racism, although it was also an important element in the abolitionist movement. Certainly history shows the impact of religion on intergroup relations is not always benign. It is also true that the principle of the brotherhood of man, which sounds like the kind of phrase which would be universally accepted, at least in the abstract, does have its critics among ministers in this country. Dr. Carl McIntire, a Presbyterian fundamentalist, has written:

> *Jesus Christ repudiated the popular doctrine that is on the lips of thousands of preachers today -- the universal Fatherhood of God. There is no such doctrine taught in the Bible. Neither does its corollary, the brotherhood of man, exist in the Bible.*[5]

Ethnocentrism and Pluralistic Societies. *William Graham Sumner believed ethnocentrism was the normal state of "primitive society." This society was organized around the "we-group" versus the "others-groups."*

> *Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn.*

Ethnocentrism meant to Sumner that "one's own group is the center of everything" and all other groups are judged by its standards -- judged and, because they are different, found wanting.[6]

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4 Matthew 7:20.

5 Quoted in Erling Jorstad, The Politics of Doomsday: Fundamentalists of the Far Right (Nashville: Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1970), pp. 94-95.

6 William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1940 [1906], pp. 12-13).

Whether ethnocentrism springs from human nature or not can be debated, but history shows ethnic hostility and intergroup violence are common. Ethnocentrism is even embedded in our language. The Philistines and Vandals survive linguistically long after they disappeared as groups. The Greeks and Romans invented the term barbarians for those foreign to their culture. Since then, a rich vocabulary of ethnic slurs has been provided for almost every group.

Robin M. Williams, Jr., says ethnocentrism is characterized by the following feelings towards One's Own Group (Oog):

1. *A belief in the unique value of Oog.*
2. *Satisfaction with membership in Oog.*
3. *Solidarity, loyalty, or cooperation with regard to Oog.*
4. *Preference for association with members of Oog.*
5. *Belief in the rightness of Oog's relationships with other groups.*

Often accompanying these positive feelings are:

1. *Judging other groups by Oog's standards.*
2. *Belief that Oog is superior to other groups, in all ways or in some ways.*
3. *Ignorance of other groups.*
4. *Lack of interest in other groups.*
5. *Hostility towards other groups.*[7]

Ethnocentrism seems to start with our common need for a positive identification with a group, a need for trust and emotional support from others. This requires giving in return a loyalty to the group and a willingness to accept the predominant opinions and standards of conduct in the group. Some people may identify with many groups, some with only one. In the latter case, the group can become a dominating force for the individual.

The precise point where positive group identification turns into ethnocentrism may be difficult to judge, but it is clear that intergroup relations can become a vicious cycle of perceived threat and increasingly hostile feelings between groups, each pointing to the other's hostility as justification for their own, until it is true that they become dangerous to each other and violence may start. Certainly this escalation does not always occur, since societies are normally able to control violence. Still the process may have important effects, preventing members of different groups from cooperating, or even leading to the domination of one group, especially a minority, by the other. In this case, important avenues of social access -- to jobs, housing, education -- may be blocked off for the minority, denying to its members much of what is valued in life.

In a pluralistic society such as the United States, one made up of many different racial, religious, linguistic, and cultural groups, ethnocentrism is potentially dangerous. Some minorities seem to prefer not being totally assimilated to the predominant American culture. They become targets of criticism because of their different beliefs or languages or life styles, their "folkways." They may become targets for much worse things.

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7 Robin M. Williams, Jr., Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in American Communities (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 22.

Frequently, ethnocentrism is viewed as a problem of one group misunderstanding another and so better information is prescribed as the solution. In many cases, misunderstanding is common, but it is possible to understand quite well and still hate, perhaps even to be more fearful, because we find our own beliefs threatened by the other group.

In a pluralistic society, tolerance is one of the chief civic virtues.[8] *Whether ethnocentrism is "natural" or not, intergroup friction will generate hostilities. To counter this, more than understanding is required. Members of a pluralistic society need to value tolerance and feel a moral committment to social arrangements that provide fair and equitable treatment for all groups.*

Undoubtedly, if asked, most Americans will agree that they value tolerance. But we seem to have a considerable ability to accept the principle, but to make exceptions for those we dislike. The extension of tolerance and fair treatment to Blacks has waited for many years, creating a major blot on our moral history.

Ethnic attitudes -- how we view other groups different from our own -- is the focus for this study. The opinions of ministers are especially interesting because of their positions in the institutions most specifically concerned with values in our society. They are looked to for ethical, as well as religious, leadership. Their beliefs can be regarded as more than personal opinions. Project Relic found Lancaster ministers' ethnic attitudes varied from positive to the belief that Blacks are under the "curse of Ham." [9]

The report will study the relations of different Protestant denominations and of various Christian beliefs to ethnic attitudes, trying to isolate the causes of differing beliefs about Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews.

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8 Robert Paul Wolff argues tolerance is "*the* virtue of modern pluralist democracy" (italics added). "Beyond Tolerance" in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 4.

9 Genesis 9: 20-27.

II. ETHNIC ATTITUDES AND NEGATIVE BELIEFS

Ethnic Attitudes. *This is a study of ethnic or intergroup attitudes. For the purposes of this report, an ethnic attitude is a psychological orientation of a person toward ethnic groups, that is, toward groups whose members share basic, distinctive characteristics, whether race, religion, national origin, language, or culture.*[1] *These group characteristics are difficult, if not impossible, to change -- being Black is not like being a teenager, being Hispanic is not like being a member of a Masonic Lodge, and being Jewish is not like being in the working class. People are born into these ethnic groups and throughout history, they have been treated -- and mistreated -- as members of these groups.*

Ethnic attitudes might be very complex or very simple. Most people in a sample might be aware of a particular image of an ethnic group or they might hold many different images. These images could be unfavorable or favorable, reflecting contempt or admiration for a group, or they could be complex enough to reflect both negative and positive attitudes.

However, this study focuses on only one type of ethnic attitude -- the willingness of ministers in Lancaster County to accept, or reject, a certain negative image of each of three groups --Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews. There is no information about these three groups in the survey, only about the attitudes of others toward them.

Negative Ethnic Beliefs. *The data collected by Project Relic provides information on the extent that clergymen in the sample agree with a number of statements about Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews.*[2] *These statements were largely derived from traditional stereotypes of Blacks and Jews, ones which date back into nineteenth century America and before. These stereotypes have become the most widely known type of ethnic attitude and have been studied by social scientists using questionnaires for about fifty years.*[3] *Three statements about each group were used to measure negative beliefs. The statements were selected using Guttman scaling technique (see Appendix A). For attitudes toward Blacks, the respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements. (1) "Many Blacks do not place much value on keeping up the appearance of their houses or yards." (2) "Many Blacks are not dependable employees." (3) "Many Blacks have inferior intelligence as compared to Whites." These were based on the traditional image of the Black as shiftless, irresponsible, ignorant, intellectually inferior. Since the statements form a cumulative scale in this sample, they can be treated as measuring a single attitude, the extent to which a minister accepts, or rejects, this traditional negative stereotype.*

Most of the same statements were also asked about Hispanics, substituting "Spanish-speaking people" for "Blacks". The same three statements also scaled for Hispanics. The traditional Black

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1 John Harding, et al., "Prejudice and Ethnic Relations," in The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2d ed.; ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, V (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 3.

2 See Appendix A for a more detailed and technical discussion of these statements and the scaling technique used to measure negative ethnic beliefs.

3 See, for instance, Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954), pp. 192-200 on these stereotypes and research about them.

stereotype seems to have been transferred to Hispanics. Probably this process has been aided by the fact that some Hispanics have Negroid racial characteristics and the fact that Hispanics must often live in close proximity to Blacks.

The statements about Jews used in this study are quite different from those about Blacks or Hispanics. They derive from a different stereotype, which has a long European, as well as American, tradition behind it -- the Jew as materialistic, shrewd, grasping, mercenary. The following statements formed a cumulative scale, measuring attitudes toward Jews. (1) "Many Jews tend to be more successful in business and finance than non-Jews." (2) "Jewish businessmen control an unusually large portion of the financial resources of the United States." (3) "Many Jews tend to be more materialistic in their personal goals and values than non-Jews."[4]

These three scales, which provide the basis for most of the following analysis, are frequently referred to in this study as "negative beliefs" about Blacks, Hispanics, or Jews. The reason for this is that the phrase "negative beliefs" seems the most straight-forward, least misleading one for what is being measured. "Stereotype," on the other hand, has been used in somewhat different ways by different investigators and commentators for sixty years. This makes the concept more susceptible to misunderstanding.

Part of the problem with "stereotype" is that it is used more frequently as something to be condemned morally. This has given the term considerable social utility as a tool to teach better intergroup relations, but because of this usage, it has become value-laden. It evokes an automatic moral response from most people. This does not seem appropriate in a report meant to present an objective analysis of the Relic data.

Another difficulty with stereotypes seems inherent in the nature of what is being studied: they are quasi-factual. Stereotypes are stated in the form of empirical generalizations and therefore appear to be claims about facts. They are assumed to be false claims. So a stereotype says members of an ethnic group are like this or that, but the factual claims are taken to be inaccurate. However, when the methods used to measure stereotypes are examined, it is clear that the factual (or contrafactual) aspect of this conception is almost entirely ignored and that stereotyping is treated as a type of attitude, a belief, based only on a respondent's answers to certain questions. This approach is certainly understandable, since it would be very expensive to prove the belief inaccurate. The danger is that "stereotype," if it is understood to involve inaccurate generalizations, may mislead the reader into thinking that this inaccuracy is proven when it is only assumed.

Walter Lippmann's original conception of stereotype was basically "images already in our mind [sic]."[5] *While he was concerned with the divergence of stereotype and reality, this was because he believed the stereotype led us to misperceive reality, to see what it indicated we should see, and to ignore the parts of reality which did not fit with it. For example, a Jewish stereotype will make a person note a Jew who fits his image; however, a Jew who does not would be ignored or thought of as not really being Jewish. In this way, stereotypes perpetuate themselves and make coping with*

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4 The validity of these scales is discussed in Appendix A.

5 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 116. The original edition of this book was published in 1922. Lippmann treated stereotypes very broadly, not restricting them to images of ethnic groups.

reality much easier, but at the expense of open-mindedness, of mental flexibility and growth, of the ability to learn. Probably stereotypes are intellectually necessary. No one can demand scientific proof for every belief he holds about reality. Science requires extreme specialization in limited aspects of the real world. However, when stereotypes are applied to ethnic groups, they can deprive members of these groups of economic opportunities, access to social institutions, basic civil rights, and fair political consideration of their needs. Stereotyping is very human and understandable, given the limitations of our minds, but when it helps deprive others of just treatment, it should be morally opposed.

Lippmann assumed that stereotypes are inaccurate, not because there was proof a given generalization was false, but because by their nature, these "pictures in our heads" must be over-simplified. Even statistically accurate generalizations could be the basis for stereotypes. For instance, if this report leads you to believe that conservative and fundamentalist ministers are bigots or even that they strongly stereotype ethnic groups, it will have contributed to building or re-enforcing a stereotype. The generalization that conservative and fundamentalist ministers in Lancaster County hold mildly negative beliefs about Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews somewhat more frequently than mainline ministers is certainly a more accurate statement, but even it must be understood that with the implicit statistical qualification that many of these ministers do not show evidence of holding these beliefs. Since it is easier, however, to remember "fundies are bigots" than all the qualifications, there is a danger that this report could contribute to stereotyping, rather than reduce it.

Do the statements which were selected for this study through Guttman scaling measure stereotypes? They were based on traditional stereotypes, but did they, in fact, get at the images in the minds of the respondents? Two different interpretations seem possible.

The first interpretation would be that the respondents approached the questions as ones of fact and tried to answer them, as best they could, from the standpoint of neutral observers. They can be thought of as imperfect experts. Then showing a latent stereotype exists would depend on showing some systematic deviation from the truth, that is, on showing that the statements asked about are false. This approach does create a difficulty for some of the statements. For example, in the Jewish scale, the first statement ("Many Jews tend to be more successful in business and finance than non-Jews") is probably both true about business and false about finance. The second statement about "control" of "an unusually large portion" of finance in the U.S. is almost certainly still false, since Jews were discriminated against in banking.[6] *The third statement about Jews being "more materialistic" probably depends on how "materialistic" is defined and measured: the term seems vague enough that an investigator could prove it either true or false. If by definition stereotypes depend on the generalizations being clearly inaccurate, then these statements are less than perfect. Using a somewhat different approach, Gordon W. Allport deals with this problem of the truth or falsity of generalizations by defining a stereotype as "an exaggerated belief." If a person agrees with an unqualified statement like "all Blacks are ignorant," then it is clear we are dealing with a stereotype. Unfortunately, this type of statement is more likely to measure a respondent's sophistication about generalizations than the images in his mind, since any statement that says all members of a group*

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6 See Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), pp. 12-13.

have a characteristic is false (unless it is a defining characteristic of that group). In this survey of ministers, who are generally more sophisticated and educated, it seems likely that only a few would have agreed to clearly exaggerated statements of this sort. It is certainly true the statements used are too qualified to be clear exaggerations: "many . . . as compared to Whites" or "many . . . tend to be," not "all." In sum, this first interpretation might lead to the conclusion that this survey shows little about real stereotyping or at least that the results require some serious reservations.

The second interpretation of the statements used in the scales would be that they should be regarded as similar to Rorschach ink blot tests. They are almost never specified enough to be true or false. Most statements say "many . . . " and the respondent could interpret this to mean a large proportion or nearly all. If so, the statement is probably false. The respondent might interpret "many" as more than a few, but not necessarily a large percentage. Under this interpretation, almost any statement about a group would probably be true, even seemingly contradictory ones: many of them are smart, many are dumb. Another example of the importance of the interpretation supplied by the respondent is the statement: "Many Blacks do not place much value on keeping up the appearance of their houses or yards." "Many" depends on what it is compared to, just as a large mouse is quite different in size than a large elephant. Since two previous questions explicitly stated "compared to Whites," this comparison will almost certainly be used. How it is used will determine whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the question -- unless he simply rejects it as a stereotype without further thought, as many probably did. If the image of Whites that comes to mind is a White, middle class suburb and the image of Blacks is a decaying slum, then the respondent should agree and the measure would indicate stereotyping. If the comparison is a more careful and sympathetic one -- poor, Black renters in the ghetto compared to poor, White renters in the ghetto or Black, middle class houses to White, middle class houses -- , then he will reject it and he would be measured as not stereotyping. The ambiguity, the lack of precise clarification of short statements of the type used in this survey, is the means to force a respondent to project his ethnic images on the questions.[7] He must supply his own understanding of questions to respond and his ethnic attitudes are reflected in the understanding he supplies.

This interpretation would explain the otherwise curious fact that some true generalizations correlate with more obviously stereotypical statements. Selznick and Steinberg asked if on average Jews have more money than most people. Even though the statement is true, it was rejected more often by the least anti-Semitic group in their sample and accepted more by those most anti-Semitic.[8] This indicates that the notion that stereotyping is believing in inaccurate generalizations about groups and that those who stereotype are misinformed while those who do not are simply better informed in not correct.

In discussing stereotyping, Lippmann said "moral codes assume a particular view of the facts."[9]

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7 Of course, this ambiguity must be of the proper type. If it results in quite a few answering on the basis of a different basic attitude, then the question will not scale.

8 The Tenacity of Prejudice, pp. 6-7, 28.

9 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 123.

He believed that stereotypes are rooted in moral views. Stereotypes of ethnic groups then reflect our moral judgement of those groups and our feelings about how it is proper for society to deal with them. Stereotypes are values masquerading as facts, or more precisely values exert a powerful, largely unconscious, influence over stereotypes, over beliefs about the world and the groups of people who inhabit it.

What values would affect a respondent's choice to accept or reject a statement about an ethnic group? Probably most identified the more negative statements as stereotypes and rejected them because they felt stereotypes were bad. This would indicate that, at least among this sample of ministers, the movement to morally stigmatize ethnic stereotypes has achieved considerable success. For this reason, some were probably unwilling to accept any generalizations concerning these vulnerable groups. Statements which were mild enough, qualified enough so that respondents might have been willing to accept them about the rich or Americans generally were perhaps rejected simply because they were about Blacks, Hispanics, or Jews. This sympathy for underdogs, for minority groups, shows up in the fact that larger percentages in the sample accepted positive statements about these groups than negative ones. It seems very likely that values not only of justice and equality, but also compassion. brotherly love, care for those who have suffered historically because of their minority status, were engaged by the questions used in the scales of negative beliefs.

This interpretation of the scales does not rule out the possibility that at least some respondents in the sample treated the questions as simple factual ones, accepting those they believed objectively true, rejecting those they thought objectively false, and choosing "don't know" when they felt they could not make a reasonable guess. After all, stereotypes are beliefs and those who hold them think they are objectively true. Because these statements about ethnic groups were phrased in a milder form than is normally used to measure stereotypes, it is also possible some respondents agreed with a few of them even though they felt no hostility, contempt, or disapproval toward the group. What impact would this hypothesized set or respondents, who are assumed to be quite unprejudiced but happen to believe in some of these statements, have on the scales used in this study?

First, the impact would depend on how large this set might be. If the number is small, then statistics can handle the problem easily. No measure is perfect and some errors will always be present. This is recognized even in the natural sciences where measurements are usually much more precise than in the social sciences. Of course, the larger the measurement error, the harder it will be to find relations in the data. As error increases, correlations will get smaller until they are no longer statistically significant.

Second, no doubt some questions in this survey had larger proportions of respondents answering simply on the grounds of neutral beliefs and other questions had smaller proportions. Guttman scaling was used to eliminate those questions where this proportion was too large for useful analysis. The statements measuring the same attitude with the least error were those that would scale best.

Finally, if this set of respondents is large, it should show up most clearly among those who scored 1 on the scales. These respondents passed only one question, normally the mildest one. In the cases of the Black and Hispanic scales, they may have only answered "don't know" on this

question. Intuitively, it would not have been too surprising to find this group about the same as those who scored 0 on the scale. However, an examination of the tables presented later in this study shows this group fits in a sensible way. Some in the sample who scored 1 may have been tricked into passing a question even though they have no negative feelings about the ethnic group, but on the average, those at 1 share characteristics more similar to those who scored higher on the scales than do those at 0.

This indicates that although responses to these quasi-factual statements are, in one sense, beliefs, there is an evaluative element which cannot be ignored. The statements provide a way of measuring how negative a respondent's evaluation of a particular ethnic group is. This result fits with previous conclusions about this type of question: "most measures of ethnic attitudes are . . . strongly saturated with the general favorability-unfavorability dimension . . . "[10] *It seems that it is difficult to construct questions about ethnic groups which measure attitudes other than the way people's general orientations vary from favorable to unfavorable.*

According to this interpretation, the scales which resulted from using the Guttman technique can be best understood as measuring how negative is a respondent's beliefs about a group. If someone scores 3, he is among those with the most negative beliefs in the sample; if he scores 0, he is among those with the least negative beliefs.

It is true that those who agreed only that Jews are more successful in business and finance or those who only refused to reject the notion that Blacks or Hispanics place less value on the appearance of their houses or yards have, at best, very mildly negative beliefs. However, the negative dimension does not depend on just these statements, but on the entire scale. The negative image of these groups is clearer in the statements that Jews control more financial resources in the U.S. or that they are more materialistic and that Blacks or Hispanics are intellectually inferior to Whites or are not dependable employees. The fact that the questions scaled indicates they measure the same attitude.

It may appear that all the questions in these scales are too mildly negative to measure real stereotyping and certainly if this survey had been conducted with a less sophisticated sample during the 1930's, it would have been much better to use more strongly negative statements, such as "all Blacks are ignorant" or "all Jews are sly and grasping." However, in this sample, the question about inferior intelligence was as strong a question as could reasonably be used for Blacks and Hispanics. As it was, only two people strongly agreed with this statement about each group and only 10½% of the sample agreed somewhat or strongly. It would have been useful to have one stronger statement about Jews -- perhaps "Jews are less honest in business than non-Jews" -- if it had been agreed to by 10% to 15% of the sample and if it had scaled with the other questions.

Based on these considerations and on working with the ethnic scales for an extended period of time, I believe that the best interpretation of what they measure is mildly negative beliefs about each ethnic group. The questions in each scale were derived from traditional stereotypes, but normally more strongly negative questions are used to measure stereotyping. Hopefully, then, "negative beliefs" is less likely to be misinterpreted than "stereotypes."

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10 John Harding, et al., "Prejudice and Ethnic Relations," p. 13.

"Negative beliefs" should also be less misleading than the common understanding of stereotypes as inaccurate generalizations. These beliefs are negative, regardless of whether they are true or false. "That man is a drunk" is a negative belief, whether or not he habitually drinks and has withdrawal symptoms when alcohol is not available. "Many German Nazis were more vicious during World War II than German Jews" is a negative belief about Nazis even though it is true. If a person feels that some kernel of truth "explains" (really meaning "morally justifies") the holding of a negative belief, then that is his personal moral judgement. However, he should also take into account the fact that negative beliefs about ethnic groups, regardless of their truth or falsity, tend to render judgments on categories of people because of their birth, not their personal values or decisions. And negative beliefs, whether based on a kernel of truth or not, also help create and sustain intergroup tensions and hostility, a clear danger to the value of tolerance in a pluralistic society. It is quite possible that most members of a minority may choose to follow customs or moral codes which differ from those of the majority. This may lead to negative beliefs among the majority, especially among those who have not tried to understand the minority culture, but the value of tolerance should warn us that they may have a perfect right to be different. (Obviously, considered moral judgments are likely to differ depending on whether the deviant behavior involves, for example, wearing strange clothing or conscientious objection to military service or polygamy or human sacrifice.)

"Negative ethnic beliefs" is used in this study to distinguish what is measured from other ethnic attitudes. Certainly there is no evidence in this survey showing any of these ministers would behave in a rude, nasty manner toward a Jew or ask a Black who attends his church to leave or act in other discriminatory ways. Of course, a survey is not the best method of studying behavior, but it is very likely that the overwhelming majority of this sample would have morally disapproved of discrimination if they had been asked. Only 13 respondents disagreed with the statement that "Many Whites often discriminate against Blacks by not hiring or promoting them." Some who agreed with this statement might have felt this discrimination was justified because they believed Blacks were not reliable employees, but it is likely that this would be a small number, especially since discrimination is now a negative word for most people.

Neither does this survey show evidence of virulent anti-Semitism or strong racism, of ethnic bigotry among Lancaster County ministers. These phrases imply not just negative ethnic beliefs, but that these beliefs are held with a certainty impervious to new information and grounded in a strong emotional hostility toward these groups. It seems unlikely that this would properly characterize more than perhaps 10 at most in this sample.

Even "prejudice" is avoided as a label for the scales used in this study, despite the fact that this has frequently meant simply an "unfavorable ethnic attitude,"[11] which fits the interpretation of the scales. Prejudice is, in most people's minds, associated with views more strongly negative and emotional than those represented in these scales. Presumably, prejudice in this sense is the same basic attitude as what is measured here and may quite appropriately be applied to some of those at the highest point on the ethnic scales, but "negative beliefs" is preferred to remind us that the

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11 Ibid., p. 6.

questions reflect milder than normal prejudice.

If this interpretation of the scales is the most reasonable one, some may object that the baby has been thrown out with the bath water. Is this not so mild and routine that it is unimportant?

Certainly this survey can be cited as confirming previous evidence on the "fading effect" of stereotypes.[12] *In this sample, only rather pale reflections of the traditional stereotypes survive. However, it is also interesting that these reflections are still detectable and still scalable in a sample of ministers. The traditional images have not been eradicated even in this group and previous research indicates they are likely to be more prevalent among laymen.*[13] *It is probable that a random sample of those living in Lancaster County would yield higher percentages agreeing with the questions used in this study, perhaps in some cases over twice as high.*

This reservoir of negative beliefs has not resulted in recent, frequent outbreaks of racism or anti-Semitism in Lancaster County, although incidents do occur. However, in a situation of social or economic crisis, it could provide a more receptive audience for bigots. The general trend since the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's has been a deterioration of ethnic stereotypes, but historically the United States has gone through cycles of increased ethnic hatred[14] *and this could return again -- hopefully not in as virulent a form. As an indication of this possibility, the Anti-Deformation League of B'nai B'rith reported that anti-Semitic incidents more than doubled in the U.S. from 1980 to 1981.*[15] *The shift in public opinion to more conservative views may have facilitated this. Conservative times seem to lead to more activity among those on the right-wing fringe, as liberal times like the 1960's seem to lead to more activity among those on the left-wing.*

There seems, in fact, to be an important relation between negative beliefs and public opinion. Walter Lippmann first developed the concept of stereotypes in his book Public Opinion. Frequently, we think of a stereotype as having its greatest effect on the way an individual member of an ethnic group might be treated by a person who holds it. In encounters between strangers, this can certainly happen, but many people exempt from a stereotype individuals they get to know.[16] *In fact, part of the strength and persistence of stereotypes seems to be that, since they involve generalizations, people can believe that all members of a groups they know are fine, but they are all exceptions to the rule, so they do not need to change their stereotypes. Stereotypes are about groups and are most strongly engaged when people think about minorities as groups. Therefore, they condition public opinion about groups. The negative beliefs measured in this study would probably still permit the respondents to treat individual Blacks or Hispanics or Jews in a friendly way, at least in many circumstances. These ministers may well be unprejudiced in that sense. But*

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12 See, for instance, Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice, pp. 16-18 and Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, pp. 202-204.

13 Rodney Stark, et al., Wayward Shepherds: Prejudice and the Protestant Clergy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971), pp. 62-63.

14 See Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970).

15 Intellegencer Journal (Lancaster, Pa.), February 23, 1982, p. 13.

16 See Robin M.Williams, Jr., Strangers Next Door, pp. 337-351 and Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice, pp. 33-34.

even mildly negative beliefs are likely to have an impact on the respondents' reactions to public events involving one of these ethnic groups. An important protection of minority rights is the ability of these groups to appeal to public opinion. Whether appeals for help or support or equal treatment are accepted as legitimate will be influenced by the beliefs about the particular group. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960's had to replace, or at least enlarge, the traditional image of Blacks with one of a non-violent, noble group being attacked by Southern White bigots to sway important segments of public opinion in favor of the goals of the movement. The new image, conveyed by photography and television, was needed because the traditional image justified, in public opinion, unequal treatment of Blacks. Even mildly negative beliefs of the type studied in this report will reduce the ability of a community to mobilize public opinion against the acts of bigots. Those respondents who measured higher on these scales seem more likely to be able to brush off anti-Semitic or racial incidents, to be indifferent to or oppose equal opportunities in employment, fair housing, or freedom of religious practice. Even in the United States with the Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court, public attitudes toward ethnic groups and the values placed on tolerance, equity, and civil liberties will have a real impact on minorities. The treatment of Japanese-Americans after the start to World War II showed the vulnerability of ethnic groups when public opinion shifts strongly against them.

Negative beliefs by clergymen are more important than those held by the average person. Although there are real limits on the moral leadership of ministers, especially when their parishioners have contrary views,[17] *they are in positions of some influence, especially for the young and for those older persons in their congregations who are uncertain and pulled in different directions by different values during periods of social change. In these situations, ministers can be "opinion leaders" concerning ethnic relations. They may have the most impact on others' opinions through the very thing measured for the ethnic scales: verbal reactions to general statements about ethnic groups. Discussions in a pastor's office, in Sunday School, or in a study group, as well as what he says from the pulpit, are likely to gain greater acceptance when he is talking about moral questions and general attitudes than when an issue has already been defined publicly as controversial, political, and partisan, and therefore is generally regarded as outside his sphere of authority. Of course, for a minister who takes social activism and the need to apply Christian values to specific situations seriously, the fact that those in the pews may nod in agreement with the general statements and values and then ignore them in their attitudes toward specific situations can be frustrating. But it does seem likely that the concern of many ministers for brotherhood, Christian perspectives on race relations, and inter-faith understanding has contributed to the erosion of traditional stereotypes.*

Summary. *The Relic survey of a sample of ministers living in Lancaster County contained a number of statements about Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews with which the respondents were asked to agree or disagree. These statements were not created or selected by the current investigator. Some of*

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17 See Harold E. Quinley, The Prophetic Clergy: Social Activism Among Protestant Ministers (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974).

these statements seemed intuitively appealing, but others seemed of doubtful utility. Therefore, Guttman scaling was used to select the three questions for each ethnic group which fit together best, resulting in three 4-point scales.

The interpretation of these scales is crucial to this study. The best interpretation seems to be this:

1) *The scales measure attitudes toward each ethnic group;*
2) *The statements used in each scale derive from traditional stereotypes of Blacks and Jews;*
3) *Although the scales relate to previous research on stereotypes and prejudice, they contain significantly milder statements and so are labeled "negative ethnic beliefs";*
4) *"Beliefs" indicates that the form of the statements was quasi-factual, that respondents were asked if they believed the statements were true;*
5) *The scales do not measure how true or false these statements are, but how unfavorable is the image of a group held by each respondent, therefore, they are labeled "negative" beliefs.*

The statements in these scales are mild enough that they are unlikely to be good indicators of whether or not a respondent would treat individual members of these ethnic groups in an unfair manner. However, even mild negative beliefs appear important for public opinion. They will condition a person's opinions about minorities as groups. The security of minorities in a democracy ultimately depends on support among those in the majority. Negative beliefs provide justifications for the unfair treatment of minorities and a climate permissive of acts of discrimination and bigotry. For this reason, the distribution, social location, and causes of even mildly negative beliefs are important.

Public opinion is not undifferentiated. The opinions of some are more likely to have an impact on others and on the action taken by a community. Political leaders or activists, civic leaders, those in the media or with easy access to it are more likely to have this kind of impact. Ministers are also among those whose opinions are likely to be more than just personal, especially when problems of ethnic relations are defined in basically moral terms. The ethnic attitudes of ministers are of particular importance and interest.

III. THE DISTRIBUTION OF NEGATIVE ETHNIC BELIEFS

This section gives descriptions of the final versions of the ethnic scales used in this report, the distributions and interrelations of these scales, and a discussion of the extent of negative ethnic beliefs among ministers in Lancaster County.

The basic scales of negative ethnic beliefs use three questions to create a 4-point scale, indicating the number of questions a respondent "passed" (see Appendix A). Because distributions are skewed (see Tables A-1 and A-2, Appendix A) and because four row tables are difficult to read, most of the tables in this report combine those who scored 3 on a scale with those who scored 2. This results in 3-point scales, varying from 0 through 2. The categories of these scales are sometimes referred to as "low" (0), "medium" (1), and "high" (2).

The survey provides more information on the respondents' feelings about the questions than is incorporated in these scales. They were given a choice among five responses ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." To make use of this additional information, more sensitive measures of negative beliefs were created by adding together each individual's responses for the three statements in each scale. A final composite index of negative ethnic beliefs was then created by adding all three of these expanded scales together (see Appendix A). Since these expanded scales may provide a better estimate of the underlying relations in the data, correlations for them are included in this report.

Negative Beliefs About Blacks: The B-Scale. *Table III-1 shows that slightly more than 50% of the ministers scored 0 on this scale, not passing any of the negative questions asked. About 22% passed two or three of these questions and are ranked high on the scale. This measure will frequently be referred to as the B-Scale.*

TABLE III-1:
THE DISTRIBUTION OF NEGATIVE BELIEFS ABOUT BLACKS
THE B-SCALE

B-SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	74	49.7%	50.3%
1	41	27.5	27.9
2	32	21.5	21.8
Missing Data	2*	1.3	---
TOTAL	149	100.0%	100.0%

**Two respondents excluded because they are Blacks.*

Negative Beliefs About Hispanics: The H-Scale. *The distribution of negative beliefs about Hispanics--the H-Scale--is given in Table III-2. It is quite similar to the distribution of the B-Scale, except that there are fewer in the higher category and more in the middle group.*

TABLE III-2:
THE DISTRIBUTION OF NEGATIVE BELIEFS ABOUT HISPANICS
THE H-SCALE

H-SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	74	49.7%	50.3%
1	45	30.2	30.6
2	28	18.8	19.0
Missing Data	2	1.3	-------
TOTAL	149	100.0%	99.9%*

**Percentages not adding to 100% in this and subsequent tables are due to rounding.*

Negative Beliefs About Jews: The J-Scale. *Table III-3 shows the distribution for the measure of negative beliefs about Jews. There are 21% who scored 0 and 43% who scored 2. While the B-Scale and H-Scale are skewed to the lower end, the J-Scale is skewed to the higher end. However, this does not necessarily mean the ministers were more negative toward Jews than Blacks or Hispanics. The statements used about Blacks and Hispanics are the same; those about Jews are quite different. Only if the statements are equally negative could this difference in the distributions be taken as indicating more negative attitudes toward Jews. (This problem is discussed further at the end of this chapter.)*

TABLE III-3:
THE DISTRIBUTION OF NEGATIVE BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS
THE J-SCALE

J-SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	31	20.8%	20.9%
1	53	35.6	35.8
2	64	43.0	43.2
Missing Data	1	0.7	-------
TOTAL	149	100.1%	99.9%

Negative Ethnic Beliefs: The E-Scale. *The three scales discussed above also scaled using the Guttman technique (see Appendix A). This provides a composite E-Scale measuring attitudes toward all three groups--Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews. The distribution is almost symmetrical, with most respondents (60%) in the middle group.*

Interrelations of Scales. *If a respondent has negative beliefs about one ethnic group, is he also more likely to have them about the others? Intuitively, this seems very plausible. The fact that the three measures for the different groups can be scaled to measure an underlying attitude of negative ethnic beliefs also indicates this should be true. If the three measures correlate strongly enough, then it would make little difference if one or all or the composite ethnic scale is used in this analysis.*

Table III-5 shows that the B-Scale and H-Scale are significantly associated with each other.

TABLE III-4

THE DISTRIBUTION OF NEGATIVE ETHNIC BELIEFS

THE E-SCALE

E-SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	29	19.5%	19.9%
1	87	58.4	59.6
2	30	20.1	20.5
Missing Data	3	2.0	-------
TOTAL	149	100.0%	100.0%

TABLE III-5

INTERRELATION OF B-SCALE AND H-SCALE

B-SCALE

H-Scale:	0	1	2	TOTAL
0	74%	32%	19%	51%
	(55)	(13)	(6)	(74)
1	20	44	39	31
	(15)	(18)	(12)	(45)
2	5	24	42	19
	(4)	(10)	(13)	(27)
TOTAL	99%	100%	100%	101%
	(74)	(41)	(31)	(146)

Somer's d = .46

p = .0000 (that is less than 1/10,000)

Of those at 0 on the B-Scale, 74% were also 0 on the H-Scale. However, this association is far from perfect. Of those at 2 on the B-Scale, 19% refused to transfer this image to Hispanics and were 0 on the H-Scale; only 42% of them were 2. There were 29 respondents who scored lower on the B-Scale than the H-Scale, indicating more negative views of Hispanics than Blacks, but only 4 of these (15% of the row) scored 0 on the B-Scale and 2 on the H-Scale.

Table III-6 shows that the relation between the B-Scale and J-Scale is less than that between the B-Scale and H-Scale. This could be expected since the statements used to measure attitudes toward Blacks and Jews are quite different. Of those high on the B-Scale, 69% were also high on the J-Scale, while of those low on the B-Scale, 23% were high on the J-Scale. The scales associate, but most respondents in the sample scored differently on the two scales.

TABLE III-6:
INTERRELATION OF B-SCALE AND J-SCALE

	B-SCALE			
J-SCALE:	0	1	2	TOTAL
0	31%	15%	6%	21%
	(23)	(6)	(2)	(31)
1	46	27	25	36
	(34)	(11)	(8)	(53)
2	23	59	69	43
	(17)	(24)	(22)	(63)
TOTAL	100%	101%	100%	100%
	(74)	(41)	(32)	(147)

Somer's d = .36
p = .0000

The association between the H-Scale and J-Scale shows a further reduction–d = .23, compared to .46 and .36 for the previous tables. Again most respondents received different scores on the two scales.

TABLE III-7:
INTERRELATION OF H-SCALE AND J-SCALE

	H-SCALE			
J-SCALE:	0	1	2	TOTAL
0	26%	20%	11%	21%
	(19)	(9)	(3)	(31)
1	43	33	21	36
	(32)	(15)	(6)	(53)
2	31	47	68	43
	(23)	(21)	(19)	(63)
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(74)	(45)	(28)	(147)

Somer's d = .23
p = .0010

Of course, the relation of these scales to the E-Scale is greater: d = .62 for the B-Scale, .30 for the H-Scale, and .61 for the J-Scale.

The relations among these ethnic attitudes are stronger if the expanded scales are used. Table III-8 shows Pearson's r for each of these relations.

TABLE III-8:
INTERCORRELATIONS OF EXPANDED NEGATIVE BELIEFS SCALES

	H-SCALE	J-SCALE	E-SCALE
B-Scale	.70	.41	.87
H-Scale		.41	.85
J-Scale			.72

The correlations are reasonably strong, except those between the J-Scale and the B-Scale and H-Scale, which are too low to indicate that all of these scales measure the same thing. This confirms previous findings that ethnic measures are intercorrelated, but they also reflect feelings toward the specific group. After reviewing some of the research results, several investigators conclude:

> *It seems to us essential for the understanding of intergroup attitudes to keep firmly in mind the existence and importance of a general factor (tolerance versus ethnocentrism) and group factors (degree of favorability or unfavorability toward Negroes, Jews, Turks, etc.)..."*[1]

The E-Scale should be regarded as the best measure of general negative ethnic beliefs, but it cannot be substituted for the other scales without a real loss of information about attitudes toward those groups specifically. Therefore, all four scales are used in this report.

The Extent of Negative Beliefs. *Do these scales show greater or lesser amounts of negative beliefs than would be expected for this sample? The study was not set up so that it could answer this question clearly. The scales discussed above are intended to help in examining the different social and religious characteristics of those who have more negative ethnic beliefs compared to those who have less negative beliefs. If the same questions had been asked of a national sample, a sample of people generally in Lancaster County, or a national sample of ministers, it would be possible to compare these to the Relic results and show which is higher or lower. If no comparative figures are available, then different people will bring different expectations to the data. Some who are more idealistic may feel that any detectable amount of negative ethnic beliefs is too much and so the results are surprisingly high. These people should keep in mind that rather mild and qualified statements had to be used in the study or almost all the respondents would have rejected them. Some who are more realistic may find it surprising that, given the mild form of the statements, they were not accepted by more respondents. These evaluations do not depend so much on the data, but on the subjective expectations brought to it.*

One way of trying to deal with this difficulty is to compare the Relic data to previous surveys. In 1963, 1971, and 1978, Louis Harris and Associates asked national samples whether they "tend to agree or disagree" with certain stereotypes of Blacks.[2] *One of the statements was: "Blacks have*

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1 John Harding, et al., "Prejudice and Ethnic Relations," p. 17.

2 See William Brink and Louis Harris, The Negro Revolution in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), pp. 140-141; Harold E. Quinley and Charles Y. Glock, Anti-Semitism in America (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 132; and "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion, April/May, 1981, p. 34. The 1963 survey was conducted for Newsweek and the 1978 one for the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

less native intelligence than Whites." This is quite similar to the statement: "Many Blacks have inferior intelligence as compared to Whites" asked in the Relic survey. In the national samples, 39% agreed in 1963, just after the March on Washington, 37% in 1971, and 25% in 1978. (The trend in these figures reflects a general tendency for fewer people to accept stereotypes in more recent times.) In the Lancaster survey in 1977-78, 12% agreed to the comparable statement. Another statement used by Harris was: "Blacks tend to have less ambition than Whites." The Relic statement is somewhat similar: "Many Blacks, by nature of their culture, are lazy and slow." This is probably a more negative wording of the statement because of the stronger connotation of "lazy." In the Harris surveys, 66% agreed in 1963, 52% in 1971, and 49% in 1978. In the survey of ministers, 20% agreed.

In another national survey in 1964, respondents were asked: "In general, do you think that Negroes are as intelligent as White people–that is, can they learn things just as well if they are given the same education and training?" This is a more stringent definition of intelligence than may have been used by respondents in the Harris or Relic survey; 19% in the national sample said "no" to the question, a smaller proportion than would be expected from the Harris figures. The 1964 survey also used the statement: "Generally speaking, Negroes are lazy and don't like to work hard." Those agreeing composed 40% of the sample.[3]

These comparisons indicate that fewer respondents in the Relic sample accepted negative statements about Blacks than in national samples, perhaps about half to two-thirds compared to the 1978 Harris survey. It is more difficult to judge if this result is less than expected. The national samples include respondents from the South, where the beliefs were more prevalent--in 1963, 60% in the South agreed that Blacks were less intelligent and 81% that Blacks were less ambitious. In addition, a sample of ministers will be more educated, but older, than average. Educated respondents are more likely to disagree with statements of this sort, but older respondents are more likely to agree (see Chapter IV). Given these different factors, it is difficult to judge what should be expected, but the Relic data seems within the range that might be predicted from national surveys for negative beliefs about Blacks.

National data is also available for attitudes toward Jews, but the comparability problem is even greater. The 1964 survey asked if it was "probably true or probably false" that: "International banking is pretty much controlled by Jews."[4] *One of the Relic statements is somewhat similar, but it asks about the U.S. "Jewish businessmen control an unusually large portion of the financial resources in the United States." In the national sample, 30% agreed to the statement. In the Relic sample, 37% agreed. If the "don't knows" are exluded--and they were high in both samples--,56% of those with an opinion agreed nationally and 60% in Lancaster County. The difference of 4% is certainly not meaningful given the difference in the two statements. However, considering the higher educational level of the Relic survey, it seems surprising that the two percentages are in the same range. A question from a 1975 Harris poll tends to confirm this. Asked if Jews controlled or played*

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3 Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice, p. 171. This survey was sponsored by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

4 Ibid., p.6; Appendix A, p. 10.

an "important role" in "big New York banks," 14% agreed they controlled and another 30% agreed that they had an important role.[5] *These results seem to be in the same general range as the 37% who accepted the Relic statement.*

The 1964 survey also asked if it was "probably true" that "Jews stick together too much" and 52% agreed. This question was used as one of the measures of mild anti-Semitism.[6] *Relic interviewers asked if: "Many Jews prefer to stick to themselves, and tend to socialize with each other rather than with non-Jews," and 70% agreed. This question scaled with negative beliefs about Jews in this study (see Appendix A), indicating that it measured essentially the same attitude as the question in the 1964 survey. If "too much" had been used in the Relic question, it seems likely the percentage agreeing would have fallen to the same range as in the 1964 study, but it seems unlikely that it would have been reduced by 40% or 50%. Again the Relic results seem about the same as national ones.*

A 1963 survey of church members in the San Francisco area used a question more similar to the one in this survey: "Jews like to be with other Jews and tend to avoid non-Jews." The results were also closer, with 72% of the Protestants saying "yes" or "somewhat," compared to 70% of the Relic sample.[7] *A statement that: "International banking tends to be dominated by Jews" also appears to yield results similar to Relic.*[8] *Of course, the sample of church members, despite the fact that the well-educated were overrepresented,*[9] *was not as educated as the Relic sample, but it was drawn from an area of the country regarded as less socially conservative.*

The sample of church members was compared to a 1968 sample of professional parish clergymen from the large Protestant demoninations in the entire state of California.[10] *It was found that the ministers rejected negative statements about Jews more than the church members did.*[11] *For five identical statements, the ministers agreed about two-thirds as often, on average, as the church members. In the Relic data, on the other hand, negative beliefs of ministers seem roughly equal to those in the church member sample. This seems true even though the Relic data was collected 15 years later and anti-Jewish beliefs have been declining over time.*[12]

After comparing the above figures and many others, my best judgement would be that although the negative beliefs about Jews measured in the Relic survey are not completely out of line, they do seem to be more prevalent than would be expected from the distributions found in previous studies. These attitudes may be, very roughly, half again as common as might be expected, that is, we might

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5 Reported in Harold E. Quinley and Charles Y. Glock, Anti-Semitism in America, p. 9.

6 Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice, pp. 6, 9-10, 23.

7 Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 114. This survey was also sponsored by the Anti-Defamation League.

8 Ibid., p. 111.

9 Ibid., pp. 236-237.

10 For a description of this sample, see Harold E. Quinley, The Prophetic Clergy, Appendix A.

11 Rodney Stark, et al., Wayward Shepherds, pp. 61-65. Unfortunately, none of the questions asked the California ministers is reasonably comparable to those asked in the Lancaster County survey.

12 Harold E. Quinley and Charles Y. Glock, Anti-Semitism in America, pp. 7-18.

predict perhaps two-thirds of national results, but actually they are approximately equal. In the Relic data, then, a fairly even distribution might be expected on the J-Scale, whereas in fact it is skewed to the high end of the scale, with 43% in the high group and 21% in the low one. However, the conclusion that negative beliefs about Jews is somewhat higher in this sample is, at best, a guess.

The final problem to consider is whether negative attitudes about Jews are more common in this survey than those about Blacks. Certainly, it must be kept in mind that the two stereotypes behind these beliefs--the irresponsible, inferior Black and the materialistic Jew--are quite different and the Black image seems more derogatory. However, it is still possible to try to judge not which image is worse, but which is more frequently held among the respondents.

Selznick and Steinberg, in their analysis of the 1964 national sample, say that in their data "with respect to these stereotypes, anti-Semitic and Anti-Negro prejudice are about equally prevalent."[13] *In the Relic sample, a gross comparison of the B-Scale and J-Scale seems to show negative beliefs about Jews are about twice as widespread as those about Blacks (see Tables III-1 and III-3). The average of the expanded Jewish scale is almost double that of the expanded Black scale--6.6 compared to 3.4. However, the statements about Jews seem to be worded more mildly than the ones about Blacks. What part of this difference is due to the difference in wordings and what part is real?*

Two statements, one about Blacks, the other about Jews, were similar in the Relic survey: "Many Blacks stick to themselves and have as little to do with Whites as possible" and "Many Jews prefer to stick to themselves, and tend to socialize with each other rather than with non-Jews." Each of these is significantly related to its respective scale of negative beliefs, although the correlation is stronger for the Jewish question. In the sample, 48% agreed to the Black statement and 70% to the Jewish one. The Jewish percentage is almost half again the Black figure. This estimate fits with the one derived by comparing the Relic data to previous surveys. The best conclusion seems to be that about half the difference in Black and Jewish negative beliefs in this sample is due to the milder wording of the statements in the J-Scale and about half appears to be a real difference in the prevalence of these two types of beliefs. However, this conclusion depends, to a great extent, on judgement. The data itself is far from conclusive.

This estimate that negative beliefs about Jews are more common in this sample should not be generalized to Lancaster County as a whole. It may well be dependent on the fact that religious distinctions are more significant to ministers than racial ones. This may or may not be true of the average person in Lancaster. Research also shows that ministers are not necessarily representative of their congregations, although those with traditional religious views may be more representative than those with more liberal religious views.[14] *Generally, opinion research shows that beliefs of elite and mass, of leaders and followers may be quite different.*[15] *Finally, the sampling of churches in the*

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13 Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice, p. 171.

14 Harold E. Quinley, The Prophetic Clergy, pp. 243-245 and passim. See also Charles Y. Glock, Benjamin B. Ringer, and Earl R. Babbie, To Comfort and To Challenge: A Dilemma of the Contemporary Church (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), Part Two.

15 Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 206-261.

Relic study means that small congregations are weighted as equal to large ones. This overrepresents more rural and more religiously conservative churches compared to their proportion of church membership in the County. Since no County-wide survey exists to compare with the Relic results, there is no way to really judge whether anti-Jewish attitudes are more common than anti-Black attitudes in the general population. This survey indicates that possibility, but the most likely guess is this difference would be greatly reduced in a random sample of Lancaster County.

IV. RESOCIALIZATION AND THE SOCIAL LOCATION OF NEGATIVE ETHNIC BELIEFS

The general theoretical perspective that shaped the analysis of the Relic data was undoubtedly influenced by my background, training, and experience. The approach owes a great deal to the general study of public opinion and political attitudes, but especially to the field of political socialization--how people learn their basic orientations to politics [1]

From the beginning of this study, the ethnic attitudes measured by the data were considered culturally learned beliefs about groups. Explaining these mild, routine, socially acquired beliefs seemed a different task than explaining deep-rooted prejudice where there is evidence of a strong, emotional rejection of any attempt to alter the attitude. Dealing with the first type of ethnic attitudes seemed to call essentially for a sociological approach, while the second type probably requires a psychological one. This is not a study of the psychopathology of bigotry, but an examination of the correlates of negative beliefs about ethnic groups, trying to use these to understand better the social processes and belief systems which created the distributions of these beliefs.

The stereotypes on which these beliefs are based date far back in American history. The image of irresponsible, ignorant Blacks probably goes back to the time when they were torn from their original cultures and forcibly put into a very different one. Slavery as an institution did not encourage Whites to think of Blacks as responsible. Educating slaves was disapproved of as dangerous. In the vicious cycle of discrimination, as long as Blacks were regarded as irresponsible and ignorant, they were given poorer schools and worse jobs, helping perpetuate the stereotype.

The traditional stereotype of Jews dates back even further to the ban by the medieval church on Christians' lending money for interest.[2] *Although this did not, in fact, give them a monopoly on moneylending, it made them an important, but vulnerable, group in the earliest periods of capitalism and the consolidation of royal power. It was also convenient since they could be expelled from a country when financial reasons dictated. The image of the greedy Jewish moneylender was immortalized by Shakespeare in the person of Shylock. The belief that Jews control banking and finance is a modern descendant of this image. Economic discrimination against Jews because of this stereotype has pushed them into marginal, riskier businesses, sometimes of the type non-Jews could use to justify their stereotype.*[3]

These images have been present in America almost since the forming of the country, but the half century after the end of Reconstruction was probably the period when they gained near universal acceptance and became ingrained in the culture. Someone growing up during this period had no need to form his own impressions of well-known groups like Blacks and Jews: he learned the

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1 See Robert Weissberg, Political Learning, Political Choice, and Democratic Citizenship (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1974) and Stanley Allen Renshon, ed., Handbook of Political Socialization: Theory and Research (New York: The Free Press, 1977).

2 Joshua Trachtenberg, The Devil and the Jews: The Medieval Conception of the Jew and Its Relation to Modern Anti-Semitism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), pp. 188-194.

3 Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice, pp. 187-188.

traditional, ready-made images from his society. His parents, his peers, books, various social institutions--including all the important agencies of socialization--very likely accepted and passed on these images. Since this period was one of great technological innovation in printing and later in electronics, new media became available to amplify and perpetuate these traditional stereotypes. They will be preserved in films, radio programs, and fiction from this period as long as our culture exists,[4] *even though some day they may seem quaint and unbelievable. In a sense, the previous chapter provides a weak test of the idea that negative ethnic beliefs are culturally learned and not developed by each individual based on his experiences and perceptions of Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews. The questions asked were based on traditional stereotypes of Blacks and Jews. If each person's stereotype reflected his own experience, then there should be a wide variety of images. The questions should not scale together around the traditional images.*[5]

Certainly during the period from 1880 to 1930, a few rejected these images, but a more concerted attack on them has been made in the last 50 years. In the 1930's, social scientists started making empirical studies of stereotypes.[6] *Evidence indicates that at least a few colleges during this period were teaching more positive attitudes toward Blacks.*[7] *After World War II, there were an increased number of studies of ethnic attitudes and this material was incorporated into teaching, particularly in the social sciences. This academic attack on these images spread to the more popular culture and the term stereotype became identified with an oversimplified, derogatory racial or ethnic image, certainly something to be disapproved of and rejected. This attack is still going on and it is clear that traditional stereotypes have decayed over time.*

The campaign to eradicate stereotypes can be thought of as a process of resocialization within American culture.[8] *This shift from a theory of socialization to resocialization is more important than it may first appear, because it shifts the focus of what needs to be explained. If ethnic stereotypes did become an ingrained, pervasive part of American culture, then the normal mechanisms of cultural transmission will tend to perpetuate them. Perhaps Oscar Hammerstein II was right about an island in the South Pacific when he said you have "got to be taught to hate and fear, got to be carefully taught," but in the U.S., learning these stereotypes was almost inevitable. Here you have got to be carefully untaught. So what needs to be explained is why some people have come to reject common negative ethnic beliefs.*[9]

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4 See Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, pp. 200-202.

5 Of course, previous research indicates considerable agreement on stereotypes, especially on Blacks as ignorant, superstitious, and lazy and Jews as mercenary, shrewd, but intelligent. See Ibid., pp. 192-199.

6 Ibid., pp. 192-200.

7 Angus Campbell, White Attitudes Toward Black People (Ann Arbor: Institute of Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1971), p. 62.

8 Resocialization normally means a person must learn new values and attitudes because he becomes part of a different culture, as an immigrant must. But cultures change over time and the agencies of socialization will reflect these changes. This involves both teaching the young new attitudes, ones different from those of their parents, and attempting to resocialize adults. This broader conception of resocialization is what is meant in this study.

9 Selznick and Steinberg also take this view. See The Tenacity of Prejudice, p. 169.

If the process by which some reject these beliefs is one of resocialization, then the initiative for this is likely to come from the more highly organized agencies of socialization, that is, from the media, the churches, youth organizations, and especially the schools, not from families or peer groups. Families, at least in the aggregate, seem best adapted to passing on traditional values and attitudes from generation to generation. If a family ignores ethnic attitudes, then a child can normally pick up the traditional stereotypes from playmates and friends. Of course, if parents are resocialized to disapprove of the traditional images, they can then transmit this to their children, immunizing them against these views present in other parts of the culture.

Education. *The process of resocialization, to be successful in changing an ingrained set of beliefs, would have to rely heavily on the schools. So the first hypothesis in this study would predict that education should be inversely correlated with negative ethnic beliefs, that is, those with higher educational levels will be more likely to reject these traditional images.*

Although previous studies indicate this hypothesis is true,[10] *it was not clear that it would be with the Relic data. Ministers are generally highly educated. It is not possible, as with most samples, to contrast those having only a grade school education with college graduates. If education varies little, then it will not have any measurable impact on negative beliefs. Perhaps for this reason, the ministers were not asked for the number of years they spent in school, but just for their "educational background." The open-ended responses, which were sometimes vague, then had to be coded. It was clear that in this sample, although most ministers had been to college and seminary, a significant number had not. The final coding judged 65% to have both college and seminary, 16% to have a substantial amount of college, and 19% to have less education--high school or less, or some advanced training, or not more than two years of college. Analysis showed that, contrary to expectations, the middle group with just a college education was more similar on ethnic beliefs to the less educated group, so they were combined with them.*

Tables IV-1 through IV-4 show that this rough division by seminary training is quite strongly related to negative beliefs. For the Jewish Scale, d=-.36 and for the Black scale, it is -.35. The measure relates somewhat less to the E-scale (d=-.26) and the H-scale (d=-.25). The Pearson's r's for the expanded scales are similar, except the correlation for the E-scale increases--for Blacks, r=-.31; for Hispanics, r=-.26: for Jews, r=-.37; for the combined ethnic scale, r=-.36. Given the fact that there were only about 10 in the sample who did not cite any significant advanced training or college work, this measure of education works surprisingly well.

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10 The evidence for this hypothesis in broader samples is very strong. See especially Ibid., Chs. 5, 8, and 10. In fact, the general hypothesis about education was not really tested in this study. If education had not been correlated to negative beliefs, the general hypothesis would not have been rejected. The failure would have been attributed to the high level of education in the sample.

TABLE IV-1

THE B-SCALE BY EDUCATION

		EDUCATION		
		LESS THAN SEMINARY	COLLEGE AND SEMINARY	TOTAL
B-Scale:	0	28% (14)	62% (59)	50% (73)
	1	38 (19)	23 (22)	28 (41)
	2	34 (17)	16 (15)	22 (32)
TOTAL		100% (50)	101% (96)	100% (146)

Somer's d = -.35

p = .0001

TABLE IV-2

THE H-SCALE BY EDUCATION

		EDUCATION		
		LESS THAN SEMINARY	COLLEGE AND SEMINARY	TOTAL
H-Scale:	0	34% (17)	58% (56)	50% (73)
	1	40 (20)	26 (25)	31 (45)
	2	26 (13)	16 (15)	19 (28)
TOTAL		100% (50)	100% (96)	100% (146)

Somer's d = -.25

p = .0036

TABLE IV-3

THE J-SCALE BY EDUCATION

EDUCATION

	LESS THAN SEMINARY	COLLEGE AND SEMINARY	TOTAL
J-Scale: 0	10%	27%	21%
	(5)	(26)	(31)
1	26	42	36
	(13)	(40)	(53)
2	65	31	43
	(33)	(30)	(63)
TOTAL	101%	100%	100%
	(51)	(96)	(147)

Somer's d = -.36

p = 0001

TABLE IV-4

THE E-SCALE BY EDUCATION

EDUCATION

	LESS THAN SEMINARY	COLLEGE AND SEMINARY	TOTAL
E-Scale: 0	10%	25%	20%
	(5)	(24)	(29)
1	57	60	59
	(28)	(58)	(86)
2	33	15	21
	(16)	(14)	(30)
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%
	(49)	(96)	(145)

Somer's d = -.26

p = .0017

Undoubtedly, part of the reason for this is simply that the additional years of education in a seminary do reduce further the likelihood of accepting negative ethnic beliefs: if a college education helps, a graduate education helps more. However, it still seemed puzzling that the group with just a college education was more like those with less education rather than those who went on to seminary. When this group was examined more closely, the main explanation seemed to be that many in this group were graduates of Bible colleges, which give professional training for the ministry at the undergraduate level. This raised the question of whether education at strongly religious schools had a different impact on negative beliefs. To deal with this, the sample was recoded for those who went to college, splitting out those who attended Bible colleges or strongly religious colleges, that is, ones that require Bible studies or emphasize a "Christian atmosphere."[11]

This classification was related reasonably strongly to negative beliefs about Jews (see Table IV-5). It was also related to the E-scale (d=-.26). The relation to the B-scale was weaker (d=-.21)[12] *and it is insignificant for the H-scale (d=-.02). This indicates these colleges, on average, are not resocializing their students as thoroughly as regular colleges, especially concerning the traditional stereotype of the Jew. There have been recent moves to upgrade education at many of these colleges and it is possible that this association will be reduced in the future.*

TABLE IV-5
THE J-SCALE BY TYPE OF COLLEGE

	TYPE OF COLLEGE*		
	BIBLE OR STRONGLY RELIGIOUS COLLEGE	REGULAR COLLEGES	TOTAL
J-Scale: 0	8% (3)	31% (23)	23% (26)
1	40 (15)	37 (27)	38 (42)
2	53 (20)	32 (24)	39 (44)
TOTAL	101% (38)	100% (74)	100% (112)

Somer's d = -.30
p = .0031

*Both those who went on to seminary and those who did not are included.

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11 See C. Robert Pace, Education and Evangelism: A Profile of Protestant Colleges (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), passim, for some of the attitudinal differences of those who attend evangelical colleges. His data does not include Bible colleges.

12 These relations exist even though those who went to Bible or strongly religious colleges were younger--45% were 40 or less in age, while 29% of those who went to regular college were that young.

How does education reduce stereotyping? Is it just a matter of teaching that these traditional images are bad? Campbell, in investigating attitudes toward Blacks in a 1968 sample of 15 major U.S. cities, says the major impact has come from college education since World War II.[13] *His data shows only a weak relation between education and racial attitudes for those educated before World War II (except for women who graduated from college). This would support the idea that there was a change during the 1940's in the specific values taught by colleges concerning race relations. The impact of this resocialization was amplified by the increasing proportion of the population going on to college.*

However, the racial attitudes used by Campbell are not negative beliefs or stereotypes. Selznick and Steinberg, using measures much closer to those in this report, argue that education has a deeper impact.[14] *They say there are two cultures in this country--an "enlightened" one and an "unlightened" one. Education is the main process of socialization to the enlightened one. Part of this process is the teaching of "official and ideal values" concerning democratic norms, civil liberties, and tolerance of cultural diversity, as well as the rejection of racism and anti-Semitism. But they also argue that part of the process is that education increases people's "cognitive sophistication." The educated look at the world differently. They are more likely to see its complexity and accept uncertainty and doubt about the way it works. They are more open-minded about beliefs. The less educated have a "primitive cognitive style." They lack intellectual sophistication and the ability to accept ambiguity. They are more superstitious and agree more readily to intellectually simplistic beliefs, such as: "People can be divided into two distinct classes--the weak and the strong." Selznick and Steinberg create an index of "simplism," which is strongly associated with education and with their measure of anti-Semitism.*[15]

It seems quite plausible that those more cognitively sophisticated will reject generalizations about ethnic groups more readily as intellectually doubtful and they would do this even if they had never heard of stereotyping. The less educated, preferring simple beliefs and explanations, are more likely to find these generalizations reasonable. Their cognitive style will find stereotyping more congenial.[16]

The cognitively sophisticated are also more likely to be open to resocialization concerning their ethnic attitudes. They will be more open to learning, including the more unusual type which involves modifying or rejecting previously held beliefs. They will be more likely to try to understand the complexity of racial and ethnic problems and more open to new norms which disapprove of stereotypes and discrimination.

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13 Angus Campbell, White Attitudes Toward Black People, pp. 54-67.

14 Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice, Ch. 8 and passim.

15 Of course, it is not possible to divorce "cognitive" and "evaluative" in this discussion, as Selznick and Steinberg recognize. The cognitively unsophisticated person is also more likely to favor simple moral solutions. Believing that Blacks are intellectually inferior is cognitive, a belief, in form, but it is also a simple moral justification for the lower economic status of Blacks in this country.

16 This fits with Walter Lippmann's original conception of stereotypes as the opposite of open-mindedness (see Ch. II of this report).

Which process--learning that ethnic stereotypes are bad or learning a more sophisticated intellectual style--is most important in explaining the impact of education on negative ethnic beliefs cannot be answered here. Probably both have had an effect. In any case, the Relic data confirms the importance of education for ethnic attitudes.

Age. *If the change in negative ethnic beliefs is due to resocialization, then the effects should show up stamped on the succeeding generations of Americans. Those who grew up before serious resocialization took place should accept these beliefs more readily than those raised later. Age should be directly correlated with negative ethnic beliefs. In a cross-sectional sample, it is not possible to separate maturational or aging effects--changes in a person's attitudes as he gets older --from generational effects--attitudes formed because of the historical period a person was raised in. A cohort study of tolerance from the mid-1950's to 1971 showed that the cohorts (those born about the same time) became more tolerant as they aged, with younger groups doing this more rapidly than the older ones. Tolerance is similar to the attitudes studied here and may follow a similar pattern. Part of the differences in age groups on negative beliefs would be generational and part would be maturational, due to the fact that younger ministers would be more open to gradual resocialization. It should be noted that in this case the maturational effect is historically dependent. If the climate of the times shifts back again to greater ethnic hostility and resocialization is abandoned, then all age groups are likely to increase their negative beliefs.*[17]

If stereotypes were ingrained in American culture before World War II, the oldest ministers should be highest on negative beliefs. The effects of resocialization, especially through the educational system, should gradually decrease these beliefs, with the youngest group having the least negative beliefs.

Some of this gradual resocialization effect may come from sources other than education. For example, the media before World War II reenforced stereotypes in their treatment of Blacks and Jews. This has gradually decreased and may have contributed to lower levels of negative beliefs.

Important historical events can also resocialize if they are so significant that they change people's attitudes. When they have an equal effect on all age groups, then it will not be possible to identify them in a sample of this type. However, socialization theory indicates that attitudes will be formed largely while a person is growing up and attending school. After graduation and getting a job, attitudes are more likely to harden. New learning, at least about social and political things, is likely to decrease and new information is more likely to be selected to fit previous attitudes. For these reasons, important historical events should have a more important effect on those who are maturing when they take place, as the Great Depression had on the political attitudes of the generation who grew up during it.

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17 See Neal E. Cutler, "Political Socialization Research as Generational Analysis: The Cohort Approach Versus the Lineage Approach," in Handbook of Political Socialization, ed. by Stanley Allen Renshon, pp. 298-300, 312-313, 317.

The historical event most relevant for ethnic attitudes during this period was the Civil Rights Movement, especially as led by Dr. Martin Luther King. Non-violent confrontation of Jim Crow laws in the South presented a very different picture of Blacks than the traditional stereotype. This climaxed in the March on Washington in 1963. If these events were dramatic enough to have an educational impact, to resocialize people's ethnic attitudes, then those ministers who were still growing up or in seminary during this period should reject negative beliefs, especially about Blacks, more frequently. Using 25 as about the age when a person is likely to get his first ministerial appointment and 1963 as the date for the event, it was predicted that those ministers who were 40 or less when this sample was taken (largely in 1978) would reject negative beliefs more. Whether this would generalize from Blacks to Hispanics and Jews was uncertain.

In the Relic data, age does correlate with negative beliefs. If ungrouped age is related to the expanded scales, r is .37 for the Black scale, .30 for the Jewish scale, and .36 for ethnic scales. Again the correlation with the Hispanic scale is less (r=.22).

Tables IV-6 through IV-9 group the ministers according to the decade when they turned 25. They generally confirm expectations. The oldest group, although very small in this sample, is clearly more inclined to negative beliefs about Blacks and Hispanics. It is slightly lower on the J-Scale than the 1940's group. This is probably because this second oldest group has the highest percentage (38%) of ministers without substantial college experience, although there is also some evidence indicating that anti-Semitism increased in America in the 1940's.[18]

TABLE IV-6
THE B-SCALE BY AGE (DECADE GROUPINGS)

	AGE GROUP					
	33 or younger (1970's)	34-43 (1960's)	44-53 (1950's)	54-63 (1940's)	64 or older (1930's or (1920's)	TOTAL
B-Scale: 0	67%	73%	39%	36%	33%	50%
	(18)	(22)	(19)	(10)	(4)	(73)
1	26	17	35	39	8	28
	(7)	(5)	(17)	(11)	(1)	(41)
2	7	10	27	25	58	22
	(2)	(3)	(13)	(7)	(7)	(32)
TOTAL	100%	100%	101%	100%	99%	100%
	(27)	(30)	(49)	(28)	(12)	(146)

Somer's d = .25
p = .0000

18 Harold E. Quinley and Charles Y. Glock, Anti-Semitism in America, p. 7.

TABLE IV-7

THE H-SCALE BY AGE (DECADE GROUPINGS)

AGE GROUP

	33 or younger (1970's)	34-43 (1960's)	44-53 (1950's)	54-63 (1940's)	64 or older (1930's or 1920's)	TOTAL
H-Scale: 0	56%	57%	51%	53%	8%	50%
	(15)	(17)	(25)	(15)	(1)	(73)
1	41	30	25	29	42	31
	(11)	(9)	(12)	(8)	(5)	(45)
2	4	13	25	18	50	19
	(1)	(4)	(12)	(5)	(6)	(28)
TOTAL	101%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%
	(27)	(30)	(49)	(28)	(12)	(146)

Somer's d = .15

p = .0090

TABLE IV-8

THE J-SCALE BY AGE (DECADE GROUPINGS

AGE GROUP

	33 or younger (1970's)	34-43 (1960's)	44-53 (1950's)	54-63 (1940's)	64 or older (1930's or 1920's)	TOTAL
J-Scale: 0	44%	17%	16%	14%	17%	21%
	(12)	(5)	(8)	(4)	(2)	(31)
1	37	63	37	14	17	36
	(10)	(19)	(18)	(4)	(2)	(53)
2	19	20	47	72	67	43
	(5)	(6)	(23)	(21)	(8)	(63)
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	100%
	(27)	(30)	(49)	(29)	(12)	(147)

Somer's d = .31

p = .0000

TABLE IV-9

THE E-SCALE BY AGE (DECADE GROUPINGS)

AGE GROUP

	33 or younger (1970's)	34-43 (1960's)	44-53 (1950's)	54-63 (1940's)	64 or older (1930's or 1920's)	TOTAL
E-Scale: 0	44%	17%	12%	15%	17%	20%
	(12)	(5)	(6)	(4)	(2)	(29)
1	48	73	65	59	25	59
	(13)	(22)	(32)	(16)	(3)	(86)
2	7	10	22	26	58	21
	(2)	(3)	(11)	(7)	(7)	(30)
TOTAL	99%	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%
	(27)	(30)	(49)	(27)	(12)	(145)

Somer's d = .24

p = .0001

The two youngest groups are the most free of negative beliefs. In the case of Blacks, the 1960's group is slightly more likely to reject all the statements than the 1970's one. This could be due to the greater impact of the civil rights struggle on this group or it may be due to the youngest group having fewer seminary graduates and more who attended strongly religious colleges. In the case of the J-scale, this youngest group is notable because it has 44% at 0 compared to 17% for the next best groups. It appears almost as if the pattern shown by the B-scale occurs a decade later in the J-scale. For the B-scale, the oldest group is clearly highest, the 1940's and 1950's groups are very similar as are the 1960's and 1970's. For the J-scale, the 1940's and 1920's-1930's are similar, the 1950's show a reduction, the 1960's decline at the high end of the scale but show no increase at the low end, and then the 1970's shows a sizable increase in those at 0. What social process might explain a 10 year lag is unclear. Tables IV-10 through IV-13 show age dichotomized into those that were probably still in seminary or school before 1963 and those who were probably already ministers at that time. It does divide the population into two contrasting groups.

TABLE IV-10

THE B-SCALE BY AGE (YOUNGER, OLDER)

		AGE		
		40 OR YOUNGER	41 OR OLDER	TOTAL
B-Scale:	0	72%	39%	50%
		(34)	(39)	(73)
	1	19	32	28
		(9)	(32)	(41)
	2	9	28	22
		(4)	(28)	(32)
TOTAL		100%	99%	100%
		(47)	(99)	(146)

Somer's d = .36

p = .0001

TABLE IV-11

THE H-SCALE BY AGE (YOUNGER, OLDER)

		AGE		
		40 OR YOUNGER	41 OR OLDER	TOTAL
H-Scale:	0	62%	44%	50%
		(29)	(44)	(73)
	1	32	30	31
		(15)	(30)	(45)
	2	6	25	19
		(3)	(25)	(28)
TOTAL		100%	99%	100%
		(47)	(99)	(146)

Somer's d = .23

p = .0064

TABLE IV-12

THE J-SCALE BY AGE (YOUNGER, OLDER)

		AGE		
		40 OR YOUNGER	41 OR OLDER	TOTAL
J-Scale:	0	34% (16)	15% (15)	21% (31)
	1	45 (21)	32 (32)	36 (53)
	2	21 (10)	53 (53)	43 (63)
TOTAL		100% (47)	100% (100)	100% (147)

Somer's d = .36

p = .0001

TABLE IV-13

THE E-SCALE BY AGE (YOUNGER, OLDER)

		AGE		
		40 OR YOUNGER	41 OR OLDER	TOTAL
E-Scale:	0	34% (16)	13% (13)	20% (29)
	1	57 (27)	60 (59)	59 (86)
	2	9 (4)	27 (26)	21 (30)
TOTAL		100% (47)	100% (98)	100% (145)

Somer's d = .31

p = .0003

It is quite strongly related to the B-scale and J-scale. If age is divided at 45 or 50, d for the B-scale is reduced. The year 1963 does seem to be a watershed in American racial attitudes.

In this data, negative ethnic beliefs show a strong relation to age. If this trend continues, these beliefs will be greatly reduced as younger ministers replace older ones. There are still some ministers 40 or less who score high on these scales, but clearly in terms of this trend, the future is optimistic for improved attitudes toward ethnic relations. The natural momentum of the trend makes it unlikely that it will be reversed in the next 25 years, although history shows that younger groups with less favorable beliefs could appear.

The patterns in the data on age fit with the conception of resocialization. Those age groups that were expected to show more rejection of the traditional images did so. Aging is not taken to be a cause of ethnic beliefs, instead age is interpreted to reflect the cumulative effect of resocialization, especially through the educational system.

Rural Location. *Spatial location is another factor which can help illuminate the social processes behind negative beliefs. The difference between urban and rural environments can be substantial. From a national perspective, much of Lancaster County would be classified as urban or suburban. Lancaster City is quite accessible for most people. Population densities are generally high, except in the southern end of the County. It is not many miles to Philadelphia and Baltimore.*

However, the image of Lancaster is rural. This could be just the heavy emphasis on countrified atmosphere and the Amish in tourist advertisements, but the importance of agriculture to the economy and the survival of a number of smaller towns indicate that it may be more than this. If the County has been thoroughly urbanized, then geographical location should make no difference in the Relic data. If rural culture is still strong, then it should have an impact.

Rural culture is normally thought of as more resistant to social change than urban culture. Traditional values, attitudes, and behavior survive longer. If this is true, the process of resocialization would predict that negative ethnic beliefs are also more likely to survive in rural areas. Rural schools, at least before many of them were consolidated, would be less likely to resocialize ethnic attitudes. Even if they tried as hard, cultural resistance would make the task more difficult. If rural culture is more integrated than urban, all the other agencies of socialization are more likely to exert a homogeneous influence on a person, making change more difficult.

There is clearly an alternative explanation for an urban/rural difference on ethnic beliefs. Minorities in Lancaster County are strongly concentrated in and around the City (see Chapter I). Evidence indicates that social contact with members of these groups is associated with lower levels of stereotyping.[19] *The Relic questionnaire did not ask about contacts with Blacks, Hispanics, or Jews. So the possibility exists that if urban ministers reject negative beliefs more, this is the reason.*

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19 See for example, William Brink and Louis Harris, The Negro Revolution in America, pp. 140-141. Unfortunately, cause and effect are not clear. Those who stereotype less may therefore have more social contact. The process of intergroup contacts is complex. For a detailed analysis, see Robin M. Williams, Jr. Strangers Next Door, Ch. 7.

To measure urban/rural, each respondent was coded according to the location of his church--in Lancaster City or its immediate suburbs, in larger towns (Columbia, Elizabethtown, Ephrata, Lititz, and Manheim, with populations from about 5,000 to 12,000), or in rural areas or smaller towns. This is not the same as whether he grew up in an urban or rural setting, but it is likely that many of the ministers who have more rural churches came from that background. In any case, they would now be closely involved in rural culture. Many of the urban ministers could have been raised in rural areas, but they may have preferred an urban church. The measure is not ideal, but it is adequate enough to be related to negative beliefs.

Tables IV-14 through IV-17 show that those from more rural areas do score higher on the B-scale and the J-scale. These associations are significant. They exist even though ministers in Lancaster City are somewhat more likely to be over 40 and rural ministers somewhat more likely to be 40 or under. Rural ministers are less educated (53% went to seminary versus 70% for the urban ministers), but those in larger towns are, on average, the best educated (78% seminary trained). It is true that more rural ministers are more likely to belong to conservative or fundamentalist denominations, but this is one of the features of the rural culture (see Chapter V).

TABLE IV-14
THE B-SCALE BY URBAN/RURAL LOCATION

		URBAN/RURAL			
		LANCASTER CITY	LARGER TOWNS	RURAL	TOTAL
B-scale:	0	60%	53%	40%	50%
		(33)	(17)	(24)	(74)
	1	27	19	33	28
		(15)	(6)	(20)	(41)
	2	13	28	27	22
		(7)	(9)	(16)	(32)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	100%
		(55)	(32)	(60)	(147)

Somer's d = .16

p = .0125

TABLE IV-15

THE H-SCALE BY URBAN/RURAL LOCATION

URBAN/RURAL

		LANCASTER CITY	LARGER TOWNS	RURAL	TOTAL
H-Scale:	0	54% (30)	50% (16)	48% (28)	50% (74)
	1	25 (14)	34 (11)	34 (20)	31 (45)
	2	21 (12)	16 (5)	19 (11)	19 (28)
TOTAL		100% (56)	100% (32)	101% (59)	100% (147)

Somer's d = .03

p = .3566

TABLE IV-16

THE J-SCALE BY URBAN/RURAL LOCATION

URBAN/RURAL

		LANCASTER CITY	LARGER TOWNS	RURAL	TOTAL
J-Scale:	0	23% (13)	22% (7)	18% (11)	21% (31)
	1	48 (27)	38 (12)	23 (14)	36 (53)
	2	29 (16)	41 (13)	58 (35)	43 (64)
TOTAL		100% (56)	101% (32)	99% (60)	100% (148)

Somer's d = .19

p = .0042

TABLE IV-17

THE E-SCALE BY URBAN/RURAL LOCATION

		URBAN/RURAL			
		LANCASTER CITY	LARGER TOWNS	RURAL	TOTAL
E-Scale:	0	22% (12)	19% (6)	19% (11)	20% (29)
	1	66 (36)	56 (18)	56 (33)	60 (87)
	2	13 (7)	25 (8)	25 (15)	21 (30)
TOTAL		101% (55)	100% (32)	100% (59)	101% (146)

Somer's d = .09

p = .0942

Rural location is not related to the H-Scale. In fact, a higher percentage of urban ministers scored high on this scale. This perhaps reflects a reaction to the newest and fastest growing sizable minority group in the City, but it is also true that some of the rural ministers indicated they knew little about Hispanics and so they answered "don't know" frequently. This kept them from scoring high on this scale.

An examination of the relations of rural location to the expanded scales shows r's of .21 for the Black scale, .10 for the Hispanic scale, .20 for the Jewish scale, and .22 for the combined scale. The Hispanic coefficient is still not statistically significant, but the one for the ethnic scale is.

The relations with rural location are not very strong, perhaps because the measure is not an entirely satisfactory indicator of rural culture. There is some doubt about the interpretation of the results, but they fit with the idea that rural areas are more resistant to change, including the resocialization of ethnic attitudes. Whatever the cause, location is important since it shows that support for human relations work is likely to be weaker in Lancaster County as a whole than in the City.

Other Social Characteristics. *Normally, in a survey, it is necessary to study other social variables. In the Relic data, some of these do not vary enough to have a significant effect. Sex was essentially controlled because only two respondents were women.*

Occupation was controlled because all were ministers, although it would have been useful to know which ones were part-time. Social class may not be fully controlled. This is usually measured by both occupation and income. Income would certainly vary and this tends to correlate with negative beliefs, but Selznick and Steinberg show that in their data this is largely because those with higher incomes are more educated.[20] *No question in the survey asked in which region of the*

20 The Tenacity of Prejudice, pp. 79-84, 176-177.

country the respondent was born and raised. This is certainly of importance because racial attitudes in the South have been more anti-Black. Since the only information available was college and seminary attended, the ministers were coded for attending one of these in the South. Only 9 were identified. Of these 5 scored 2 on the B-Scale and the other 4 scored 0. This was strongly related to age, with most of the older ones at 2 and the younger at 0. In order not to reduce the sample, these ministers were not excluded. Undoubtedly, most of the sample were raised in this area of the country.

Conclusions. *This chapter has been a study of the social location of negative ethnic beliefs--how they are distributed according to urban/rural areas, age groups, and educational background. The expectations about the data were confirmed, although the relations between these factors and the Hispanic scale are weaker, insignificant in the case of urban/rural differences. These expectations were based on socialization theory--that ethnic attitudes are learned, especially while growing up and going to school, and that they tend to persist in adulthood. It was assumed that the traditional stereotypes of Blacks and Jews were ingrained in American culture earlier in our history and that in order to change this, resocialization, particularly through the educational system, was necessary. This conception of the process provided predictions that fit the data. This analysis does not test the conception directly, since no data is available on the process itself, but it does show the product is what would be expected on the basis of this process.*

V. THE DENOMINATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NEGATIVE ETHNIC BELIEFS

This chapter returns to the problem of the impact of religion on negative ethnic beliefs. Here we will be concerned with the distribution of these beliefs in the various Christian denominations.

Denominations reflect the separations, and sometimes recombinations, of Christianity down through history. They are the present day survivors of past religious movements and theological controversies, often divided further by differences in the races and the ethnic backgrounds of immigrants to this country. They vary from large to small, from old--for example, Catholics, Lutherans, or Anabaptists--to fairly recent--the various fundamentalist or pentecostal churches. This variety is richly represented in Lancaster County. The Relic data finally required 32 different codes for denominations, even though independent fundamentalist churches were grouped together.

Denominations as Clusters of Religious Beliefs. *What does this denominational affiliation of ministers mean? What does it stand for? Two different answers can be offered. Denominations could be interpreted in terms of theological positions. They are, in this view, essentially fellowships of like-minded believers. They are surrogates for the religious beliefs of their members and differences among them should be related to these beliefs.*

Unfortunately, history, despite repeated attempts, has not done a neat job in sorting out religious beliefs. Schisms have involved doctrinal differences, but other factors also affect who leaves and who remains in the original church. Religious movements have normally influenced at least some members of almost all denominations, in addition to creating separate churches, as fundamentalism did in the earlier part of this century. Further complicating this process is the fact that the impact of these movements on denominations is highly differential: some are profoundly affected, while others are only marginally influenced. The current evangelical movement has had an impact on both Baptists and Episcopalians, but it has been much greater on the first than the second.[1]

This process has resulted in many American denominations accommodating a wide range of religious beliefs. Very few of them drive out "heretics," although theological conflicts can lead people, including ministers, to shift denominations. The wide range of religious beliefs and styles in the Baptist and Methodist traditions seems particularly American. Baptists are divided into various denominations or even independent local churches, some strongly Calvinist and others more Arminian in approach. The American Baptist Convention, the Northern, non-Black denomination, has had to absorb the impacts of the social gospel, modernist, fundamentalist, and evangelical movements. It has lost members to other Baptist denominations, but it spans a considerable variety of beliefs. The Church of the Brethren also seems to accommodate a particularly broad theological range.

This argument cannot be taken to the other extreme. Some denominations, especially smaller ones, appear able to maintain a remarkable uniformity of beliefs. Larger denominations normally have some religious beliefs or attitudes that predominate. There are real differences among denominations.

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1 See "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion, April/May, 1981, p. 23, for data on this from 1980 Gallup polls.

Denominations as Social Institutions. *A second approach to interpreting what denominational affiliation means is to treat the denominations as social institutions. They are usually formal organizations, with some means of church governance, but occasionally they are informally organized through networks of communications. They usually have professionals employed by the denomination, support colleges and seminaries, and publish magazines and books. The most loosely organized, like independent fundamentalist churches, seem to substitute allegiance to "non-denominational" organizations, perhaps for youth or mission work, for national affiliation. They also rely heavily on certain publishing concerns, on electronic communications, like television or the exchange of cassette tapes, and on traveling evangelists and gospel singers to provide mutual support, coordinate actions, and maintain similar beliefs and views. This can be a remarkably efficient communications system, spreading identical phrases rapidly nationwide*

Denominations as social institutions can be regarded as socialization agents, that is, they try to teach religious beliefs, whether these are very specific or very general; attitudes about other churches; personal moral conduct; and social life. This broad set of possible concerns indicates the potential importance of churches in socialization. Curiously, although the church is constantly mentioned in lists of agencies of socialization, not much research appears to have been done from this perspective. Beck suggests this may be because most people's exposure to the church is much more restricted than to parents, peers, or schools.[2] *Obviously, ministers are an exception to this rule. They are much more likely to have been active in a church while still young and they spend their lives in it. They have an assigned role in the institution, which brings to bear on them certain expectations and social pressures. They are normally economically dependent on their church. Realistically, in terms of career advancement, they often must be strongly oriented toward their denominations. They attend seminaries or Bible colleges or training sessions and these function as agencies of socialization for their denominations (or for mainline, evangelical, or fundmentalist denominations generally). Much of the literature published by a denomination is aimed at its ministers. For regular members, Sunday School and sermons may be important opportunities for socialization to the denomination, but the recruitment and socialization of ministers is critical for the preservation of the institution. Surely the Catholic or Lutheran Church would be quite different today had they never used clergy. If no professional ministers are hired, the denomination will have to place strong reliance on its basic writings and traditions and on the local fellowship of believers, as some of the Anabaptists have done.*

Denominational Conservatism and Negative Ethnic Beliefs. *Churches and denominations socialize their members and ministers, but they also interact with society and so have an effect on general socialization. In fact, some social theorists identify the principal role of religion as providing cohesion to society by conveying a common set of social values. In the U.S., we lack a single, established church or the religious unity of primitive societies to do this. Instead many more or less autonomous religious organizations exist. Those people most influential in each denomination--and to some extent, in each local church--can choose what social values will be taught. In relation to what*

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2 Paul Allen Beck, "The Role of Agents in Political Socialization," in Handbook of Political Socialization, ed. by Stanley Allen Renshon, p. 136.

is being examined in this study, they can choose to attempt to resocialize their ministers and members about negative ethnic beliefs or to ignore and even resist this. Resocialization, then is filtered through the beliefs and attitudes present in each denomination. Some will tend to resist this change, while others will regard it as an important part of their duties, an obligation of social conscience.

What basic attitude is likely to be critical in determining which of these two paths will be selected? Unfortunately, there seem to be a large number of possibilities, but I think the most probable one is the prevalent attitude in each denomination toward contemporary society. This may be basically favorable or unfavorable. It may approve or reject the official, "respectable" culture, especially the predominant values or ideal norms--those standards of conduct we feel we should live up to even when we do not. The difference on this attitude may correspond to the distinction between "worldly" and "other worldly" churches, but it is possible to have a great deal of concern for the world and still reject the predominant culture.

This criterion can be used to divide denominations into established versus conservative churches. Some denominations are frequently called mainline or mainstream, acknowledging this difference. These churches may be very critical of existing society and even favor social activism to change it. But this criticism tells us that we should live up to our ideal norms, to our professed values. The official values are employed as standards for current behavior and to encourage moral betterment.

The mainline denomination can also be called conservative, depending on the perspective used. They conserve and pass on present social values, such as liberal-democratic norms and a sense of obligation for the poor. In this sense, they seem to fulfill the religious role of conveying a common set of social values, but in the context of pluralistic society.

Generally, mainline denominations have large memberships and extensive national organizations. They are usually older than most conservative churches, having their historical roots before the 19th century. They normally support public schools and the type of liberal education taught in most colleges. They use professional ministers and prefer them to be highly educated. They find it reasonably easy to cooperate with other mainline Protestant denominations, both at the national and local level. They may, though, find conservative churches considerably harder to work with and may feel that they are not quite respectable, that they are more on the fringe of society, perhaps even something of an embarrassment to Christianity.

Conservative denominations are more difficult to typify. They have many doctrinal differences: some are strongly Calvinist, some strongly Arminian; some insist on Biblical literalism, others are more flexible; some emphasize strong personal, emotional experiences, as in holiness or pentecostal churches, while others are more legalistic in approach, as in fundamentalist churches that stress the right interpretation of the Bible; some may be premillenialists, some postmillenialists. This profusion of differences has frequently made cooperation among conservative churches more difficult than among mainline churches. It also makes creating a typology of denominations based on religious beliefs more difficult.[3]

However, these conservative denominations seem to share a critical attitude toward contemporary

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3 See David O. Moberg, The Church as a Social Institution: The Sociology of American Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 85-98.

society. This is a more basic or radical critique than that offered by mainline churches. Frequently, conservatives believe moral decay is far advanced in our society and that only a profound renewal can help. Our society, they say, must return to traditional Christian values to survive. In the cases of some denominations, they believe the corruption of the world cannot be changed and are otherworldly, concerned with preparing for the end.

The conservative denominations want to conserve something different than the mainline churches. The values to be preserved are traditional ones, the old social norms which seem to be those of 19th century America. These values are rural in origin, even if the conservatives are in an urban setting, as if they are refusing to adapt to contemporary urban society.[4]

Conservative denominations are frequently smaller than mainline ones and may have a less elaborate national structure. Some are essentially composed of the voluntary cooperation of independent, local churches. They are more likely to have historical roots in the 19th or even 20th century. If their date of origin does go back to the Reformation period, as with the Mennonites, then they had to maintain a rather remarkable separation from the world. Usually, the conservative disapproval of contemporary society leads them to create a separate educational system, if this is financially feasible. The desire for a Christian education leads to some suspicion of public and most private colleges, especially for ministers. Bible and strongly denominational colleges are normally very important in the socialization of many members and most ministers, although the importance attached to education as a criterion for selecting a pastor is often much less than in mainline churches. Finally, conservative denominations will often view the established churches as too worldly and smug, as departing from "old-fashioned" religion or Biblical demands.[5]

The expected result of denominational conservatism as defined here is that these churches are less likely to resocialize their ministers concerning negative ethnic beliefs because of their general resistance to the predominant, official culture and to new attitudes and values. The mainline denominations are likely to accept, even welcome, this resocialization and to regard it as a proper part of the social role of their churches. This would predict that denominational conservatism will be positively correlated with negative ethnic beliefs in the Relic data.

This data provides an unusually good test for this relation. In national samples of lay people, truly conservative denominations constitute a fairly small proportion. Some mainline denominations are more conservative than others, but the differences may wash out if these are used as the test, especially since there are conservatives in all denominations. In addition, churches can socialize their ministers in a deeper way than their average members.

Some may feel this has been a tortuous route to an obvious, perhaps even tautological, conclusion: conservatives will be conservative about their ethnic attitudes, as well as other things. But conservative and liberal are notoriously slippery concepts. It is clear that denominational conservatism

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4 Some may feel "reactionary" is a more accurate description of the views detailed here than "conservative," but that word is too peforative. In addtions, those in mainstream churches would acknowledge many values espoused by the conservatives as traditional American ones, but would be more likely to wonder how they can be adapted to modern society. It could be argued conservative churches have a role in society of preserving traditional values.

5 Of course, this discussion is influenced by Troeltsch's typology of church and sect and its intellectual descendents (see Ibid.). However, "sect" means something different to ministers than it does to sociologists and it would tend to be misleading in this report.

does not mean the same thing as negative ethnic beliefs: relating them is not a tautology. Conservatism, as defined here, is not political conservatism either. It is, in fact, clearly possible to be a member of a conservative denomination and a political liberal, as Jimmy Carter and Sen. Mark Hatfield show. Even establishing any consistent relation between religious and political conservatism has been difficult,[6] *since members of these churches are drawn disproportionately from the lower class and are frequently liberals in terms of their attitudes toward welfare and the role of government in the economy. Wuthnow, in a summary of the literature, shows that the hypothesis that the more religious or the more religiously conservative will be more conservative politically, economically, or socially has been often used, but most of the time it does not work. Of course, often the measures of religion have been very simple, for example, frequency of church attendence, and the samples composed largely of the religiously unsophisticated, making it difficult to develop better measures.*[7] *A sample of ministers provides a better opportunity to observe the impact of denominations and conservative religious beliefs.*

The initial test of the hypothesis relating denominational conservatism to negative beliefs was made using a grouping of denominational families worked out by Howard Kenig. This typology provided four, rather than two, categories: (1) mainline, urban oriented Protestant churches, such as the United Church of Christ, Methodists, and Lutherans; (2) conservative, more rural oriented churches, such as Baptists and Evangelical Congregationalists; (3) plain and non-resisting churches, such as the Mennonites and Church of the Brethren; and (4) Bible and fundamentalist churches, such as the Assemblies of God and independent fundamentalists. A few Protestant denominations with less orthodox views were not included and Catholics were excluded for this part of the analysis. The initial tests were positive and significant, even though it was not entirely clear the four groups could be treated as forming an ordinal scale ranking churches on denominational conservatism. Later the denominational categories were recoded to try to fit the criterion of the basic attitude toward contemporary society more closely. The most important revisions were splitting the Baptist denominations among mainline, conservative, and fundmentalist and the grouping of all holiness and pentacostal churches with the fundamentalists (see Appendix B for a more precise coding). This increased correlations between denominational groups and the negative scales marginally (the d's increased about .05).

Tables V-1 to V-4 present the information according to the revised coding. The fact that these denominational families are arranged in order on the ethnic scales seems to indicate that the average conservatism, in the sense of separation from contemporary society, does increase from conservative to plain to fundamentalist and holiness denominations. However, the proper ranking of the middle two groups is not clear because ministers of the plain churches are older--85% over 40--than the conservative ministers--62% over 40. The fundamentalist and holiness group are, on the other hand, younger--50% over 40.[8]

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6 Robert Wuthnow, "Religious Commitment and Conservatism: In Search of an Elusive Relationship," in Religion in Sociological Perspective: Essays in the Empirical Study of Religion, ed. by Charles Y. Glock (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), pp. 122-124.

7 More elaborate measures have been used in psychology. See James E. Dittes, "Psychology of Religion," in The Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, V, pp. 622-634.

8 Because of this, if age is controlled, the relation between denominational conservatism and negative beliefs increases.

If this measure of denominational conservatism is correlated with each of the expanded ethnic scales, the results are similar, except the relation with the composite scale increases more. For the Black scale, r=.29; for the Hispanic one, r=.27; for the Jewish one, r=.26[9] *and for the combined ethnic scale, r=.35.*

TABLE V-1
THE B-SCALE BY DENOMINATIONAL FAMILIES
DENOMINATIONAL FAMILIES

	MAINLINE	CONSERVATIVE	PLAIN	FUNDAMENTALIST and HOLINESS	TOTAL
B-Scale: 0	69%	46%	35%	35%	52%
	(42)	(6)	(12)	(9)	(69)
1	21	31	35	31	28
	(13)	(4)	(12)	(8)	(37)
2	10	23	29	35	21
	(6)	(3)	(10)	(9)	(28)
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%	101%	101%
	(61)	(13)	(34)	(26)	(134)

Somer's d = .28
p = .0001

TABLE V-2
THE H-SCALE BY DENOMINATIONAL FAMILIES
DENOMINATIONAL FAMILIES

	MAINLINE	CONSERVATIVE	PLAIN	FUNDAMENTALIST and HOLINESS	TOTAL
H-Scale: 0	65%	54%	39%	31%	51%
	(40)	(7)	(13)	(8)	(68)
1	21	31	42	39	31
	(13)	(4)	(14)	(10)	(41)
2	15	15	18	31	19
	(9)	(2)	(6)	(8)	(25)
TOTAL	101%	100%	99%	101%	101%
	(62)	(13)	(33)	(26)	(134)

Somer's d = .23
p = .0010

9 Removing those ministers who went to college in the South has little effect: r's for Blacks and Jews are reduced by .01 and r for Hispanics by .03.

TABLE V-3

THE J-SCALE BY DENOMINATIONAL FAMILIES

DENOMINATIONAL FAMILIES

		MAINLINE	CONSERVATIVE	PLAIN	FUNDAMENTALIST and HOLINESS	TOTAL
J-Scale:	0	31%	15%	15%	8%	21%
		(19)	(2)	(5)	(2)	(28)
	1	40	31	29	35	36
		(25)	(4)	(10)	(9)	(48)
	2	29	54	56	58	44
		(18)	(7)	(19)	(15)	(59)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	101%	101%
		(62)	(13)	(34)	(26)	(135)

Somer's d = .24

p = .0005

TABLE V-4

THE E-SCALE BY DENOMINATIONAL FAMILIES

DENOMINATIONAL FAMILIES

		MAINLINE	CONSERVATIVE	PLAIN	FUNDAMENTALIST and HOLINESS	TOTAL
E-Scale:	0	31%	15%	12%	8%	20%
		(19)	(2)	(4)	(2)	(27)
	1	57	62	64	58	59
		(35)	(8)	(21)	(15)	(79)
	2	12	23	24	35	20
		(7)	(3)	(8)	(9)	(27)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	101%	99%
		(61)	(13)	(33)	(26)	(133)

Somer's d = .24

p = .0003

An inspection of Tables V-1, V-3, and V-4, shows that all three conservative groups are more similar to each other than they are to the mainline ministers. (This is less true for the H-Scale in Table V-2.) When the ministers affiliated with conservative, plain, and fundamentalist/holiness denominations are combined, the results are Tables V-5 to V-8. These show that dividing the

Protestant denominations into mainline and conservative works quite well in the Relic data.[10] *In the end, it became clear that the simplest and most practical criterion for sorting these denominations would be whether they belonged to the National Council of Churches or not: mainline churches usually do and conservative ones usually do not.*[11] *This classification also has the advantage that it does not correlate with age--almost exactly the same percentage of ministers are over 40 in each category.*

When this dichotomous measure is related to the expanded scales, r is .33 for Blacks, .27 for Hispanics, .28 for Jews, and .37 for the composite ethnic scale. The measure is also related to other questions about these groups which were not used in the negative scales. For example, d=.28 for the responses to: "Many Blacks, by nature of their culture, are lazy and slow" and it is .18 for the same statement about Hispanics. The relation between denominational conservatism and "Many Jews are often too quick to claim that other people are persecuting or harassing them" is d=.34. All of these associations are statistically significant.

TABLE V-5
THE B-SCALE BY DENOMINATIONAL CONSERVATISM
DENOMINATIONAL CONSERVATISM

		MAINLINE	CONSERVATIVE	TOTAL
B-Scale:	0	69%	37%	52%
		(42)	(27)	(69)
	1	21	33	28
		(13)	(24)	(37)
	2	10	30	21
		(6)	(22)	(28)
TOTAL		100%	100%	101%
		(61)	(73)	(134)

Somer's d = .35
p = .0001

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10 The fact that the d's increase should not be regarded as indicating much: they tend to grow when a scale is collapsed.

11 "Mainline" in Tables V-5 to V-8 does include one Unitarian-Universalist minister, although this denomination does not belong to the Council, and "Conservative" includes nine Church of the Brethren, although that denomination does belong.

TABLE V-6

THE H-SCALE BY DENOMINATIONAL CONSERVATISM

DENOMINATIONAL CONSERVATISM

		MAINLINE	CONSERVATIVE	TOTAL
H-Scale:	0	65% (40)	39% (28)	51% (68)
	1	21 (13)	39 (28)	31 (41)
	2	15 (9)	22 (16)	19 (25)
TOTAL		101% (62)	100% (72)	101% (134)

Somer's d= .25

p = .0036

TABLE V-7

THE J-SCALE BY DENOMINATIONAL CONSERVATISM

DENOMINATIONAL CONSERVATISM

		MAINLINE	CONSERVATIVE	TOTAL
J-Scale:	0	31% (19)	12% (9)	21% (28)
	1	40 (25)	32 (23)	36 (48)
	2	29 (18)	56 (41)	44 (59)
TOTAL		100% (62)	100% (73)	101% (135)

Somer's d = .32

p = .0003

TABLE V-8

THE E-SCALE BY DENOMINATIONAL CONSERVATISM

		DENOMINATIONAL CONSERVATISM		
		MAINLINE	CONSERVATIVE	TOTAL
E-Scale:	0	31%	11%	20%
		(19)	(8)	(27)
	1	57	61	59
		(35)	(44)	(79)
	2	12	28	20
		(7)	(20)	(27)
TOTAL		100%	100%	99%
		(61)	(72)	(133)

Somer's d = .29

p = .0005

A final, more elaborate typology of denominations according to the classification scheme used in The Encyclopedia of American Religions, one based on theological tradition, was also used (see Appendix B for details). This divides the data too finely, resulting in several columns with small numbers of ministers. Differences in age are accentuated. Variations in educational level which may be accidental rather than caused by the different denominational attitudes toward ministerial training make interpretation difficult. However, with these cautions, the information is presented in Tables V-9 to V-12, with the age and educational differences listed at the bottom of Table V-9 for comparative purposes with all the tables.

Since the classification does not really form an ordinal scale, statistics are not presented with these tables. Actually, d's vary from .15 to .18 and are significant. If after examining the data, the categories had been rearranged, these coefficients could have been increased.[12] *Clearly, these theological families do vary on conservatism: some of these traditions separate the church from the world more than others.*

Modeling the Social Characteristics of Ethnic Beliefs. *So far we have considered four characteristics which are related to negative ethnic beliefs for ministers--lack of seminary education, age, more rural location of church, and denominational affiliation. These four variables are also more or less related to each other. What happens to each relation when the other variables are properly controlled? For example, is lack of seminary training linked to negative beliefs only because older ministers are more likely to be less educated and more likely, because of their age, to have these*

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12 Eta, which permits nominal level data for the independent variable, is reasonably strong for each table: .34 for Blacks, .31 for Hispanics, .29 for Jews, and .33 for the combined scale. But the assumption that all the column means are stable is probably violated (as well as the assumption that the dependent variable is interval level).

TABLE V-9

THE B-SCALE BY THEOLOGICAL FAMILIES

THEOLOGICAL FAMILIES

	LITURGICAL	LUTHERAN	REFORMED	PIETIST-METHODIST	EUROPEAN FREE CHURCH	BAPTIST	FUNDAMENTALIST HOLINESS and ADVENTIST	TOTAL
B-Scale: 0	54% (7)	60% (6)	70% (14)	64% (18)	35% (12)	62% (8)	30% (8)	50% (73)
1	15 (2)	30 (3)	30 (6)	25 (7)	35 (12)	8 (1)	33 (9)	28 (40)
2	31 (4)	10 (1)	0 (0)	11 (3)	30 (10)	31 (4)	37 (10)	22 (32)
TOTAL	100% (13)	100% (10)	100% (20)	100% (28)	100% (34)	101% (13)	100% (27)	100% (145)
Age: Over 40	61%	60%	75%	70%	85%	46%	52%	67%
Education: Seminary	75%	100%	100%	87%	41%	62%	30%	65%

TABLE V-10
THE H-SCALE BY THEOLOGICAL FAMILIES
THEOLOGICAL FAMILIES

	LITURGICAL	LUTHERAN	REFORMED	PIETIST-METHODIST	EUROPEAN FREE CHURCH	BAPTIST	FUNDAMENTALIST HOLINESS and ADVENTIST	TOTAL
H-Scale: 0	46%	70%	65%	66%	39%	46%	30%	50%
	(6)	(7)	(13)	(19)	(13)	(6)	(8)	(72)
1	15	30	30	14	42	46	37	31
	(2)	(3)	(6)	(4)	(14)	(6)	(10)	(45)
2	39	0	5	21	18	8	33	19
	(5)	(0)	(1)	(6)	(6)	(1)	(9)	(28)
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	101%	99%	100%	100%	100%
	(13)	(10)	(20)	(29)	(33)	(13)	(27)	(145)

TABLE V-11

THE J-SCALE BY THEOLOGICAL FAMILIES

THEOLOGICAL FAMILIES

	LITURGICAL	LUTHERAN	REFORMED	PIETIST-METHODIST	EUROPEAN FREE CHURCH	BAPTIST	FUNDAMENTALIST HOLINESS and ADVENTIST	TOTAL
J-Scale: 0	31% (4)	40% (4)	40% (8)	14% (4)	15% (5)	23% (3)	11% (3)	21% (31)
1	23 (3)	30 (3)	45 (9)	45 (13)	29 (10)	23 (3)	41 (11)	36 (52)
2	46 (6)	30 (3)	15 (3)	41 (12)	56 (19)	54 (7)	48 (13)	43 (63)
TOTAL	100% (13)	100% (10)	100% (20)	100% (29)	100% (34)	100% (13)	100% (27)	100% (146)

TABLE V-12
THE E-SCALE BY THEOLOGICAL FAMILIES
THEOLOGICAL FAMILIES

	LITURGICAL	LUTHERAN	REFORMED	PIETIST-METHODIST	EUROPEAN FREE CHURCH	BAPTIST	FUNDAMENTALIST HOLINESS and ADVENTIST	TOTAL
E-Scale: 0	23%	40%	40%	14%	12%	23%	11%	20%
	(3)	(4)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(3)	(3)	(29)
1	46	50	60	75	64	46	52	59
	(6)	(5)	(12)	(21)	(21)	(6)	(14)	(85)
2	31	10	0	11	24	31	37	21
	(4)	(1)	(0)	(3)	(8)	(4)	(10)	(30)
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(13)	(10)	(20)	(28)	(33)	(13)	(27)	(144)

beliefs? Is this relation between education and ethnic beliefs spurious, a correlation that occurs in the data, but not one that identifies a cause?[13]

Because of the small size of the Relic sample, it proved difficult to control for one or two or three variables using tables. Therefore, multiple regression and path analysis were employed (see Appendix E). This does involve assuming that the variables can be treated as interval level data (see Appendix D).

To properly control for the different social characteristics, it is necessary to create a model. This must be done because the variables are not independent of each other. Some of them need to be treated as both causes and effects. For example, a minister who belongs to a conservative denomination is more likely to be assigned to a church in a rural setting and, therefore, rural location should be treated as a cause and as an effect. The model needed to deal with this complication is actually made up of a set of regression equations, but frequently a diagram can simplify understanding and working with it (see Figure V-1). The diagram indicates the assumptions made about whether a variable is a cause, an effect, or both. If the variables can be ranked in a hierarchy from the most basic cause[14] *to the pure effect, the model is much easier to use. This ranking assumes a "weak causal ordering": those variables ranked high may cause those lower in the hierarchy, but no lower variable causes one ranked higher.*

Figure V-1 assumes the following order: 1) age, 2) denominational conservatism, 3) seminary education, 4) rural location of church, and 5) negative ethnic beliefs (using the expanded scale). This means age is assumed not to be affected by the other factors in the model, but it may, for example, be negatively related to seminary education. Denominational affiliation affects whether a minister needed to attend seminary and the likelihood of his being assigned to a church in a more rural setting. If he has seminary education, he is more likely to be assigned an urban church.

This hierarchy is necessary to properly control for different effects, but the data determines whether an arrow (usually called a "path") in a model will be significant and how strong it will be. If the model in Figure V-1 is statistically estimated using the Relic data, the results are the numbers near each arrow (normally called "path coefficients"). These are standardized regression coefficients and the one between the first and second variable in the ordering--in this case, between age and denominational conservatism--is identical to Pearson's r. This means no other variables are controlled for. The other coefficients indicate the magnitude of the relations with some or all of the other variables controlled (see Appendix E). Table V-13 presents the path coefficients for each equation of the model in each column. From this information, the total effects of each variable, properly controlled, can be calculated and compared. The results of this are shown in Table V-14, with the characteristics in the model listed according to relative impact on ethnic beliefs. All four have significant, independent direct effects, but these vary from fairly strong to fairly weak.

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13 On the logic of spuriousness, see Herbert Simon, Models of Man (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 37-49.

14 This is not necessarily the same as the most statistically important or theoretically interesting variable.

FIGURE V-1: A SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS MODEL OF NEGATIVE ETHNIC ATTITUDES (5 Variables)



Includes significant paths only.

TABLE V-13

PATH COEFFICIENTS FOR THE SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS MODEL (5 VARIABLES)

Independent Variables:	DENOMINATIONAL CONSERVATISM	SEMINARY EDUCATION	RURAL LOCATION	NEGATIVE ETHNIC BELIEFS
1. Age	.022*	.006*	-.047*	.355
2. Denominational Conservatism		-.572	.252	.192
3. Seminary Education			-.073*	-.190
4. Rural Location				.221

N = 133 Multiple R = .575 (for last column)

*F test not significant.

TABLE V-14

TOTAL EFFECTS FOR THE SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS MODEL

	DIRECT EFFECTS	INDIRECT EFFECTS	TOTAL
1. Denominational Conservatism	.192	.174	.366
2. Age	.355	-.007	.348
3. Rural Location	.221	---	.221
4. Seminary Education	-.190	-.016	-.206

Age remains an important factor in this model with the largest direct effect. However, it has little interaction with the other three characteristics: controlling for it has almost no impact on these variables. This shows that, in the example previously cited, the relation between seminary education and ethnic beliefs is not a spurious correlation due to the effects of age on these two variables.

The importance of age is not due to the assumption that it ranks first in the causal ordering. It could be placed anywhere and the results would be almost identical. The relative importance of a "basic" variable depends on the size of its paths. If they are small enough, their cumulative effects will be small, making the variable seem weak, remote, and unimportant. Age would appear this way if it did not have a strong direct effect.

The three other variables also have independent effects. The urban or rural location of a minister's church has a fairly weak, but significant, effect (.221) in the model.[15] *Controlling for age*

15 This effect does depend somewhat on the ordering of the variables. If the rural location is taken as an indicator of background and therefore as increasing the likelihood of being raised in a conservative church, this would increase its effects by about .03 to .10, depending on the exact order. This could put rural location a bit over .3.

increases the rural effect, but controlling for denominational conservatism almost exactly balances the impact of age.

Denominational conservatism is the characteristic that has the largest effect in this model--.366. The direct effect, with all other variables controlled, is significant, but fairly weak by itself. The indirect paths are the strongest in the model. Some of this comes from the tendency for ministers affiliated with the conservative type of churches to have positions in more rural areas. This accounts for .056 of the effects. The largest indirect impact is due to the strongest link in the model, the correlation of .572 between denominational conservatism and lack of seminary training. This contributes .118 to the total effects of conservatism.

This result should not be surprising. Denominations usually supervise seminaries. These institutions are the principal instruments of socialization for ministers in each denomination, so they will also tend to resocialize students with racial and ethnic attitudes different from those regarded as proper by the denomination. Seminaries are professional schools and must be concerned with finding placements for their graduates. Working relations with a denomination--or with mainline denominations generally or with some grouping of independent churches--are vital to their programs. In addition, many conservative churches are much less likely to regard seminary training as a required qualification for ministers. The attitudes toward education vary among denominations in such a way that the coefficient for seminary could be interpreted as being largely due to them. It is probably true that the effects of these two cannot be totally separated, at least in this type of broad survey data. This is not a serious difficulty if both variables are thought of mainly in terms of the socialization process, realizing that they will normally be closely linked. This would result in the same general interpretation whether the effects are attributed to denominations or seminaries or both working jointly. It is more of a problem if denominations are taken to indicate religious beliefs and seminary training to indicate an extension of general education, having an impact largely through its effect on cognitive functioning.

The data does show seminary attendance as having an independent, if limited, effect even when denominational conservatism is controlled. Since only a few mainline ministers did not attend, this probably depends largely on those in conservative churches who are seminary trained having ethnic beliefs less negative than those in these churches who did not go to seminary.

The causal order of conservatism and education can be reversed, although this would assume that ministers tend to select mainline denominations because they happen to have received seminary training, rather than attending seminaries because their denomination requires it. This seems doubtful, but if it is done, the total effects of seminary increase to -.348 and those of denominational conservatism decrease to .248.

Conclusions. *Being affiliated with a mainline Protestant denomination reduces negative ethnic beliefs by ministers. Part of this effect is due to these churches providing more graduate, professional training through seminaries. The resocialization of ethnic attitudes in and through these mainline schools is probably fairly complete, at least among those that supply ministers to Lancaster County and in relation to these traditional stereotypes. On the other hand, conservative*

Protestant denominations--ones with critical attitudes toward contemporary society or beliefs about separation from the world--cling more closely to traditional values and beliefs. They do this too indiscriminately, preserving the bad with the good, traditional American stereotypes along with more positive aspects of our past. Denominational conservatism shelters these negative beliefs from resocialization away from racism and ethnocentrism. Certainly, it is appropriate to point out this is in contrast to mainline ministers and some in denominations classified as conservative showed no trace of ethnocentrism of the type measured in this study. However, the relation of denominational conservatism and ethnic beliefs is significant and fairly strong. It is not produced spuriously by differences in age or by the more rural setting of conservative churches, but seems due to the characteristics of this type of denomination.

Both rural location of church and age of minister retain independent effects on ethnic beliefs. Rural institutions and attitudes enable ministers from conservative denominations to maintain traditional stereotypes more than those from the same denominations in an urban setting. Rural culture seems more resistant to change, including the resocialization of ethnic beliefs. This locational effect is not very strong when denominational conservatism is controlled. This indicates Lancaster City and the more rural areas of the County are still different, but the contrast is not very striking.

The effects of age are stronger than those of rural location. The possibility that people become more ethnocentric as they get older cannot be completely ruled out, but it is unlikely that this aging effect is important in this data. Age correlates with negative beliefs basically because of the historical trend away from racism and ethnic hostility in America. Resocialization concerning stereotypes, especially of the young through the public school system, is probably the most important source of this change.

The association of ethnic attitudes with age promises future reductions in the prevalence of negative images, but this is a very gradual process and, by itself, may never eliminate all problems arising from the stereotyping of minority groups.

VI. RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC BELIEFS

The previous chapter showed that denominational conservatism is related to negative ethnic beliefs. However, the interpretation did not assume that this relation was intrinsic, that religious conservatism must always lead to these beliefs. Instead the association was interpreted in terms of the operations of history and social processes. It was possible to imagine conservative denominations gradually absorbing positive ethnic beliefs and, in a future period of increased intergroup hostility, becoming defenders of minorities against the prevailing culture.

However, this interpretation was preferred not just because it seemed to fit a measure of denominational affiliation better, but also because it did not assume that conservative religious beliefs cause ethnocentrism. That seemed a large assumption to make on rather indirect information. This chapter will examine what the Relic data seems to say about this important relation of religious and ethnic beliefs.

Glock and Stark's Model of Anti-Semitism. *Glock and Stark, in their study of Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism and in a supplemental study of ministers,[1] found anti-Semitism to be stronger in more conservative denominations.[2] They treated these denominations as clusters of religious beliefs[3] and went on to present several analyses to support their contention that Christianity "not only played a crucial historical role in the rise of anti-Semitism, but that even today it continues to reinforce and foster hatred of the Jews."[4] They locate the roots of anti-Semitism in a "process" which leads from Christian orthodoxy to particularism about salvation to religious hostility toward contemporary Jews and finally to secular anti-Semitism. "Almost inexorably, those caught up in this syndrome of religious ideology are led to a general hostility toward the Jews."[5] They do not present tables showing the relations of anti-Semitism to orthodoxy and particularism directly; instead, an Index of Religious Bigotry is used.[6] This combines the results of a large number of questions in such a way that religious hostility to Jews is weighted much more than orthodoxy or particularism. Therefore, their results have been attacked as misleading and due just to the interrelations of anti-Jewish questions.[7]*

Later Glock and Stark (with Bruce Foster and Harold Quinley) analyzed Quinley's sample of California ministers and compared it to their sample of church members from the San Francisco area. They do present a model of their process with path coefficients, but they do not calculate the total effects so that the importance of each variable is clear (see Chapter V and Appendix E on path analysis). Table VI-A presents the results of these calculations, using all paths. In the church member sample, the total effects of orthodoxy (.074) and particularism (.137) on anti-Semitism are rather weak. The reason for this is that the path from religious hostility toward Jews and secular

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1 Rodney Stark, et al., Wayward Shepherds: Prejudice and the Protestant Clergy.

2 Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism, p. 129.

3 For their sample of laypersons, mostly from mainline denominations, they could be right. Other socializing except those about fairly simple and specific religious beliefs, may be very muted.

4 Ibid., p. 137.

5 Ibid., p. 209.

6 Ibid., pp. 135-136.

7 James E. Dittes. "Psychology of Religion" in The Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, V, p. 629. This was published in 1969.

Christian beliefs, rather than leading "almost inexorably" to secular anti-Semitism, has a rather limited impact, apparently because these people do not generalize well from their religious attitudes to secular affairs. This happens in opinion polls: the public refuses to be logical, probably because they have not bothered to think much about it.

The evidence for Glock and Stark's model is better in the clergy sample. Particularism has almost no effect, although they attribute this to skewed distributions, but orthodoxy is related to religious hostility more strongly (almost .4) and this hostility is generalized to secular attitudes toward Jews at a somewhat higher rate (.295). Still the total effects of orthodoxy are .218, a significant, but not very strong, relation between Christian beliefs and anti-Semitism. (In their original book, they argued that religious libertarianism can reduce the link, but this was apparently not measured for the sample of ministers,[8] *so there is no way to tell if controlling for it would increase or decrease the impact of orthodoxy.)*

TABLE VI-A: TOTAL EFFECTS IN GLOCK AND STARK'S MODEL OF ANTI-SEMITISM

	DIRECT EFFECTS	INDIRECT EFFECTS	TOTAL
Church Member Sample:			
1. Orthodoxy	-.032	.106	.074
2. Particularism	.087	.050	.137
3. Historical Jews as Crucifiers	-.001	.009	.008
4. Religious Hostility toward Contemporary Jews	.200	-	.200
Clergy Sample:			
1. Orthodoxy	.074	.144	.218
2. Particularism	.004	.038	.042
3. Historical Jews	.070	.005	.075
4. Religious Hostility	.295	-	.295

Based on Rodney Stark, et al., Wayward Shepherds, pp. 80-84, 127-128.

Some of Glock and Stark's difficulty in showing a strong relation between religious beliefs and ethnic attitudes may be because the samples come from a liberal area and most of the ministers are from mainline denominations. The Relic data provides the possibility of examining the effects of orthodoxy and particularism in a more conservative location.

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8 Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism, Chapter 5 on liberatianism.

Orthodoxy. *The fact that Lancaster is religiously conservative presented a difficulty in constructing a measure of orthodoxy (see Appendix C for details on the scales used in this chapter). A question on the divinity of Christ had to be used, even though only one minister disagreed with it. "Do you believe in the devil?" helped to sort out some of the more liberal ministers, but a question on bodily resurrection had to be used as the final one in the scale. It can be questioned whether denying this is heterodox.*

Tables VI-1 to VI-4[9] *present the relations of this scale to ethnic beliefs. Table VI-3 confirms a significant, but fairly weak, relation between orthodoxy and negative beliefs about Jews. Table VI-1 shows a relation between orthodoxy and beliefs about Blacks, which is contrary to Glock and Stark's findings. In fact, they argue that the lack of this relation in their data increased "our confidence that we have isolated specifically religious factors to account for much contemporary anti-Semitism, because they fail to have any important effect on racial attitudes."*[10] *This is not confirmed by the Relic data, although the relation between orthodoxy and the expanded Black scale is a rather weak r=.16 (p = .02). Table VI-2 shows that d is not significant for the Hispanic scale, but r for the expanded scale is almost as strong as for the expanded Black scale. The correlation of orthodoxy and the expanded, composite E-scale is the largest--r=.31. Since this scale varies more than any of the others, this may be mainly due to the statistical mechanics, but it suggests the possibility that orthodoxy is more related to a general ethnocentrism than to specific attitudes toward Jews.*

Particularism. *Marion J. Levy, Jr., distinguishes between "exclusive" and "nonexclusive" religions. "One may not, institutionally speaking, be both a Christian and a Jew simultaneously... One may not be both a Catholic and a Baptist."*[11] *Levy says this contrasts with religions like Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, which are nonexclusive and can be accepted at the same time by the same person. In societies which have more than one exclusive religion, conflict between them is more likely.*[12]

Levy's exclusive religion is similar to Glock and Stark's particularism--"the belief that only one's own religion is legitimate."[13] *They agree that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam were historically particularistic faiths, but argue that Christianity developed this to the highest degree by taking over the centralization of the Roman Empire.*[14] *The fruits of this were shown during the Inquisition. The Reformation destroyed the unity of the Church, but particularism survived. A theology of religious tolerance is a recent development in the history of Christianity and Glock and Stark believe particularistic views still persist in contemporary America, although legitimacy is not normally restricted only to one's own denomination.*

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9 Table VI-25 provides a summary of the relations between the scales used in this chapter and ethnic beliefs.

10 Ibid., pp. 170-171.

11 Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 1952, p. 514.

12 Ibid., p. 515.

13 Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism, p. 20.

14 Ibid., pp. 28-35.

TABLE VI-1

THE B-SCALE BY ORTHODOXY SCALE

ORTHODOXY

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
B-Scale:	0		75%	59%	39%	50%
			(12)	(30)	(31)	(74)
	1		6	24	35	28
			(1)	(12)	(28)	(41)
	2		19	18	25	22
			(3)	(9)	(20)	(32)
TOTAL:		(1)*	100%	101%	99%	100%
			(16)	(51)	(79)	(147)

Somer's d = .21

p = .0030

*Data not reported because only one respondent is involved.

TABLE VI-2

THE H-SCALE BY ORTHODOXY SCALE

ORTHODOXY

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
H-Scale:	0		69%	50%	46%	50%
			(11)	(26)	(36)	(74)
	1		19	31	33	31
			(3)	(16)	(26)	(45)
	2		13	19	21	19
			(2)	(10)	(16)	(28)
TOTAL:		(1)	101%	100%	100%	100%
			(16)	(52)	(78)	(147)

Somer's d = .10

p = .0897

TABLE VI-3

THE J-SCALE BY ORTHODOXY SCALE

ORTHODOXY

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
J-Scale:	0		44%	25%	14%	21%
			(7)	(13)	(11)	(31)
	1		38	35	35	36
			(6)	(18)	(28)	(53)
	2		19	40	51	43
			(3)	(21)	(40)	(64)
TOTAL			101%	100%	100%	100%
		(1)	(16)	(52)	(79)	(148)

Somer's d = .22

p = .0030

TABLE VI-4

THE E-SCALE BY ORTHODOXY SCALE

ORTHODOXY

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
E-Scale:	0		44%	24%	13%	20%
			(7)	(12)	(10)	(29)
	1		38	61	63	60
			(6)	(31)	(49)	(87)
	2		19	16	24	21
			(3)	(8)	(19)	(30)
TOTAL			101%	101%	100%	101%
		(1)	(16)	(51)	(78)	(146)

Somer's d = .18

p = .0091

TABLE VI-5

THE B-SCALE BY PARTICULARISM SCALE

PARTICULARISM

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
B-Scale:	0	47%	64%	58%	35%	49%
		(7)	(14)	(29)	(18)	(68)
	1	20	27	30	31	29
		(3)	(6)	(15)	(16)	(40)
	2	33	9	12	35	22
		(5)	(2)	(6)	(18)	(31)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	101%	100%
		(15)	(22)	(50)	(52)	(139)

Somer's d = .16

p = .0104

TABLE VI-6

THE H-SCALE BY PARTICULARISM SCALE

PARTICULARISM

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
H-Scale:	0	67%	61%	49%	40%	50%
		(10)	(14)	(24)	(21)	(69)
	1	13	22	37	35	31
		(2)	(5)	(18)	(18)	(43)
	2	20	17	14	25	19
		(3)	(4)	(7)	(13)	(27)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(15)	(23)	(49)	(52)	(139)

Somer's d = .14

p = .0240

TABLE VI-7

THE J-SCALE BY PARTICULARISM SCALE

PARTICULARISM

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
J-Scale:	0	27%	39%	18%	12%	20%
		(4)	(9)	(9)	(6)	(28)
	1	53	30	34	35	36
		(8)	(7)	(17)	(18)	(50)
	2	20	30	48	54	44
		(3)	(7)	(24)	(28)	(62)
TOTAL		100%	99%	100%	101%	100%
		(15)	(23)	(50)	(52)	(140)

Somer's d = .20

p = .0021

TABLE VI-8

THE E-SCALE BY PARTICULARISM SCALE

PARTICULARISM

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
E-Scale:	0	20%	41%	18%	10%	19%
		(3)	(9)	(9)	(5)	(26)
	1	53	46	71	58	60
		(8)	(10)	(35)	(30)	(83)
	2	27	14	10	33	21
		(4)	(3)	(5)	(17)	(29)
TOTAL		100%	101%	99%	101%	100%
		(15)	(22)	(49)	(52)	(138)

Somer's d = .18

p = .0034

Glock and Stark measure particularism in terms of restrictions placed on gaining salvation. If a respondent says that someone cannot be saved if he has never heard of Christ, that is regarded as a particularist reply. (See Appendix C for the complete scale used in this study.)

Tables VI-5 to VI-8 relate particularism to the negative scales. The associations are approximately the same as for orthodoxy, even though the relation between the two religious scales is not as high as might be expected (d=.33, treating orthodoxy as cause and particularism as effect, and r=.40, which is .12 less than Glock and Stark found in their ministerial sample). If the expanded scales are used, the coefficients for the Hispanic scale and especially the E-scale are increased, the latter to r=.27.

These findings can be taken as confirming Glock and Stark's expectations that Christian orthodoxy and particularism will be related to negative beliefs about Jews. However, the Relic data does not show that these factors are either powerful sources of anti-Semitism or that they are uniquely related to attitudes toward Jews. If anything, they have more impact on a general tendency to accept traditional stereotypes.

Evangelism. *Other scales about religious beliefs were also created from the Relic interviews. One measured evangelism. Those who regard this as very important and who said that their church emphasized witnessing to others ranked higher on this scale (see Appendix C).*

Tables VI-9 to VI-12 present the data for this scale. The associations are generally of the same magnitude as for orthodoxy and particularism. (It is related to each of them reasonably strongly: d=.41 and r=.46 for orthodoxy and d=.42 and r=.50 for particularism.)

The expanded scales indicate that evangelism is somewhat more related to the Jewish and the combined scale. For Blacks, r=.22; for Hispanics, r=.26; for Jews, r=.30; and for the E-scale, r=.32.

Jews, of course, have often been the particular target of evangelism, especially, but not exclusively, by those Christians who believe the Second Coming requires the conversion of the Jews. In fact, one question in the Relic interview schedule asked ministers how interested they would be in attending a talk by a former Orthodox Jew on his conversion to "Jesus as his Savior." This associated strongly with the J-scale (d=.42),[15] *indicating that those more interested were also more likely to accept the traditional stereotype of the materialistic Jew (69% ranked high on the J-scale). The question was also related more weakly to the B-scale and H-scale (d=.26 for each).*

Belief in Biblical Prophecy. *Another measure was more strongly related to negative ethnic beliefs than any of the three scales considered so far. This was the extent a minister believed in Biblical prophecy, especially about the future and about the creation of the state of Israel (see Appendix C). Although this scale was related to the three previous ones, particularly particularism (d=.40) and evangelism (d=.41), it did a better job of predicting ministers' ethnic views.*

Tables VI-13 to VI-16 show the relations between Biblical prophecy and the negative scales. For the expanded scales, r=.29 for Blacks, r=.35 for Hispanics, r=.35 for Jews, and r=.40 for the E-scale. An examination of the tables shows that those who rejected Biblical prophecy more were also very likely to have rejected the statements about ethnic groups. Since the scale was skewed to

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15 It should be pointed out that this association is for a single question. It should not be compared directly to the other d's in this chapter which relate scales.

TABLE VI-9

THE B-SCALE BY EVANGELISM SCALE

		EVANGELISM				
		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
B-Scale:	0	77%	57%	53%	40%	52%
		(13)	(21)	(16)	(21)	(71)
	1	24	27	20	34	28
		(4)	(10)	(6)	(18)	(38)
	2	0	16	27	26	20
		(0)	(6)	(8)	(14)	(28)
TOTAL		101%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(17)	(37)	(30)	(53)	(137)

Somer's d = .19

p = .0028

TABLE VI-10

THE H-SCALE BY EVANGELISM SCALE

		EVANGELISM				
		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
H-Scale:	0	77%	57%	52%	38%	51%
		(13)	(21)	(16)	(20)	(70)
	1	18	22	23	45	30
		(3)	(8)	(7)	(24)	(42)
	2	6	22	26	17	19
		(1)	(8)	(8)	(9)	(26)
TOTAL		101%	101%	101%	100%	100%
		(17)	(37)	(31)	(53)	(138)

Somer's d = .16

p = .0126

TABLE VI-11

THE J-SCALE BY EVANGELISM SCALE

EVANGELISM

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
J-Scale:	0	47%	30%	13%	13%	22%
		(8)	(11)	(4)	(7)	(30)
	1	47	32	29	36	35
		(8)	(12)	(9)	(19)	(48)
	2	6	38	58	51	44
		(1)	(14)	(18)	(27)	(60)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	100%	101%
		(17)	(37)	(31)	(53)	(138)

Somer's d = .23

p = .0005

TABLE VI-12

THE E-SCALE BY EVANGELISM SCALE

EVANGELISM

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
E-Scale:	0	47%	27%	13%	13%	21%
		(8)	(10)	(4)	(7)	(29)
	1	53	60	60	60	59
		(9)	(22)	(18)	(32)	(81)
	2	0	14	27	26	20
		(0)	(5)	(8)	(14)	(27)
TOTAL		100%	101%	100%	99%	100%
		(17)	(37)	(30)	(53)	(137)

Somer's d = .22

p = .0004

TABLE VI-13

THE B-SCALE BY BIBLICAL PROPHECY SCALE

BIBLICAL PROPHECY

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
B-Scale:	0	71%	85%	59%	40%	51%
		(5)	(11)	(23)	(35)	(74)
	1	29	8	23	33	28
		(2)	(1)	(9)	(29)	(41)
	2	0	8	18	26	21
		(0)	(1)	(7)	(23)	(31)
TOTAL		100%	101%	100%	99%	100%
		(7)	(13)	(39)	(87)	(146)

Somer's d = .26

p = .0006

TABLE VI-14

THE H-SCALE BY BIBLICAL PROPHECY SCALE

BIBLICAL PROPHECY

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
H-Scale:	0	86%	84%	59%	39%	50%
		(6)	(11)	(23)	(34)	(74)
	1	14	8	26	38	31
		(1)	(1)	(10)	(33)	(45)
	2	0	8	15	24	19
		(0)	(1)	(6)	(21)	(28)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	101%	100%
		(7)	(13)	(39)	(88)	(147)

Somer's d = .29

p = .0001

TABLE VI-15

THE J-SCALE BY BIBLICAL PROPHECY SCALE

BIBLICAL PROPHECY

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
J-Scale:	0	43%	54%	21%	15%	21%
		(3)	(7)	(8)	(13)	(31)
	1	57	39	46	30	36
		(4)	(5)	(18)	(26)	(53)
	2	0	8	33	56	43
		(0)	(1)	(13)	(49)	(63)
TOTAL		100%	101%	100%	101%	100%
		(7)	(13)	(39)	(88)	(147)

Somer's d = .35

p = .0000

TABLE VI-16

THE E-SCALE BY BIBLICAL PROPHECY SCALE

BIBLICAL PROPHECY

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
E-Scale:	0	43%	54%	18%	14%	20%
		(3)	(7)	(7)	(12)	(29)
	1	57	39	64	61	60
		(4)	(5)	(25)	(53)	(87)
	2	0	8	18	25	21
		(0)	(1)	(7)	(22)	(30)
TOTAL		100%	101%	100%	100%	101%
		(7)	(13)	(39)	(87)	(146)

Somer's d = .23

p = .0012

the top, with over half of the sample agreeing to all of the questions, there are a fair number who rank high on prophecy, but low on ethnic beliefs. It would have been very useful to have one more question in this scale which was more difficult to agree with.

Religious Distrust. *This is a measure of the extent to which ministers feel distrustful about people who do not believe in God–are these people "likely to hold dangerous political ideas" or is a homosexual "likely not to believe in God?" (See Appendix C.)*

This was associated rather strongly with the ethnic scales (see Tables VI-17 to VI-20). The d's for the H-scale and J-scale are .36 for each. The correlations for the expanded scales show the strength of these relations better: r=.39 for the Black scale, r = .46 for the Hispanic scale, r=.47 for the Jewish scale, and r=.55 for the E-scale.

Belief in Civil Liberties. *This scale is intended to reflect a minister's commitment to civil liberties by asking whether an atheist should be restricted in his conduct or if a film should be banned if it portrays Jesus in the wrong light (see Appendix C). The scale is similar to what Glock and Stark called religious libertarianism.*[16]

This scale is also rather strongly related with the ethnic scales (see Tables VI-21 to VI-24). The r's for the expanded measures are -.39 for the Black Scale, -.48 for the Hispanic, -.49 for the Jewish, and -.54 for the E-scale.

Table VI-25 provides a summary of the Somer's d's and Pearson's r's for the various religious scales--plus denominational conservatism--and the ethnic scales.[17] *As was mentioned, the scales of religious beliefs are interrelated. The first four scales discussed are a set of doctrinal beliefs. Those who are more orthodox tend to be more particularistic and evangelical and to believe in Biblical prophecy more strongly. However, the interrelations are far from perfect (r's vary from .39 to .57). This set of doctrines seems clearly related to negative ethnic attitudes in this data. It is also, of course, related to denominational conservatism. Controlling for age reduces the relations between religious distrust and civil liberties and negative beliefs, although they are still quite strong. However, age has little impact on Biblical prophecy, evangelism, particularism, and orthodoxy and cannot explain why they associate with negative beliefs.*

Modeling Religious and Ethnic Beliefs. *In order to properly estimate the relative impact of religious beliefs on ethnic attitudes, modeling and path analysis will again be used (see Chapter V and Appendix E).*

In order to simplify, it will initially be assumed that Biblical prophecy, since it correlates most strongly with the expanded ethnic measure, is the best indicator of doctrinal beliefs to use in the model. Figure VI-1 diagrams a four variable model of ministers' beliefs. The hierarchy used is: 1) Biblical prophecy, 2) religious distrust, 3) civil liberties, and 4) negative ethnic beliefs. This assumes that attitudes about religious censorship and civil liberties for atheists may affect ethnic beliefs. Distrust of non-religious people can have an impact on ethnic beliefs and civil liberties. However, a minister's theological beliefs, represented by Biblical prophecy, are treated as basic

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16 Ibid., ch. 5.

17 Several other scales of religious beliefs were created and they also correlated with the ethnic scales. It appears in the Relic data that any measure which ranks ministers from more religiously conservative to more liberal is associated with ethnic attitudes. The other scales are not used here because they were more difficult to interpret.

TABLE VI-17

THE B-SCALE BY RELIGIOUS DISTRUST SCALE

RELIGIOUS DISTRUST

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
B-Scale:	0	72%	48%	40%	25%	50%
		(34)	(15)	(18)	(5)	(72)
	1	17	36	31	35	28
		(8)	(11)	(14)	(7)	(40)
	2	11	16	29	40	22
		(5)	(5)	(13)	(8)	(31)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(47)	(31)	(45)	(20)	(143)

Somer's d = .28

p = .0000

TABLE VI-18

THE H-SCALE BY RELIGIOUS DISTRUST SCALE

RELIGIOUS DISTRUST

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
H-Scale:	0	81%	47%	31%	25%	50%
		(38)	(15)	(14)	(5)	(72)
	1	15	34	42	35	31
		(7)	(11)	(19)	(7)	(44)
	2	4	19	27	40	19
		(2)	(6)	(12)	(8)	(28)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(47)	(32)	(45)	(20)	(144)

Somer's d = .36

p = .0000

TABLE VI-19

THE J-SCALE BY RELIGIOUS DISTRUST SCALE

RELIGIOUS DISTRUST

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
J-Scale:	0	30%	31%	11%	5%	21%
		(14)	(10)	(5)	(1)	(30)
	1	51	38	31	10	36
		(24)	(12)	(14)	(2)	(52)
	2	19	31	58	85	43
		(9)	(10)	(26)	(17)	(62)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(47)	(32)	(45)	(20)	(144)

Somer's d = .36

p = .0000

TABLE VI-20

THE E-SCALE BY RELIGIOUS DISTRUST SCALE

RELIGIOUS DISTRUST

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
E-Scale:	0	28%	29%	11%	5%	20%
		(13)	(9)	(5)	(1)	(28)
	1	64	55	60	55	59
		(30)	(17)	(27)	(11)	(85)
	2	9	16	29	40	21
		(4)	(5)	(13)	(8)	(30)
TOTAL		101%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(47)	(31)	(45)	(20)	(143)

Somer's d = .24

p = .0001

TABLE VI-21

THE B-SCALE BY CIVIL LIBERTIES SCALE

CIVIL LIBERTIES

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
B-Scale:	0	24%	29%	56%	77%	51%
		(6)	(7)	(37)	(24)	(74)
	1	36	46	26	13	28
		(9)	(11)	(17)	(4)	(41)
	2	40	25	18	10	21
		(10)	(6)	(12)	(3)	(31)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(25)	(24)	(66)	(31)	(146)

Somer's d =-.31

p = .0000

TABLE VI-22

THE H-SCALE BY CIVIL LIBERTIES SCALE

CIVIL LIBERTIES

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
H-Scale:	0	12%	42%	56%	77%	50%
		(3)	(10)	(37)	(24)	(74)
	1	46	33	27	23	31
		(12)	(8)	(18)	(7)	(45)
	2	42	25	17	0	19
		(11)	(6)	(11)	(0)	(28)
TOTAL		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(26)	(24)	(66)	(31)	(147)

Somer's d =-.36

p = .0000

TABLE VI-23

THE J-SCALE BY CIVIL LIBERTIES SCALE

CIVIL LIBERTIES

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
J-Scale:	0	8%	4%	26%	36%	21%
		(2)	(1)	(17)	(11)	(31)
	1	31	17	39	48	36
		(8)	(4)	(26)	(15)	(53)
	2	62	79	35	16	43
		(16)	(19)	(23)	(5)	(63)
TOTAL		101%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(26)	(24)	(66)	(31)	(147)

Somer's d = -.33

p = .0000

TABLE VI-24

THE E-SCALE BY CIVIL LIBERTIES SCALE

CIVIL LIBERTIES

		0	1	2	3	TOTAL
E-Scale:	0	8%	4%	23%	36%	20%
		(2)	(1)	(15)	(11)	(29)
	1	52	71	61	55	60
		(13)	(17)	(40)	(17)	(87)
	2	40	25	17	10	21
		(10)	(6)	(11)	(3)	(30)
TOTAL		100%	100%	101%	101%	101%
		(25)	(24)	(66)	(31)	(146)

Somer's d = -.25

p = .0001

TABLE VI-25

SUMMARY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS MEASURES AND ETHNIC SCALES

	ORTHODOXY	PARTICULARISM	EVANGELISM	BIBLICAL PROPHECY	RELIGIOUS DISTRUST	CIVIL LIBERTIES	DENOMINATIONAL CONSERVATISM
B-Scale (d)	.21	.16	.19	.26	.28	-.31	.35
Expanded B (r)	.16	.18	.22	.29	.39	-.39	.33
H-Scale (d)	.10*	.14	.16	.29	.36	-.36	.25
Expanded H (r)	.16	.21	.26	.35	.46	-.48	.27
J-Scale (d)	.22	.20	.23	.35	.36	-.33	.32
Expanded J (r)	.24	.21	.30	.35	.47	-.49	.28
E-Scale (d)	.18	.18	.22	.23	.24	-.25	.29
Expanded E (r)	.31	.27	.32	.40	.55	-.54	.37

*Not significant.

FIGURE VI-1: A BELIEF MODEL OF NEGATIVE ETHNIC ATTITUDES (4 Variables)



and may help determine all his other beliefs. Table VI-26 shows the path coefficients for each equation in the four variable belief model. All possible paths, when statistically estimated from the Relic data, are significant.

TABLE VI-26
PATH COEFFICIENTS FOR THE BELIEF MODEL
(4 VARIABLES)

	Dependent Variables		
Independent Variables:	RELIGIOUS DISTRUST	CIVIL LIBERTIES	NEGATIVE ETHNIC BELIEFS
1. Biblical Prophecy	.418	-.230	.135
2. Religious Distrust		-.353	.337
3. Civil Liberties			-.341
N=143	Multiple R=.650 (for last column)		

These paths provide the information needed to determine the relative importance of each variable in the model. Table VI-27 shows the order of importance based on the total effects of each variable with the others in the model properly controlled. Religious distrust makes the largest contribution to ethnic beliefs, most of it directly, but about 35% of the effects of civil liberties are also attributed to this distrust on the grounds that distrust reduces belief in these democratic norms.

TABLE VI-27
TOTAL EFFECTS FOR 4 VARIABLE BELIEFS MODEL

	DIRECT EFFECTS	INDIRECT EFFECTS	TOTAL
1. Religious Distrust	.337	.120	.457
2. Biblical Prophecy	.135	.270	.405
3. Civil Liberties	-.341	--	-.341

The second most important factor is Biblical prophecy. The largest path is mediated through religious distrust, indicating prophecy and the other doctrinal beliefs it represents are a source of suspicion that makes a minister less likely to reject negative ethnic beliefs. This indirect path is about a third of the effects attributed to Biblical prophecy. These effects are accumulated from other paths as well and, in the end, prophecy becomes important because it is linked to all the other beliefs. This fits with the expectation that it measures basic religious attitudes, that these are very important to a minister, and that they therefore condition his other beliefs.[18]

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18 If the arrow between civil liberties and religious distrust is reversed in this model, the total effects of prophecy increase to .470 and those of civil liberties increase to .464, while religious distrust loses its indirect effect.

In order to investigate Glock and Stark's model (see Table VI-A), orthodoxy and particularism were introduced into the four variable belief model. Table VI-28 shows the hierarchy assumed: orthodoxy was ranked as most basic and particularism was treated as possibly dependent on orthodoxy and Biblical prophecy.

TABLE VI-28
PATH COEFFICIENTS FOR 6 VARIABLE BELIEF MODEL
DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Independent Variables:	BIBLICAL PROPHECY	PARTICU-LARISM	RELIGIOUS DISTRUST	CIVIL LIBERTIES	NEGATIVE ETHNIC BELIEFS
1. Orthodoxy	.392	.201	-.021+	-.129	.016
2. Biblical Prophecy		.478	.293	-.133	.180
3. Particularism			.218	-.083	-.081+
4. Religious Distrust				-.329	.341
5. Civil Liberties					-.341

N=135 Multiple R=.647 (for last column)

+These paths are over-controlled and actually reverse signs.

The calculations for total effects are given in Table VI-29. The impact of Biblical prophecy is somewhat reduced, compared to the four variable model, declining from .405 to .380. This reduction seems less than might have been expected. Particularism has little impact on the combined measure for ethnic beliefs: the indirect path through religious distrust is almost .1, but the reversal of the direct path cancels most of this. Orthodoxy achieves total effects of .208, nearly three-fourths of it through Biblical prophecy. This seems to fit the results found in the sample of California ministers almost too well. In that case, orthodoxy was .218 and particularism was .042.

TABLE VI-29
TOTAL EFFECTS FOR 6 VARIABLE BELIEF MODEL

	DIRECT EFFECTS	INDIRECT EFFECTS	TOTAL
1. Religious Distrust	.341	.112	.453
2. Biblical Prophecy	.180	.200	.380
3. Civil Liberties	-.341	--	-.341
4. Orthodoxy	.016	.192	.208
5. Particularism	-.081	.127	.046

If this model is applied to the expanded measure of negative beliefs about Jews, since Glock and Stark's theory is about anti-Semitism, the results are Table VI-30. This does show an increase to .243 in the total effects of orthodoxy, because the direct path to beliefs about Jews is larger than to general ethnic beliefs. The effects of all the other variables, including prophecy, are reduced.[19]

TABLE VI-30

TOTAL EFFECTS FOR 6 VARIABLE MODEL USING BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS

	DIRECT EFFECTS	INDIRECT EFFECTS	TOTAL
1. Religious Distrust	.298	.100	.398
2. Civil Liberties	-.305	--	-.305
3. Biblical Prophecy	.128	.169	.297
4 Orthodoxy	.090	.153	.243
5. Particularism	-.088	.112	.024

The hierarchy assumed is the same as in Table VI-28. The path coefficients can be found by substituting the Direct Effects column in Table VI-30 for the final column in Table VI-28.

Generally, the pattern in the California ministers and Relic data is very similar (compare Tables VI-A to Tables VI-29 and VI-30). There are two major differences. First Biblical prophecy has a larger relative effect on ethnic attitudes, even those toward Jews, than orthodoxy. Second, the scale of general religious distrust works better in predicting ethnic attitudes in the Relic data than Glock and Stark's measure of religious hostility does in the California data. This is true even though their measure concerns attitudes toward Jews specifically, while the distrust scale measures attitudes toward non-religious people. Since Blacks and Hispanics are overwhelmingly Christian and since 93% of the Relic sample agreed that Jews are "truly religious," it is surprising that distrust relates more strongly to ethnic beliefs than Glock and Stark's religious hostility toward Jews relates to their measure of anti-Semitism.

Interpreting the Belief Models. *Why are the religious and ethnic beliefs of ministers in the Relic survey related? The first possibility is that this is due to "response set" or "aquiesence." This interpretation would claim that some respondents tend to agree more with any question that is asked. The correlations of the various scales just measure this tendency and do not mean that one type of Christian belief leads to ethnocentrism. They are a product of the way the subject was investigated and have no theoretical meaning.*

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19 The explanatory power of the model (multiple R squared) is also reduced by about 20% for the Jewish measure. When the expanded Black and Hispanic scales are used, the total effects are:

	Black	Hispanic
1. Religious Distrust	.325	.397
2. Biblical Prophecy	.315	.322
3 Civil Liberties	-.262	-.274
4 Orthodoxy	.117	.166
5 Particularism	.024	.064

However, in the case of negative ethnic beliefs, acquiesence may be theoretically meaningful. If a respondent agrees with negative statements about ethnic groups in an interview, it seems likely that he will also do so when talking to his parishioners and others, helping to perpetuate stereotypes, rather than eradicate them.

Response set seems to be a particular problem when questionnaires are administered to groups, as is often done with college students, and perhaps with mail questionnaires, as was used in the study of California ministers. In these settings, it is easier for a respondent not to take his answers too seriously and to fall into a pattern which helps him finish the questionnaire more quickly. Personal interviews, as were used in the Relic survey, help to correct this. The respondent is more likely to take each question seriously because he is talking directly to the interviewer. (In some cases, the ministers in this survey took it so seriously that the interview went on for two or three hours.) The setting probably creates some pressure on a person not to always give the same response and might introduce some error in a reaction against response set. A personal interview may also induce someone to select a response regarded as socially acceptable, rather than one that best reflects his true feelings. If this occurred, it would likely reduce the measures of negative ethnic beliefs and increase the civil liberties scale, while having less effect on the questions about religious beliefs, where ministers are more likely to have definite views. This might artificially increase the relation of civil liberties and ethnic attitudes, but it would generally work against the hypotheses tested in this study, making them more difficult to confirm.

Response set is more likely to be a problem with a sample of the general public or with a group chosen because it is convenient, as with college students. The questions may concern things the investigator thinks are important, but the respondents do not. When asked their opinions on matters about which they have none, response set may be used as a quick rule of thumb to provide answers.

However, when interviewing professional people, the problem is more likely to be the opposite. They take the questions seriously, normally having well-formed opinions, and give complex answers which they do not feel are properly represented by the limited choice of responses provided on the questionnaire. When forced to select the best alternative, they will, but they will also offer clarifications. Rather than having questions more subtle than the opinions, they are likely to have opinions more subtle than the questions.

Ministers will take questions about religious beliefs seriously. Even one not very theologically inclined is in a role which requires him to respond to questions about beliefs. It is expected of him. In these circumstances, "don't know" may be a carefully considered response with theological implications for the relation of God and man.

That response set is not a serious problem, at least for the religious scales used in this report, is confirmed by the fact that they associate strongly with the coding of denominational groups, which is not based on a response to an attitude question. For example, 34% of the mainline ministers compared to 85% of the fundamentalist and holiness ministers scored at the top of the orthodoxy scale and 10% of the first group compared to 81% of the second scored high on evangelism. The contrast is less on Biblical prophecy--44% versus 81%--, but the distribution of this scale is skewed more toward the top. It seems unlikely that these results are because fundamentalist and holiness pastors have a greater tendency toward response set.

The scales measure something of importance about beliefs, but precisely what is not clear. The models indicate that negative ethnic beliefs do have reasonable strong roots in religious distrust and in a set of doctrines, especially belief in Biblical prophecy. Therefore, the relation of denominational conservatism and ethnic attitudes is not just a historical accident due to the resistance of these churches to change, including resocialization away from traditional stereotypes. The properties of the religious distrust and prophecy scales require interpretation to understand the reasons they may be related to ethnocentrism.

The measures of distrust, civil liberties, and negative ethnic beliefs are associated strongly enough that they might be regarded as a syndrome,[20] *all of them responding to an underlying suspicion of people and groups who are different. The original questions are about Blacks, Hispanics, Jews, atheists, and homosexuals and some of the variation in responses will be due to specific feelings about each of these groups, but the fact that religious distrust works better than Glock and Stark's measure of religious hostility toward Jews seems understandable only if some general attitude of suspicion toward out-groups is being tapped.*

Does this syndrome of suspicion indicate a "paranoid style"?[21] *Richard Hofstadter discusses this not as a diagnosis of mental illness, but as a psychological style useful in interpreting common elements in a number of different American political and social movements. If the expectations about the findings of this report had been formed on the basis of his essay--this was not done--, the Relic data would have confirmed them.*

However, labeling the distrust scale "religious paranoia" and claiming it results in the rejection of democratic norms and in prejudice seems to clearly over-interpret the data. The questions used, like: "Would you think that a person who says there is no God is likely to hold dangerous political ideas," seem too mild for Hofstadter's conception. He regards belief in conspiracies as central to the paranoid style,[22] *but there is no measure of this in the Relic data.*[23] *Hofstadter also emphasizes that the paranoid style is "exaggerated," "distorted," "over-suspicious," and "apocalyptic." These attributes are difficult to measure using a questionnaire, but they seem unlikely to fit the Relic respondents. The data may reflect a pallid version of the paranoid style or some susceptibility to it by those who ranked high on distrust.*[24]

The most important information from the belief models is that this syndrome of religious distrust, lack of support for civil liberties, and negative ethnic beliefs is linked reasonably strongly to doctrinal beliefs, especially to Biblical prophecy. The effects of the prophecy scale were the most

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20 The r's are: -.56 for civil liberties and ethnic beliefs, .54 for religious distrust and ethnic beliefs, and -.47 for civil liberties and distrust.

21 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 3-40.

22 Ibid, p. 29.

23 The wide circulation of books like John Stormer's None Dare Call It Treason among Lancaster County conservatives is suggestive that conspiratorial theories may have a following.

24 Hofstadter does relate the paranoid style to religion. "In American experience, ethnic and religious conflicts, with their threat of the submergence of whole systems of values, have plainly been the major focus for militant and suspicious minds of this sort..." He also argues that millennial movements, which expect the Second Coming and the end of the world, have been characterized by The Paranoid Style. p. 39; see pp. 30-31, 38.

surprising result in the Relic data. Before the investigation, Glock and Stark's particularism seemed a more plausible concept relating religious and ethnic beliefs and yet its effects turned out to be considerably weaker. Why Biblical prophecy relates to the syndrome of suspicion is central to interpreting the belief models.

Manifestly, the questions in the scale seem to measure belief in God's plan for the world and the Bible as the source of evidence about this plan. Two elements seem to be involved: the authority of the Bible and God's role in history, especially the possibility of continuing supernatural intervention in contemporary affairs. The scale may sort ministers into those who are more modernist, more willing to adapt religion to modern attitudes, and those who are more traditionalist, more concerned with defending the primacy of divine revelation.[25]

Prophecy has played an important role in the American evangelical movement.[26] *Belief in the current importance of prophecy is connected to millennarian thought. The Second Coming would be the ultimate fulfillment of prophecy and the justification of faith. Because attitudes on prophecy depend on Biblical interpretation, prophetic beliefs are ususally associated with literalism or the "common sense," non-allegorical understanding of the Bible, particularly its most difficult prophecies in Daniel and Revelations. Millennialism and consistent literalism are basic themes of premillennial dispensationalists, an important group in the intellectual life of the fundamentalist movement. Dispensationalists emphasize the separate role of the Jews in prophecy:*

> *The dispensationalist believes that throughout the ages God is pursuing two distinct purposes: one related to the earth with earthly people and earthly objectives involved which is Judaism; while the other is related to heaven with heavenly people and heavenly objectives involved, which is Christianity . . .*[27]

The creation of Israel is seen as the fulfillment of Ezekial 36:24: "For I will take you from among the heathen, and gather you out of all countries, and will bring you into your own land." The question about Israel used in the scale of Biblical prophecy (see Appendix C) could be interpreted as measuring dispensationalism or fundamentalism. This was rejected as an over-interpretation because 60% of the Relic sample ranked at the top of the prophecy scale and it does not seem plausible to label that large a proportion fundamentalists.

If the interpretation of the religious content of the prophecy scale as an affirmation of Biblical authority and of continuing supernatural intervention in history is accurate, why is the scale linked to ethnocentrism? Why is it linked more strongly than orthodoxy or particularism? A possible explanation is that the questions measure authoritarianism in religious guise.

The research on the authoritarian personality arose out of the reaction to Nazi anti-Semitism.[28]

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25 William R. Hutchinson, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).

26 See C. Norman Kraus, Dispensationalism in America: Its Rise and Development (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1958), especially Chapters 5 and 6, on the Prophecy Conferences of the late 19th century.

27 Lewis Sperry Chafer, Dispensationalism (Dallas, Texas: Dallas Seminary Press, 1936), p. 107, quoted in Charles Caldwell Ryrie, Dispensationalism Today (Chicago: Moody Press, 1965), p. 45.

28 T.W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).

It led to the creation of the F-Scale (F stands for fascism), which was related to ethnocentrism. Some statements used in this scale show similarities to the belief in prophecy:

> *Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.*
>
> *Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.*
>
> *Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.*[29]

These questions were taken to measure superstitiousness by the investigators. It is possible that, for some ministers, belief in Biblical prophecy plays the same role as superstition does in the conception of the authoritarian personality. The magical side of religion has been important throughout history. Awe and a sense of transcendence are a part of the religious experience (and play a part in religion's role of inculcating values and standards of conduct in society). The investigators of the authoritarian personality believed superstition is a sign of "ego weakness" and "indicated a tendency to shift responsibility from within the individual onto outside forces beyond one's control . . . "[30]

However, despite numerous studies using the F-Scale since it was developed, its meaning and its relation to personality factors is still controversial.[31] *The Relic study contains no psychological scales and there is no way to verify any connection between the prophecy scale and deeper motivations. The strong manifest content of the questions in terms of religious beliefs makes it seem doubtful that they would serve as adequate measures of latent personality factors--normally deliberately vague statements are used for this, so that a respondent can project his feelings on them.*

The Authoritarian Personality has been fruitful in producing alternative interpretations. One of these is cognitive sophistication.[32] *This view argues that the questions in the F-Scale measure "simplism," a style of thought which finds simplistic beliefs and moral judgments congenial. Cognitive sophistication involves a style more realistic, more aware of the world's complexity, more open to doubt, and more willing to change beliefs.*

It is quite possible the prophecy scale reflects this difference in style of thinking. However, Selznick and Steinberg attribute sophistication mainly to education.[33] *In the Relic data, the prophecy scale is more strongly associated with denominational conservatism (r=.45) than education (r=-.36), although this might not be true in a sample with a lower average level of eduction.*

Cognitive style does seem the most plausible interpretation of why the prophecy scale is related to the suspicion syndrome, including negative ethnic attitudes. Belief in the current relevance of prophecy involves a certain approach to religion, but it may also associate with a way of perceiving and thinking about the world. This style need not be primitive and unsophisticated, however. It

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29 Ibid., p. 256.

30 Ibid., p. 236.

31 See John P. Kirscht and Ronald C. Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967).

32 See Chapter IV, Education.

33 Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice, Chapter 8 and passim.

may be very scholarly[34] *and rationalistic, as seems true of dispensationalist writers.*[35] *The style does seem to depend on categorical thinking. The primary intellectual function is to properly sort the things of the world into the proper boxes, as the dispensationalists sort out history into seven dispensations. Proper understanding is proper classification. The intellectual impulse seems to be to impose a system, an order on the world, striving especially for closure and certainty. This style contrasts to a more empirical or scientific one that would recognize typologies as a somewhat crude intellectual tool, useful in some cases, but with the understanding that the things classified are different in many ways.*[36] *Generally, things can be better understood as continuous phenomena, shading gradually from one to another. The intellectual impulse needs to be more one of curiousity and discovery, with truth only tentatively found and subject to further modification.*[37]

If belief in Biblical prophecy and the attitudes about religion that accompany it involve holding to a categorical style of thought, then the reason why this would result in a greater tendency to stereotype becomes clearer. Stereotypes treat ethnic groups as categories. When strongly held religious convictions collide with modern, secular society, the suspicion generated may be laid on easily identified groups. This may not be unique to ethnic groups; it may apply to any group that can be labelled and has beliefs or a lifestyle that is different.

Whatever the proper interpretation of the Biblical prophecy scale, the Relic data only shows that some link exists between the religious beliefs it measures and ethnocentrism. These beliefs are more common in conservative churches, but they also exist in mainline denominations in Lancaster County.

Does Relic, then, show that religion does not have a beneficial influence on ethnic relations, that instead this effect is pernicious? This conclusion can only be reached if it is assumed that those who are highest on ethnocentrism are also those who are most religious, who take religion most seriously. The survey did not try to measure how seriously ministers took their religion, but since they became ministers, it seems likely they all took it seriously. The data only shows a link from certain religious beliefs to negative beliefs about ethnic groups. The impact of religion on ethnic relations has almost certainly been complex, with both good and bad effects.

Conclusions. *The Relic data shows a relation between more conservative religious beliefs and ethnocentrism. Negative ethnic beliefs are associated with scales measuring orthodoxy, particularism, and evangelism, although these relations are only moderately strong even for the measure combining the three expanded scales (see Table VI-25). The scale of doctrinal belief that showed the strongest relation to ethnic attitudes was Biblical prophecy (r=.40). Two scales which did not measure basic doctrines were more closely related to ethnic beliefs--distrust of non-religious people (r=.55) and a willingness to abridge the rights of atheists and accept religious censorship (r-.54). When the various scales are analyzed together, religious distrust and Biblical prophecy have the great-*

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34 Hofstadter discusses elaborate pedantry as part of the paranoid style (see The Paranoid Style, pp. 35-38), but here I am not implying an obsessive concern with detail.

35 See Charles Caldwell Ryrie, Dispensationalism Today.

36 This would be true of denominational conservatism in this report.

37 In psychology, Milton Rokeach has investigated a similar distinction in The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960).

est impact on negative ethnic beliefs. The explanation given for the importance of distrust was that it measures a general attitude of suspicion toward people and groups who are different, including ethnic minorities. The interpretation of Biblical prophecy offered was that it measures an attitude toward religion that involves holding to a categorical style of thought, one particularly congenial to stereotyping.

APPENDIX A: SCALING NEGATIVE BELIEFS ABOUT BLACKS, HISPANICS, AND JEWS

The Relic survey provided 12 questions about attitudes toward Blacks, 10 questions concerning Hispanics, and 8 concerning Jews with 5 possible responses to each question--strongly agree, somewhat agree, don't know, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree. This was far too many questions to use separately; if this had been done, 30 tables would be required for each variable related to ethnic beliefs. However, selecting a single question about each group would involve throwing away a great deal of information. It would make the conclusions doubtful since they would depend only on the particular question and might have differed if another had been selected.

Intuitively, some of the questions seemed much better for measuring negative ethnic beliefs than others. For example: "Many Blacks have inferior intelligence as compared to Whites" seemed better than: "Many Blacks are resentful and bitter toward Whites," a statement which could be agreed to by a White sympathetic enough to Blacks to have read about Black Power or Black Rage. Since choosing questions simply on intuitive grounds might cast doubts on the results, some technique of statistical scaling was needed to select a limited number of the better questions.

Guttman Scaling. *The technique used was Guttman scaling.*[1] *This was partly a practical consideration: it was available on SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences), the computer program used to analyze this data (the factor analysis subroutine would not run). Guttman scaling provides statistical evidence that the questions combined in a scale do measure the same thing, that they form a single dimension. The scale indicates that the questions get at a single, underlying attitude, something that would be unlikely if all the available questions were simply added together.*

A Guttman scale uses several questions which are progressively more difficult to "pass," and thus measures attitude intensity. If these questions scale perfectly, they would fit in this way:

		Questions		
		1	*2*	*3*
	0			
	1	*pass*		
Individuals	*2*	*pass*	*pass*	
	3	*pass*	*pass*	*pass*

An individual who is scaled 0 did not pass any of the questions. Someone ranked 1 passed only the mildest question, but not the two stronger ones. An individual who is 2 passed two questions and someone ranked 3 passed all three of them.

This shows that a Guttman scale is cumulative, as would be true of questions like: "are you over 5 feet tall? over 5½ feet tall? over 6 feet tall?" An individual should not agree with the last question after saying no to the second one. If a question does not enter a scale, then it may be measuring a different attitude, at least for some people responding to it (or it may be at about the same level of difficulty as a question already in the scale).

Of course, in real data, no scale will be perfect, so criteria have been developed to decide when

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1 See W.S. Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scaling (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), Chaper 12 and Garson, Political Science Methods (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1976), pp. 222-226.

the responses are close enough to be called a Guttman scale. The generally accepted standards are a coefficient of reproducibility (C_r) of .90 or higher and a coefficient of scalability (C_s) of .60 or higher. All the Guttman scales in this study meet these criteria.

Scores for each respondent were derived by adding 1 for each question passed on a scale. This produced four-point, ordinal scales, ranging from 0 to 3.

Scales of Negative Beliefs. *The questions about attitudes toward Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews which scaled together are among those which were most intuitively appealing as measures of negative beliefs. The distributions of each four-point scale are given in Tables A-1, A-2, and A-3. In the tables of the main part of the report, these measures have been reduced to three-point scales by combining the individuals scoring 2 and 3. This was done for two reasons: it is difficult to read a table with four rows and the distributions for negative beliefs about Blacks and Hispanics are skewed, with only 8% and 6%, respectively, in the sample scoring 3 on each scale. The data was originally examined using the four-point scales and the conclusions were not altered by the choice to use the shorter scales in this report.*

These Guttman scales were the best dependent variables for testing the basic relations in the data. However, the three questions combined into each scale contained more information than these scales utilized, because Guttman scaling dichotomized the responses to each question, ignoring the difference, for instance, between "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree." In order to create more sensitive measures of the respondent's willingness to accept or reject the statements, longer scales were coded by assigning 4 to "strongly agree," 3 to "somewhat agree," 2 to "don't know," 1 to "somewhat disagree" and 0 to "strongly disagree" for the same questions used in the four-point scales. These were then added up for each set of questions about Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews, resulting in scales for each ethnic group which could vary from 0 to 12, and then all 9 questions were added for a composite index of negative ethnic beliefs on a scale which could vary from 0 to 36. Since three of these four expanded scales averaged below the neutral point--the exception is the Jewish scale, which averaged .6 above the neutral point of 6--, it could be argued that they should be inverted and treated as measuring favorable or positive beliefs. However, there are indications in the data that measuring positive beliefs would have given somewhat different results. Some respondents appeared to reject any statement, negative or positive, about these groups, probably identifying any generalization about them as stereotypes. Therefore, it is more accurate not to invert these scales, but to remember that the respondents on average rejected negative beliefs.

The expanded scales are clearly more sensitive measures than the shorter scales. It is also easier to justify treating them as interval, rather than ordinal, scales. By doing this, probably a better estimate of the real strength of the relations in the data can be made. Therefore, Pearson's r's for these scales have been included in this report. However, for those who object to not sticking strictly to the Guttman scales and to assuming interval level data, the basic analysis uses tables and ordinal statisitics.

The following are the scales of negative beliefs about each group.

1. Negative Beliefs About Blacks

The questions scaled, in order of difficulty or attitude intensity, were:

1. *Many Blacks do not place much value on keeping up the appearance of their houses or yards.*
2. *Many Blacks are not dependable employees.*
3. *Many Blacks have inferior intelligence as compared to Whites.*

For all three questions, the responses varied from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Those who did not disagree, either somewhat or strongly, passed question 1. Those who agreed passed question 2 and 3. Only 12% of the sample agreed with question 3, the toughest one to pass. The distribution is skewed to the low end of the scale (see Table A-1).

TABLE A-1: NEGATIVE BELIEFS ABOUT BLACKS--THE B-SCALE

SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	74	49.7%	50.3%
1	41	27.5	27.9
2	20	13.4	13.6
3	12	8.1	8.2
Missing Data	2*	1.3	-----
TOTAL	149	100.0%	100.0%

C_r=.95

C_s=.83

*Two respondents excluded because they are Blacks.

The expanded scale for beliefs about Blacks had a range in the actual date from 0 to 12, a mean of 3.4, and a standard deviation of 3.0.

The questions fit together well, with a coefficient of reproducibility (C_r) of .95 and a coefficient of scalability (C_s) of .83.

2. Negative Beliefs About Hispanics

The same questions as those above, with "Spanish-speaking people" substituted for "Blacks," also scaled for beliefs about Hispanics. The same cut off points were used and the distribution is very similar. The coefficient of scalability is slightly less (see Table A-2).

The expanded scale for attitudes toward Hispanics had an actual range from 0 to 12, a mean of 3.5, and a standard deviation of 2.8.

TABLE A-2: NEGATIVE BELIEFS ABOUT HISPANICS--THE H-SCALE

SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	74	49.7%	50.3%
1	45	30.2	30.6
2	19	12.8	12.9
3	9	6.0	6.1
Missing Data	2	1.3	----
TOTAL	149	100.0%	99.9%

C_r=.95

C_s=.78

3. Negative Beliefs About Jews

The questions concerning beliefs about Jews were quite different than those concerning Blacks and Hispanics. The questions which scaled best, in order of intensity, were:

1. *Many Jews tend to be more successful in business and finance than non-Jews.*
2. *Jewish businessmen control an unusually large portion of the financial resources of the United States.*
3. *Many Jews tend to be more materialistic in their personal goals and values than non-Jews.*

Those who strongly or somewhat agreed with each question passed. The first question was so mild that 75% of the sample passed, 37% passed question 2, and 28% passed question 3. This creates a more even distribution than those for the other two scales (see Table A-3).

TABLE A-3: NEGATIVE BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS--THE J-SCALE

SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	31	20.8%	20.9%
1	53	35.6	35.8
2	37	24.8	25.0
3	27	18.1	18.2
Missing Data	1	0.7	---
TOTAL	149	100.0%	99.9%

C_r=.93

C_s=.76

The expanded scale of beliefs about Jews had an actual range from 0 to 12, a mean of 6.6, and a standard deviation of 2.7.

4. Negative Ethnic Beliefs

This measure is a Guttman scale of the three previous scales. Getting 1 or more on the Jewish scale was treated as the first question, 2 on the Black scale was the second, and 3 on the Hispanic was the most difficult to pass. Table A-4 gives the distribution on this scale.

TABLE A-4: NEGATIVE ETHNIC BELIEFS--THE E-SCALE

SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	29	19.5%	19.9%
1	87	58.4	59.6
2	23	15.4	15.8
3	7	4.7	4.8
Missing Data	3	2.0	-----
TOTAL	149	100.0%	100.1%

C_r=.99

C_s=.92

When the three scales of beliefs about Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews were added together, the indicator had an actual range from 0 to 30 (out of a possible 36), a mean of 13.4, and a standard deviation of 6.8.

Validity of Scales of Negative Beliefs. *Guttman scaling offers evidence that the questions used in each scale measure essentially the same attitude. But are these questions really measuring a respondent's willingness to accept negative images of each ethnic group? This is the question of validity.*

The face validity seems good. The questions which combined into the scales were among those that intuitively seemed to be better measures of the traditional stereotypes of the irresponsible Black and the greedy Jew. It is also possible to study their validity by correlating the scales to the remaining questions about the ethnic groups. They should relate most strongly to those questions which seem to be the best remaining measures for negative beliefs.

The Black and Hispanic scales are most closely correlated to the responses to: "Many Blacks (Spanish-speaking people), by nature of their culture, are lazy and slow."

TABLE A-5: VALIDATION OF BLACK SCALE

B-SCALE

Blacks are Lazy:	0	1	2	3	TOTAL
Disagree	94% (70)	66% (27)	45% (9)	25% (3)	74% (109)
Don't Know	1 (1)	12 (5)	10 (2)	8 (1)	6 (9)
Agree	4 (3)	22 (9)	45 (9)	67 (8)	20 (29)
TOTAL	99% (74)	100% (41)	100% (20)	100% (12)	100% (147)

Somer's d=.48

p=.0000 (that is, less than 1/10,000)

Table A-5 shows that 95% of those who scored 0 on the scale disagreed with this statement when applied to Blacks compared to 25% disagreement among those who scored 3. The symmetric version of Somer's d is .48 for this table; if the longer Black scale is correlated with the full set of responses to the question, Pearson's r is .60.

This relation is very similar for attitudes toward Hispanics (d=.47--see Table A-6), with the correlation for the longer scale slightly stronger--r=.68.

TABLE A-6: VALIDATION OF HISPANIC SCALE

H-SCALE

Hispanics are Lazy:	0	1	2	3	TOTAL
Disagree	96% (71)	62% (28)	53% (10)	22% (2)	76% (111)
Don't Know	3 (2)	27 (12)	32 (6)	11 (1)	14 (21)
Agree	1 (1)	11 (5)	16 (3)	67 (6)	10 (15)
TOTAL	100% (74)	100% (45)	101% (19)	100% (9)	100% (147)

Somer's d=.47

p=.0000

This question is also correlated with the longer scale for general negative ethnic beliefs. Pearson's r is .60 when the question is asked about Blacks and it is .64 when asked about Hispanics. All these relations are, of course, highly significant.

This seems to indicate that the scales and this question measure something quite similar. Laziness is part of the traditional stereotype. In fact, this question will fit into the Black scale, although both C_r and C_s are reduced. It does not quite fit into the Hispanic scale, apparently because the percentages of the sample agreeing with this question and with the one about inferior intelligence are very similar, within 2%.

The reason the lazy question does not scale quite as well as the other questions is probably that some of those who ranked 2 and 3 on the scale disagreed with it. Perhaps these respondents rejected "by nature of their culture," suspicious of this as an illegitimate excuse from moral responsibility. If this is true, then the question measures the traditional stereotype for most of the sample, but not for a few, and since it was a less perfect measure, it did not enter the best Guttman scales.

In addition, the Black and Hispanic scales are significantly associated with responses to: "Compared to Whites, many Blacks (Spanish-speaking people) have a more relaxed sexual and moral code." The Black scale is also related significantly to two statements asked only about Blacks: "Most of the crime in the U.S. is committed by Blacks" and "A Black person who commits a crime is likely to claim that his trouble with the law is due to racism." The measures of association for these four relations are less than those for the question about laziness, indicating the statements are not as good measures of negative beliefs.

There is also a significant, but weaker, relation between the Black scale and responses to: "Many Blacks stick to themselves and have as little to do with Whites as possible." For the same question about Hispanics, Somer's d is not quite significant, largely because a high proportion of those who scored low on the scale agreed with this question, probably because of the language barrier. The Black scale is also weakly, but significantly, related to: "Many Blacks are resentful and bitter toward Whites," while the Hispanic scale is not quite significantly related to this statement when it is asked about Spanish-speaking people. In all four of these relations, a rather high percent of those low on the scales agreed with the statement. For instance, 100% of those who scored 2 and 3 on the Black scale agreed that Blacks are bitter, but so did 76% of those who scored 0, probably in recognition of the rhetoric of Black militants in the 1960's.

The scales of negative beliefs about Blacks and Hispanics are not related to responses to: "Many Whites often discriminate against Blacks (Spanish-speaking people) by not hiring or promoting them." This statement asks about something different than what the scales measure--the existence of discrimination, rather than the acceptance of a traditional stereotype. Nothing in the question implies that this discrimination is good or bad and so someone who believes Blacks or Hispanics are inferior can agree with the statement, feeling that the discrimination is justified. Consequently, it was accepted by a large proportion of the sample, irrespective of their score on the two scales.

These relations indicate that the scale of negative beliefs about Blacks is a valid measure of the extent to which the respondents still accept a mild version of the traditional stereotype of the irresponsible Black. The analysis of the questions when they are asked about Spanish-speaking people

indicates that this same stereotype has been transferred by at least some in this sample to Hispanics.

The traditional stereotype of Jews that emerged from the analysis of the questions asked about them fits the image of the materialistic Jew, "more successful in business and finance," controlling "an unusually large portion" of finances in the U.S., and "more materialistic in their personal goals and values." Is the scale formed by these three questions valid?

The scale correlates most strongly with responses to the statement that: "Many Jews prefer to stick to themselves and tend to socialize with each other rather than with non-Jews." This question does not refer directly to the materialistic Jew and the negative implications of agreeing with it seem, at best, very mild (in fact, one respondent commented "Pennsylvania Dutchmen, everyone does it"). Still it is closely enough associated with the other questions that it can be substituted for the one about Jews being more successful in business and an acceptable Guttman scale will result, although C_r will be reduced by .02 and C_s by .06.

The reason this question relates rather strongly to the scales is that 89% of those at 3 on the scale, 87% of those at 2, 66% of those at 1, and 39% of those at 0 agreed that Jews stick together. Identifying Jews as distinct, seperate, different appears to be a prerequisite to negative stereotyping --nearly all of those at 2 and 3 agreed and none strongly disagreed with the question--, but some respondents see this group as sticking together and still refuse to go a step further and agree with more negative statements about Jews. Although there is evidence that Jews sticking together is part of the negative image,[2] this question does not seem as good a measure of negative beliefs, largely for intuitive reasons.

The Jewish scale also correlates with the responses to two other questions: "Many Jews tend to pay particular attention to looking out for each other's interests in their business dealings" (see Table A-7) and "Many Jews are often too quick to claim that other people are persecuting or harassing them" (see Table A-8).

TABLE A-7: FIRST VALIDATION OF JEWISH SCALE

Jews Look Out For Each Other's Business Interests:	J-SCALE 0	1	2	3	TOTAL
Disagree	39% (12)	19% (10)	5% (2)	7% (2)	18% (26)
Don't Know	16 (5)	30 (16)	11 (4)	22 (6)	21 (31)
Agree	45 (14)	51 (27)	84 (31)	70 (19)	62 (91)
TOTAL	100% (31)	100% (53)	100% (37)	99% (27)	101% (148)

Somer's d=.26

p=.0001

2 Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice, pp. 9-10, 23-24.

TABLE A-8: SECOND VALIDATION OF JEWISH SCALE

Jews Are Too Quick to Claim They Are Persecuted:	J-SCALE 0	1	2	3	TOTAL
Disagree	71% (22)	60% (32)	46% (17)	30% (8)	53% (79)
Don't Know	16 (5)	26 (14)	35 (13)	26 (7)	26 (39)
Agree	13 (4)	13 (7)	19 (7)	44 (12)	20 (30)
TOTAL	100% (31)	99% (53)	100% (37)	100% (27)	99% (148)

Somer's d=.26

p=.0001

Table A-7 shows that although few of those high on the scale disagreed with the statement about Jews looking out for each other in business, a rather large proportion of those at 0 and 1 agreed. This indicates the possibility that some of these may have interpreted the question as one about altruism rather than one implying unfair business practices by clannish Jews, as should have been true if this question was to be one of the better measures of the traditional stereotype of the greedy Jew. Still the full set of responses to this question correlates fairly highly (r=.46) with the longer scale of attitudes toward Jews. Although this correlation is lower than those between the Black and Hispanic scales and the lazy questions, this is to be expected since fewer questions were asked about Jews and so those remaining after selecting the best questions are not likely to be as strongly correlated with the scale.

The Jewish scale is also associated with responses to the statement that Jews are too quick to claim others are persecuting them. Somer's d is almost the same as for the previous question, but the correlation between using the expanded scale is less--r=.36, compared to r=.46. This indicates that although there is a common favorable/unfavorable attitude underlying both this question and the scale, they measure two somewhat different beliefs about Jews. Only 44% of those at 3 on the scale agreed that Jews have a persecution complex. Although this theme is used by active anti-Semites, sometimes even to the point of claiming the Holocaust is a Jewish delusion, it has not penetrated this sample as deeply as the more traditional image of the materialistic Jew, as indicated by the proportions of those who scored more than 0 on the Jewish scale, but responded "don't know" to the persecution question.

Since the correlations between this question and the scale are not as high as they might be, does it contribute to validating the scale? Perhaps the strongest evidence that it does comes from the fact that the persecution question reacts with other data in this study in the same way as the scale. It correlates significantly with age and education, as does the scale. It is distributed in urban and rural areas and in denominational groupings in a similar way. It is related to religious attitudes in almost the same way. If the question about persecution had been substituted for the Jewish scale throughout this study, it appears the basic results would not have changed. Therefore, these four questions

all measure fundamentally similar attitudes.

Validation requires discussing a final statement about Jews: "Many Jews tend to have a higher regard for learning and education than non-Jews."

TABLE A-9: RELATION OF JEWISH SCALE TO JEWISH REGARD FOR LEARNING

Jews Have Higher Regard For Learning and Education:	J-SCALE 0	1	2	3	TOTAL
Disagree	32% (10)	9% (5)	8% (3)	11% (3)	14% (21)
Don't Know	16 (5)	19 (10)	5 (2)	19 (5)	15 (22)
Agree	52 (16)	72 (38)	87 (32)	70 (19)	71 (105)
TOTAL	100% (31)	100% (53)	100% (37)	100% (27)	100% (148)

Somer's d=.17

p=.0088

Table A-9 shows that responses to this question are positively, although weakly, associated with the scale (r=.21 if the expanded scale is used). This question seems to measure favorable attitudes toward Jew, so it might be expected that this relation would be inverse, with those low on the scale accepting the statement more than those who are higher.[3] *Does this indicate the scale measures positive rather than negative attitudes toward Jews? After all, perhaps the respondents agreed that Jews are more successful in business because they admired the ability of Jews. Perhaps the belief that Jews stick together reflects admiration for the historical survival of the Jews, despite centuries of persecution.*

There are several reasons for rejecting these arguments. First, the materialistic Jew is a traditional negative stereotype because of its role in anti-Semitism. The image of Shylock, the spurious Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the use of Jews as scapegoats for economic troubles down through history shows this stereotype has been a major theme in anti-Semitism. It is difficult to believe that most of those in a sample as well educated as this one would be unaware of the historical role of this stereotype, but even if the respondents thought the stereotype was positive, the fact that it is widespread could be exploited and used against Jews in hard economic times. In other words, even if respondents thought this image was positive, its historical role has been negative. The second reason for rejecting these arguments is that it seems highly unlikely that more than a few in the sample could have interpreted the questions in the Jewish scale as favorable to Jews. For clergymen, agreeing that Jews are "more materialistic" appears to be a negative belief, one without any possible positive interpretation. Believing that a group controls "an unusually large portion of the financial sources" of this country also seems to reveal at least a latent suspicion of that group. Some respondents may have believed this statement was simply objectively true, although it is not since historically

3 This was true for Blacks where a positive question about Blacks maintaining strong family ties was negative related to the expanded Black scale.

Jews were usually excluded from large financial institutions and forced into riskier small businesses or into the professions. However, the basic factor is not truth or falsity in an objective sense, but the way ethnic attitudes condition beliefs about what is true or false. It seems implausible to interpret a belief in Jewish financial "control" as indicating favorable attitudes toward Jews.

Finally, if the questions used in the Jewish scale are mixed, one or two negative, one or two positive, then they should not have formed a Guttman scale. If the statement about Jews being more successful in business measured positive feelings about them and the statement about Jews being more materialistic measured negative feelings, then those respondents who agreed with the latter statement should have failed to pass the former one. In fact, only five did this, compared to 69 who passed both or failed both, as they would be expected to do if both questions measured negative attitudes. Similarly, if the statement about Jewish business success is assumed to be positive and the one concerning Jewish financial control negative, then those who agreed with the latter should have failed the former. Only one respondent did this, compared to 63 who passed both or failed both. This leaves a remaining group of 47 respondents who agreed that Jews are more successful in business, but failed both of the other questions. Some portion of these might have agreed due to admiration for Jewish business acumen. Although it seems doubtful if this portion is large, it seems prudent to be cautious about exaggerating the difference on the Jewish scale between 0 and 1 (all 47 of these respondents, of course, scored 1 on the scale).

If it is not feasible to interpret the scale of beliefs about Jews as measuring favorable attitudes, then why is the scale positively related to the statement about Jews having "a higher regard for learning and education"? Part of the explanation is because the lowest percentage of agreement with this question occurs among those who scored 0 on the scale (see Table A-9). Some of these respondents refused to agree with any generalization--negative or positive--about Jews, probably because they regarded such generalizations as stereotypes and disapproved of them. After all, the concept of stereotype is most often used in education in a pejorative way to teach the value of tolerance.

It is also possible that for some in this sample the question about learning and education did not tap favorable attitudes toward Jews. Some groups in American society, perhaps especially conservative and fundamentalist Christians, have ambiguous feelings about education. Learning is good up to a point, but faith is more important. Education should not be allowed to undermine faith. For some respondents, it is possible that agreement with this statement indicates a belief that Jews tend to have too high a regard for learning, to be excessively intellectual, and because of this, to be more susceptible to atheism. There may not be many respondents who reacted to the statement in this way; however, since this is a single question and not part of a scale, there is no check on this ambiguity.

The most likely explanation for the high percentages of agreement with this statement among those who scored above 0 on the scale is that people can hold both positive and negative images of an ethnic group simultaneously. People are not necessarily logical about their attitudes, especially those they have not thought through carefully. In addition, having positive and negative beliefs is not, in fact, self-contradictory: an ethnic group may objectively possess both desirable and undesirable traits. The direct correlation between the scale and the education question seems to indicate

that many in the sample have ambiguous feelings about Jews--some admiration mixed with some suspicion.

Does this mean the Jewish scale is not a valid measure of negative attitudes toward this group? It seems wise to keep in mind when interpreting the data in this study that the respondents may be more ambivalent toward Jews than toward Blacks or Hispanics. It should also be remembered that the scale measures only the traditional image of the materialistic Jew, not other images which might also be present, some of which may be positive ones. But despite these qualifications, the scale still measures negative beliefs. Glock and Stark point to "the fact that Jews are frequently thought to be especially intelligent and talented by persons who nonetheless dislike them. Indeed, one theme in anti-Semitism is that the Jew constitutes a grave threat because he is such a worthy opponent."[4] *The materialistic Jew is a negative image; admiration for Jewish educational values does not change that fact and probably does not even provide an important source of resistance to anti-Semitic appeals, since it can be transformed too easily into fear of smart, shrewd, aggressive Jews.*

The final check on the validity of this scale is the way it reacts with the other data in this study. If it is not a good enough measure of negative beliefs about Jews, then this should show up in the study of its relations with other variables. If the questions in the scale are too ambiguous, measuring different attitudes for different respondents, then it should correlate with other measures in a haphazard way. It does not. If the scale measures something quite different than implied by negative beliefs about materialistic Jews, then the relations examined should be very difficult to interpret. Generally, they are not. The Jewish scale is not perfect. It would be desirable to have a more strongly negative question to substitute for one of those included. However, it is a good enough measure for the purposes of this study.

The three scales seem quite valid ways of measuring mildly negative beliefs about the ethnic groups.

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4 Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism, p. 120.

APPENDIX B: TYPOLOGIES OF DENOMINATIONS

The denominational affiliations of ministers in the Relic survey were grouped into three different typologies. The first, "Denominational Families," used in Tables V-1 through V-4, is:

1. Mainline Protestant Denominations	Percentages in Sample
United Methodist	*14.8%*
United Church of Christ	*10.7*
Lutheran Church in America	*6.7*
Episcopal	*4.0*
United Presbyterian	*2.0*
American Baptist	*2.0*
African Methodist Episcopal	*1.3*
Unitarian-Universalist	*.7*
Subtotal	*42.2%*
2. Conservative Protestant Denominations	
Evangelical Congregational	*3.4%*
Southern Baptist	*3.4*
Reformed Presbyterian	*.7*
Moravian	*.7*
Calvinistic Baptist	*.7*
Subtotal	*8.9%*
3. Plain and Non-Resisting Churches	
Mennonite (except Bible Fellowship)	*11.4%*
Church of the Brethren	*6.0*
Brethren in Christ	*3.4*
Grace Brethren	*1.3*
Society of Friends (Quaker)	*.7*
Subtotal	*22.8%*
4. Fundamentalist, Holiness, and Pentacostal Churches	
Independent Fundamentalist	*5.4%*
Church of the Nazarene	*2.7*
Church of God	*2.7*
Bible Fellowship	*2.0*
Independent Baptist	*2.0*
Assemblies of God	*.7*
Full Gospel	*.7*
Apostolic	*.7*
Salvation Army	*.7*
Subtotal	*17.6%*

5. Other Protestant Churches

Seventh-Day Adventists	*1.3%*
Jehovah's Witnesses	*1.3*
Latter Day Saints (Mormon)	*.7*
Christadelphians	*.7*
Subtotal	*4.0%*

6. Catholic Church *4.7%*

The last two categories were not used in the analysis.
The second typology,

"Denominational Conservatism," was formed simply by adding together categories 2, 3, and 4 above. The third grouping by "Theological Families" is: [1]

1. Liturgical Churches
   Catholic
   Episcopal
2. Lutheran
   Lutheran Church in America
3. Reformed-Presbyterian
   United Church of Christ
   United Presbyterian
   Reformed Presbyterian
4. Pietist-Methodist
   United Methodist
   Evangelical Congregational
   African Methodist Espiscopal
   Moravian
5. European Free Churches
   Mennonite
   Church of the Brethren
   Brethren in Christ
   Grace Brethren
   Society of Friends (Quaker)

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1 Based on the classification of theological traditions used in J. Gordon Melton, The Encyclopedia of American Religions (Wilmington, N.C.: McGrath, 1978).

6. Baptist

Southern Baptist
American Baptist
Independent Baptist
Calvinistic Baptist
Christadelphians

7. Fundamentalist, Holiness, Pentacostal, and Adventist Churches

Independent Fundamentalist
Church of the Nazerene
Church of God
Bible Fellowship
Jehovah's Witnesses
Seventh-Day Adventists
Assemblies of God
Full Gospel
Apostolic
Salvation Army

It is very easy to debate where many of the smaller denominations can best be placed in these typologies. However, for those which are represented by only one or two ministers in the sample, it makes no real difference to the results of this study. Certainly, it would have been useful if finer distinctions among theological families could be made than was possible in this analysis, but this would have required a considerable increase in the sample size.

APPENDIX C: SCALES OF RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES

The following religious attitudes scales were used to analyze the Relic data. They are in alphabetical order.

1. *Biblical Prophecy*

This scale measures a minister's belief in the Bible as a source of prophecy, foretelling events not just in the past, but also in the future.

The questions scaled, in order of intensity, were:

1. *Do you believe that the Bible contains certain passages which have foretold important events that have already occurred? (Yes, No, Don't Know.)*
2. *Do you believe that the Bible contains certain passages which foretell important events that will occur? (Yes, No, Don't Know.)*
3. *Was the creation of the state of Israel and its resettlement by Jews foretold by the Bible? (Yes, No, Don't Know.)*

For each question, those answering yes passed--92% for question 1, 87% for question 2, and 61% for question 3. This skewed the distribution toward the high end of the scale (see Table C-1).

TABLE C-1: BIBLICAL PROPHECY

SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	7	4.7%	4.8%
1	13	8.7	8.8
2	39	26.2	26.5
3	88	59.1	59.9
Missing Data	2	1.3	----
TOTAL	149	100.0%	100.0%

C_r=.97

C_s=.84

Although the questions were placed in different parts of the questionnaire, the formats were very similar. This may have contributed to the high scale coefficients--the coefficient of reproducibility was .97 and the coefficient of scalability was .84.

2. *Civil Liberties*

This scale measures the extent of a minister's commitment to civil liberties. The questions pit civil liberties against religion, so they require more than an easy agreement with abstract democratic principles. The scale is based principally on responses to an 8-part question:[1]

Suppose an individual openly stated in public that he did not believe in God. Would you agree or disagree that the following actions should be taken concerning him?

a) He should not be permitted to organize a public debate in which he advocates the non-existence of God.

b) A book he wrote on religion should be removed from the public library.

c) He should not be allowed to teach in a private college or university.

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1 This question is similar to one used by Glock and Stark in their study on Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (see pp. 86-94).

d) He should be fired from a job at the supermarket.

e) He should not be allowed to teach in a public high school.

f) He should be fired from a job in a defense plant.

g) He should not be consulted for advice by the President of the United States.

h) He should not be allowed to make a speech in a public place against religion.

(Yes, No, Don't Know.)

The number of no responses by each minister was counted. The first three steps of this scale were formed from those who gave 0 to 6 no's, 7 no's, and 8 no's. The final step in the scale was formed by those who disagreed with the following question:

Christians should publicly support the banning of films and other entertainment that portray Jesus in a manner contrary to Christian teachings.

This question was added because the distribution on the first set of questions was quite high--63% of the sample answered all no's.(See the final distribution in Table C-2.)

TABLE C-2: CIVIL LIBERTIES

SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	26	17.4%	17.6%
1	24	16.1	16.2
2	67	45.0	45.3
3	31	20.8	20.9
Missing Data	1	0.7	----
TOTAL	149	100.0%	100.0%

C_r=.96

C_s=.87

The scale coefficients are high, but misleading since a single variable was coded from the 8-part question. The coefficients simply indicate that adding the question on banning films does not undermine the scale.

3. *Evangelism*

This 4-point scale measures beliefs in evangelism, in the importance of witnessing and converting others. Conservative Christians have often accused liberals of deemphasizing this. The questions used in the scale were:

1. *Christians should try to bring the message of Jesus as Savior to those who have not accepted him. (Strongly agree, somewhat agree, don't know, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.)*
2. *Does your church give particular attention to witnessing to and converting non-Christians? (Yes, no particular attention to non-Christians, do not actively seek converts.)*
3. *How much emphasis does your church give to witnessing to and converting others? (Heavy emphasis, some, not much, no emphasis.)*

Those scored for each question were those who selected the strongest possible category--strongly agree on 1, yes on 2, heavy emphasis on 3. The distributions and scale coefficients are given in Table C-3.

TABLE C-3: EVANGELISM

SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	17	11.4%	12.2%
1	37	24.8	26.6
2	31	20.8	22.3
3	54	36.2	38.8
Missing Data	10	6.7	----
TOTAL	149	99.9%	99.9%

C_r=.95

C_s=.86

4. *Orthodoxy*

This measures the extent of a minister's agreement with three traditional Christian doctrines. The three questions are:

1. *Do you believe Jesus was the son of God? (Yes, No, Don't Know.)*
2. *Do you believe in the devil? (Yes, No, Don't Know.)*
3. *Selecting the following as describing his views of what will happen after death: "My mind and spirit will be united with a body and in that form I will be in the presence of God."*

The first two questions are similar to ones used by Glock and Stark to measure orthodoxy.[2] *Since 99% agreed with the first question and 86% with the second, it was necessary to find another question that would divide the sample more evely. Bodily resurrection does that, but it is not as clearly a part of essential traditional doctrine as the first question. It does scale well with the other questions as shown by C_r=.99 and C_s=.93. The scale distribution in Table C-4 does indicate that the sample is generally quite orthodox by this measure.*

TABLE C-4: ORTHODOXY

SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	1	0.7%	0.7%
1	16	10.7	10.8
2	52	34.9	35.1
3	79	53.0	53.4
Missing Data	1	0.7	----
TOTAL	149	100.0%	100.0%

C_r=.99

C_s=.93

5. *Particularism*

The particularism scale is intended to measure the extent to which a minister feels Christianity is the only source of salvation.[3] *Some feel that a person who is good or who is deeply religious is*

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2 Ibid., p. 11.

3 See Ibid., Ch. 2.

likely to be saved; a particularist feels that salvation is possible only through Christ. The three questions used were:

1. *Only those who believe in Jesus can gain salvation. (Strongly agree, somewhat agree, don't know, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.)*
2. *Which if any of the following statements describes your own views in regard to gaining salvation?*
   a. *The only people able to gain salvation are members of your faith (denomination).*
   b. *Some members of others faiths may gain salvation.*
   c. *In order to gain salvation, one must at least be a Christian (or salvation not gained, but given through Christ).*
   d. *The possibility of salvation has nothing to do with one's particular faith, so long as one has some faith.*
   e. *Salvation is available even to those who have no faith at all.*
3. *Which if any of the following do you believe might prevent salvation?*
   a. *Being completely unaware of Jesus, as might be the case among some Hindu or Moslem or tribal cultures. (Yes, No, Don't Know.)*

A minister was scored for question 1 if he agreed strongly or somewhat, question 2 if he answered a, b, or c, and question 3 if he said yes. Most found it easy to agree with the first statement, but not with the last (see Table C-5).

TABLE C-5: PARTICULARISM

SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	15	10.1%	10.2%
1	25	16.8	17.0
2	55	36.9	37.4
3	52	34.9	35.4
Missing Data	2	1.3	---
TOTAL	149	100.0%	100.0%

C_r=.96

C_s=.83

6. *Religious Distrust*

This scale is intended to measure a minister's distrust of non-religious people.

The questions used were:

1. *Do you think people who do not believe in God pose a problem in this country? (Yes, No Don't Know.)*
2. *Would you think that a person who says there is no God is likely to hold dangerous political ideas? (Yes, No, Don't Know.)*
3. *Would you think that a person who is a homosexual is likely not to believe in God? (Yes, No, Don't Know.)*

A follow-up question was asked on how serious a problem are those who do not believe in God, but

in scaling all those who answered very, moderately, and somewhat serious passed this question. Those who responded either yes or don't know passed question 2 and those who said yes passed the last question. The coefficients and distribution of the scale are reasonable (see Table C-6).

TABLE C-6: RELIGIOUS DISTRUST

SCALE	NUMBER	PERCENT	ADJUSTED PERCENT
0	48	32.2%	33.1%
1	32	21.5	22.1
2	45	30.2	31.0
3	20	13.4	13.8
Missing Data	4	2.7	-----
TOTAL	149	100.0%	100.0%

C_r=.91

C_s=.76

APPENDIX D: THE STATISTICS USED

The statistic used to measure the degree of association in the tables in this report is Somer's d.[1] *This assumes an ordinal level of measurement, that is, for the B-scale, those respondents ranked at 2 have more negative beliefs about Blacks than those ranked at 1 or at 0. Since the various scales are d rived using Guttman technique, this assumption is clearly met.*

Somer's d is conservative compared to the more commonly used gamma, which for most of the tables in this report is about .10 to .20 higher. Somer's measure is closer in size to Kendall's tau. The significance tests for tau and d are identical.

There are symmetric and asymmetric versions of d. The asymmetric version is used when one variable is independent and the other dependent, so that one is predicting the effect of the first on the second. This version is used in most tables in this report. The exceptions are those where the scales are being interrelated.

Measures of association reflect the strength of the statistical relation between two variables. For instance, in the first 2 by 2 table below, the association between X and Y is perfect: if you know what X is, you can perfectly predict Y. Somer's d (which is the same as %d in this case) would be 1.0. In the second table, the two variables are independent:

	X	
Y	4	0
	0	4

	X	
Y	2	2
	2	2

	X	
Y	3	1
	1	3

knowing X is no help in guessing what Y is. Here d=0. In the third case, knowing X helps predict Y, but not perfectly. The measure of association tells how close you are to a perfect association. In the third table, d=.50. A minus sign indicates an association is inverse: as X gets larger, Y gets smaller.

Pearson's r, which is also used in this report, is the best known correlation coefficient. It also varies from -1.0 (perfect inversed association) to 0 (no asscoiation) to 1.0 (perfect association). Since r assumes interval level data, it is not used to test the basic relations in the tables. Interval level data measures the extent or amount of a property, not just the ranking. When r is used with the expanded negative ethnic beliefs measure, this is assumed to measure how negative a respondent's beliefs are, not just the fact that he has beliefs more negative than those below him on the scale. In the Relic data, age, when measured in years, is clearly interval level, but the other measures are technically not. However, in order to properly control for the effects of other variables on a relation, it was necessary to assume they were. Because most measures were scaled and because d and r generally behaved in similar ways in the data, I believe this does not misrepresent the basic relations. The assumption is still controversial, but is also very common.[2]

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1 See G.D. Garson, Political Science Methods, pp. 294-295, 307.

2 See Herbert R. Asher, Causal Modeling (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 64-67.

Finally, a "significant" relation in this report means p is less than .05, that is, the probability that the relation is due simply to the chance variations expected in a random sample are less than 1 in 20. Any statistic reported here that is not significant has been noted.

APPENDIX E: MODELING AND PATH ANALYSIS

Hierarchical models and path analysis are perhaps the simplest ways of dealing with the problem of properly controlling for variables when some of these are both cause and effect.[1] *A hierarchical model requires that a weak causal order be assumed. This means the variables can be ranked so that those higher in the order may cause lower ones, but those lower cannot cause higher ones (see Chapter V). In a diagram of the model, an arrow points from the higher order variable to the lower order one. If this arrow can be more plausibly reversed, then it may change the effects attributed to each variable, although how important this is varies depending on the data.*

A second important assumption of models is that they are reasonably isolated from other causes. It is recognized that each variable is not caused just by others in the model. Outside causes exist, but it is assumed that none of these has a significant effect on two or more variables in the model.

The path coefficients used in the analysis are standardized regression coefficients. They are standardized to remove the impact of differences in scales and distributions among the variables. This facilitates comparing the effects of the different variables on what is being explained (in the case of this report, on ethnic attitudes). Standardized regression coefficients are also easier to judge, since they are like correlation coefficients (Pearson's r's).

The path coefficients measure the strength of the relation between two variables with the other variables properly controlled, that is, properly if the causal ordering is correct. Which variables are controlled for a given path can be determined by examining the table of path coefficients. Since each column represents an equation in the model, those variables appearing in the same column with a given path coefficient are those whose effects are controlled. The reason this is important is because it is not proper to control for variables lower in the hierarchy. In Figure VI-1, the path from Biblical prophecy to religious distrust is not controlled for civil liberties, because civil liberties is assumed not to cause prophecy or distrust, as the arrows show.

Path analysis is a means of decomposing or separating the effects of a set of interrrelated variables on the dependent variable, on what is being explained. By determining the total effects of each variable, the importance of each can be better judged and compared. It is necessary to calculate total effects because this is made up of both the direct path and any indirect paths. If X has a direct effect on Y, but also an indirect one through Z, then the paths from X to Z and from Z to Y must be multiplied and this indirect effect added to the path from X to Y. This means part of the effect of Z is also being attributed to X. A diagram indicates the proper indirect paths. For instance, in Figure VI-1, the path from religious distrust through civil liberties to negative ethnic beliefs is proper, but going from religious distrust to Biblical prophecy is not--the arrow points in the wrong direction.

In the models used in this study, all proper paths were included in the calculations, whether they were statisticlly significant or not. This was done partly because the models did not predict

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1 See Norman H. Nie, et al., SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), pp. 383-397, 337-340 and Herbert Asher, Causal Modeling, pp. 29-61.

for theoretical reasons that any path that fit the hierarchy would be approximately zero. Of course. small paths have little impact on the total effects.

The models used in this report should probably be regarded as describing the Relic data. The scales and measures were originally created to test hypothesized relations, including those drawn from Glock and Stark, but the models were assembled after examining these relations, so it may not be prudent to claim they have been tested with this data. The models do summarize quite a bit of information: Table V-13 includes 10 questions and 3 coded items and Table VI-28 includes the responses to 30 different questions.

The measure used to estimate the models were the expanded ethnic scales, the religious scales from Appendix C, the second typology from Appendix B, the coding of education reported in Table VI-1, the coding of rural location reported in Table IV-14, and age in years.

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